Phenomenology 2010

Selected Essays from Asia and Pacific
Phenomenology in Dialogue with East Asian Tradition
2010, ISBN 978-973-1997-64-3
Editors: Lester Embree, Ion Copoeru, Yu Chung-Chi

Table of Contents

Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-10 of 24 documents


1. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Yu Chung-Chi Introduction to Volume 1
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
2. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Fang Xianghong Europäische Philosophie im zeitgenössischen Festland China
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In contemporary Chinese Mainland emerge a great number of scholars, which specialize in European philosophy, so that nearly all of the European philosophers and philosophical schools are researched. They have translated philosophical works, publicized investigational papers and books and corrected the misunderstandings between these two heterogeneous cultures. The Impact from philosophical ideas goes even beyond the academic circle and extends to the social fields, forming various “fevers”. This article will not only introduce the concerning important figures and events, but also attempt to shed light on a tendency, that is, on an ever deepening dialog between Chinese and western thoughts.
3. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Kanda Daisuke Language and Inducement
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Our present day experience is becoming increasingly intercultural. In encountering different cultures, we notice mostly the differences in language. The question here comes into focus: How we can give an account of the intercultural experience of language? This paper will inquire as to where we must pay attention in order to deal properly with language in the intercultural experience on the basis of Husserl’s texts. For that purpose, it is necessary to focus on the concept of motivation. Husserl considers motivation as the demand to complement our experiences at each moment. I will call this demand “inducement” and try to make clear the relationship between language and inducement.
4. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Kamei Daisuke The Possibility of a “Linguistic Community”
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Is a “linguistic community” among different languages possible? This question is important when it comes to the linguistic aspect of intercultural phenomenological problems. Hence, we consider the problem of translation by referring to the works of Husserl, Benjamin, and Derrida. We first examine Husserl’s use of the term “linguistic community” and then criticize it on the basis of Derrida’s interpretation. Following this, we seek the possibility of the “linguistic community” in translation through the theories of translation of Benjamin and Derrida, particularly by referring to Benjamin’s “pure language” and Derrida’s concepts of “sur-vival” and “promise.”
5. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Ni Liangkang, Chen Zhiyuan The Ultimate Consciousness and Alaya-vijnana: A Comparative Study on Deep-Structure of Consciousness between Yogacara Buddhism and Phenomenology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Both Yogacara Buddhism and Husserl’s phenomenology discuss deep-structure in a certain sense. The opposite superficial-structure, in Yogacara Buddhism, unifies the upper seven consciousnesses, and in Husserl’s phenomenology, embraces all kinds of objective consciousnesses. The relationship between those two structures, whether in Yogacara Buddhism or in Husserl’s phenomenology, is regarded as a sort of founding-founded relationship. According to the things themselves, in consciousness, deep-structure takes priority over superficialstructure. But to dwell on them asks for a reversing routine taken by Husserl: he begins with the analysis of superficial consciousness before descending into the deeper parts. But it is in Yogacara that we see more loyalty to the genetic order of the things.
6. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Abe Jun To the Field of Life: A Comparison of Husserlian Phenomenology and the Yogācāra Buddhism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The main aim of this paper is to compare Husserlian phenomenology and Yogācāra Buddhism in the discussion of living matter, particularly hylē in the former and ādāna consciousness in the latter. While they not only share the same interest which is the constitution of phenomena, i.e., for consciousness itself, but also the enigma of such living matter, they approach these subjects using a different methodology. This comparative study might open the field of life which Husserlian phenomenology failed to describe, and might unite, just like yogā means “union” in English, Western and Eastern philosophy which have been strictly separated.
7. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Murata Junichi The Phenomenology of Illumination: The Ontology of Vision in Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
According to Aristotle, there are two models of vision. The one is a contact model, according to which the realization of vision is explained by the process of the contact between light and eye, and the other is a medium model, according to which the realization of vision is made possible only through some medium that constitutes a distance between a seer and something seen. Aristotle defends the latter model, criticizing the former one. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of vision and painting, which he explicated in his last work Eye and Mind, can be interpreted as a development of the medium model of vision. He especially focuses on the role of illumination, which plays a role of the medium and constitutes the distance and makes a vision possible. All painters are trying to paint this role of illumination, which constitutes “depth, space, and color,” that means, the “flesh” of the world. In this sense, Mereau-Ponty’s ontology of vision and his ontology of “flesh” in his later works can be interpreted as a development of his and David Katz’s phenomenology of illumination.
8. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Lee Nam-in Husserl’s Phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper aims to show that there is a fundamental similarity between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology developed in his Phenomenology of Perception and some types of Husserl’s phenomenology. I will do this by defining the basic character of the phenomenology of perception and comparing it with Husserl’s phenomenology. I will try to define the basic character of the phenomenology of perception by taking into account the chapter 4 of the Introduction of Phenomenology of Perception that has the title: “the phenomenal field”. In section 1-2, I will show that the phenomenology of perception could be defined as a phenomenological psychology that aims to clarify the structure of the phenomenal field and, at the same time, as a transcendental phenomenology that aims to clarify the structure of the transcendental field. Thereafter, in section 3, I will draw the conclusion that the phenomenology of perception is a phenomenology that has two pillars of a phenomenological psychology and a transcendental phenomenology. In section 4, comparing the phenomenology of perception with some types of Husserl’s phenomenology developed in Crisis3, I will show that there is a fundamental similarity between them. In section 5, I will show that there are also differences between the phenomenology of perception and Husserl’s phenomenology as a whole and that there remains a necessity to promote a phenomenological dialogue between them.
9. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Lau Kwok-ying Four Forms of Primordial Spatiality Essential to the Understanding of Architecture: A Phenomenological Sketch
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper contains some preliminary reflections of a phenomenological philosopher on spatiality. They draw our attention to four basic forms of primordial spatiality essential to the understanding of the phenomenological and ontological conditions of activities pertaining to architecture as a discipline serving for the construction of the human habitat, namely: 1) the space of signification inaugurated by writing; 2) cartographic space constitutive of the representation of the world and locality; 3) oriented space and existential spatiality opened up by the living-body; and 4) the Earth as Ground-Ark which is the ultimate space of the human habitat. Drawing textual and theoretical resources from the works of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Derrida and especially of Husserl, these reflections conclude that there exists only one Earth as Ground-Ark on which is built the common human habitat. This is a “primitive truth”—”primitive” in the sense of primordial—a truth understood by the most primitive human civilizations. This is also a truth forgotten by the brilliant successors of Copernicus who, while dreaming of a technologically advanced humanity, contribute in spite of their success to the irrecoverable devastation of the Earth as the only space of our common habitat.
10. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Zheng Yujian Re-enchantment of Nature: McDowell and Merleau-Ponty on Perception
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
McDowell’s Mind and World bears unique importance in terms of re-focusing the contemporary empiricist problematics on a Kantian style inquiry: how can unconceptualized sense data, thus inhabiting the space of causes, become a resident of the space of reasons? By abandoning a common presupposition underlying the two dichotomous yet oscillating positions (the Myth of Given vs. a Davidsonian coherentism), the conceptual content becomes boundless. This “boundless” implies that nature is not beyond or alien to human conceptuality or rationality, or that our experiential engagement with natural objects is permeated with normative spontaneity, the same faculty for our presumed freedom. That is a main aspect of re-enchanting nature in McDowell.Merleau-Ponty opposes the disenchanting, reductive empiricism in his well-known Phenomenology of Perception. Perception never occurs in the vacuum of pre-existing meanings. Human beings are “condemned to meaning”: we have no choice but to acknowledge the genetic dependency of our full-fledged rational accomplishments on a pre-rational or pre-objective realm. This realm is not content-bleak or rationally empty but rather has its own lived-through “logic,” which is displayable to the appropriate perceptual stance.In this paper I’ll try to put McDowell and Merleau-Ponty in comparative focus so that weakness or limitation in each, while attempting to re-enchant nature from the vantage point of perception, can be seen in a more illuminative way. An evolutionary dimension, as well as a retrospective perspective, of the implicit meaning in human/animal perception will be revealed in my critical comparison. One upshot of my critique is the following positive thesis: the intentionality of man is the epistemologically legislative condition for nature to be possessed of rational relations (Darwinian reasons), while Mother Nature is the ontologically enabling condition for man to become intentional interpreter (meaning-endower). This deep-seated interdependence between man and nature with regard to reason relations, when well cashed out, will be the ultimate ground for justifying what I call the retrospective enchantment of nature.