Phenomenology 2005

Selected Essays from Northern Europe Part 1
2007, ISBN 978-973-88633-6-1
Editors: Ion Copoeru, Hans Rainer Sepp

Table of Contents

Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-18 of 18 documents


1. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Hans Rainer Sepp, Ion Copoeru Preface for All Volumes + Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
2. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Beate Beckmann-Zöller Adolf und Anne Reinach: Edith Steins Mentoren im Studium und auf dem Glaubensweg
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Adolf and Anne Reinach influenced Edith Stein (1891-1942) as mentors in her studies in Gottingen and in her religious experience. From 1909-1917 Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) held an important position as assistant professor to Edmund Husserl. After his early death in the First World War, his magnificent way of passing on the phenomenological method of Husserl’s Logical Investigations was confirmed by Roman Ingarden, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and other scholars. In this essay the biographies and works of the couple Adolf and Anne will be described in the perspective of Edith Stein, who helped to edit Reinach’s works (Gesammelte Schriften, Halle 1921).
3. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Agata Bielik-Robson Promises and Excuses: Derrida and the Aporia of Narcissism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The aim of this essay is mainly critical: it intends to demonstrate that despite all the promises to give account of a “deconstructive subjectivity,” Derrida failed to do so. This charge relies on the thesis that Derrida proved unable to rethink critically the concept of narcissism which he himself saw as crucial for the future philosophical understanding of subjectivity. Yet, what Derrida calls the aporia of narcissism is, in fact, not so much the Freudian version of this concept but a deconstructive version of the old Hegelian dilemma of the beautiful soul—and, theoretically speaking, a rather “defunct” one, for it explicitly prohibits any dialectical procedure that could lead us out of this aporetic predicament.
4. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Anselm Böhmer Querungen der Welt: Eugen Finks untergründige Themenfelder
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The focal aspects of Eugen Fink’s philosophy are the world and the question of human life’s place within it. In the interplay of different topics such as basic phenomena of human being, the cosmic game and phenomenological problems of education, there is a development of various traits of dialectical thought hidden in his philosophy. This article tries to follow and to describe these crossing lines (e.g. meontic aspects, asubjectivity or the crossroads of the Greek hen kai pan within philosophy) in order to explore some guidelines for further research in philosophical anthropology.
5. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Jonna Bornemark Alterity in the Philosophy of Edith Stein: Empathy and God
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article I will examine Stein’s discussions on alterity. In her early writings Stein develops the theme of alterity mainly in relation to the concept of empathy (Einfuhlung) and thus in relation to the other person. In her later writings the theme of alterity mainly relates to God. I will discuss the continuity and discontinuity between these two areas. I will claim that alterity in her early writings can be understood as invisibility within visibility whereas alterity in her later writings can be understood as visibility within invisibility.
6. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Martin Cajthaml The Care of the Soul in Gorgias
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
7. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Alexei Chernyakov Heidegger and “Russian Questions”
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper I attempt to connect Heidegger’s analysis of human existence in Sein und Zeit with important themes of Russian concerning the concept of personality and inherited from Byzantium Theology and Greek Patristic
8. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Ivan Chavatík Jan Patočka and his Concept of an “A-Subjective” Phenomenology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Th e paper gives a short biography of Jan Patočka, remembers his personal contacts with Husserl and reviews his position within the phenomenological movement by explaining what sort of criticism on Husserl he develops in his concept of an “a-subjective” phenomenology. It also gives a list of his papers concerning this topic.
9. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Mădălina Diaconu Der Konsumtempel als postmoderner Mythos und als verwirklichte Utopie der Posthistoire
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
“The temple of consumption as a postmodern myth and the materialized utopia of post-history” deals with imaginary motifs connected with the shopping mall, which is currently called in German “temple of consumption.” A mall makes real somewhat the mythical Schlaraffenland (pays de Caucagne) of the late Middle Age. The architecture of the mall is postmodern, while that of the classical department store, is modern. Time manifests itself fourfold: as the subjective duration of shopping, the qualitative calendar of celebrations, the prohibition of history and the folding up of the past, present and future into the present. Finally, the customers’ behaviour expresses an escapist desire to desire and a perverted katharsis.
10. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Thomas Franz Die Pluralität des Menschen: Die Anthropologien Eugen Finks und Heinrich Rombachs im Vergleich
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Martin Heidegger was the famous reviver of philosophical anthropology based on the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. In his critique of the European anthropological tradition he conceptualizes human being as “Existenz” and “Dasein.” Following Heidegger, Eugen Fink (1905-1975) and Heinrich Rombach (1923-2004) developped a pluralistic anthropology within the concept of basic phenomena. For Eugen Fink there are five existential and co-existential phenomena: death, love, work, power and play, which are dialectically connected. These five phenomena are the transhistorical and transcultural constant factors of human persons as individual and social beings. Despite Fink’s criticism of Heidegger’s anthropological formalism, his anthropological conception can be defined as existential-ontological anthropology. Heinrich Rombach deepens this conception. There is no fixed existence of the basic phenomena for each person. Rombach argues, that each person has to find his own basic phenomenon. These phenomena are different in each historical epoch and culture. For example, love in the Roman Empire is totally distinct from love in postmodernism. There is no fixation on five basic phenomena, though each phenomenon can have the function of a basic phenomenon for a human being. Finally, Rombach makes the distinction between basic individual and social phenomena. While Rombach’s philosophy is focussed on a functional and processual ontology, which he himself calls structure ontology, his anthropological conception can be characterised as a structure anthropology at all.
11. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Wolfhart Henckmann Uber die Ündefinierbarkeit des Menschen und die Grenzen der Weltanschauungen
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The article deals with three questions: What is to be understood by the undefinability of man? In which sense do worldviews have limits? What is meant by the “and” between undefinability and the limits of worldviews? A distinction is to be drawn between comparative and absolute undefinability. The former means that sciences have not yet come to an acceptable definition of man, the latter means that undefinability is the ground of existence of man, as it is experienced in border experiences (“Grenzerfahrungen”). A worldview can be understood as the apprehension of a meaningful coherence of man and world. A worldview is anthropocentric and is distinct from others in respect to the existential standpoint from where the connection of world and man is apprehended. From an unreflected lived worldview can be distinguished a reflected worldview. It is possible that it discovers a radical break between man and world. In quite different ways this is done by Dilthey’s interpretation of the border experiences of birth and death, by Nietzsche’s concept of the soul of nations (“Volksseelen”), and by Kant’s concept of “unsociable sociability.” The assumption of an absolute undefinability of man can be understood as the ground of a universal solidarity by which the antagonistic contradictions of different worldviews seem to be reconcilable, because it limits the claim on absoluteness of worldviews.
12. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Terri J. Hennings Heidegger and Kafka Before The Law
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Th is paper examines Franz Kafka’s perception of Being as it is portrayed in his novel Der Prozess against the background of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, particularly as outlined in Sein und Zeit. More specifically, it examines the notion of guilt as it focuses on the similarities and differences between Heidegger and Kafka’s project. Whereas Heidegger holds out the possibility of a non-alienated being-in-the-world, Kafka seems to suggest that this is not obtainable; that the ontological difference between beings and Being, the gap that exits between our everyday empirical knowledge of the world and a primordial truth, is beyond our reach.
13. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Annette Hilt A Shared Carnal Humanity: The Language of Proximity in Body, World and Alterity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Human being considered as enigmatic relation to itself and the world centers in carnality. The carnal body as constituent of life is a challenge for our categories of human life, since its own self-awareness backs away from conceptualization. Along with carnality as a theme speaking in Merleau-Ponty’s and Levinas’ implicit dialogue, this article considers a “shared” carnal humanity given in sensual proximity, language and the diachronic style of alterity. Thus, carnality might be a threshold between ontology and ethics, where traces of Levinas’ and Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts might intertwine in structures of being together in a world.
14. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Tomas Kačerauskas The Question of Truth in Existential Phenomenology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The problem of truth in existential phenomenology is analyzed. The author maintains that the concept of truth is inseparable from the concept of reality. In the phenomenology of Lebenswelt (Husserl) and Dasein (Heidegger) reality is the human whole, which changes while an existential project is created. The phenomena are real as much as they take part in our being towards death. The author calls this creation of the existential whole noesis, which embraces both the harmony of human view and disharmony in the light of new project.
15. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Gediminas Karoblis The Question Concerning Dance Technique
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The notion of “dance technique” is so widely used among dancers that it cannot be ignored. A few different meanings of technique are encountered in a dance practice: (1) techniques of the preparation for a dance, (2) dances might be considered as techniques for some other purposes, and, obviously, (3) the dance is distinguished from other dances by implementation of the particular technique. In this essay, the question concerning dance technique is raised following Heidegger’s reflections. Dance technique is the mode of revealing, and cannot be renounced in dance as the profanation of the sacred pureness of it. But the dance vanishes, when there is a non-conscious marionette left, instead of Consciousness of Dance as the Medium between the Music and the Body.
16. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Vakhtang Kebuladze Transformation des Intentionalitatsbegriffs in der Phanomenologie und ihre Relevanz fur die Sozialwissenschaft
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
At the very beginning of my article I explain the concept of intentionality in the realm of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In this explanation I analyse the phenomenological concepts of noesis, noema, sense, appresentation, object and try to show the relationship between intentionality, temporality, and intersubjectivity as transcendental structures of experience. Than I review a tendency in phenomenological literature (namely in the works of Heidegger, Sartre, Hildebrand, and Schmitz) which lead to a radical transformation of the concept of intentionality. In the last part I examine a possibility of usage of this transformed concept in the conception of Alfred Schutz’ finite areas of meaning.
17. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Jael Kraut Transcendental Subjectivity as Alternative to Adorno’s Objectivist Notion of Subjectivity in his Informal Music
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Th e eradication of the subject in serialism and aleatory composition leads to the elimination of music itself. Proposing a way out this “empty music”, Adorno pleads for a restoration of the subjective elements at work in composition. But since his notion of subjectivity is ambiguous (sometimes it is universal, sometimes he considers it from an objectivist standpoint, that is, as psychological, arbitrary and opposed to objects) his argument fails. Against his objectivist notion of subjectivity, this article proposes a phenomenological reading of the antinomies contemporary music is confronted with, by replacing Adorno’s arbitrary subject with the universal a priori of transcendental subjectivity.
18. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Andrei Laurukhin Husserl’s Practical Philosophy: The Project of a Scientific Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This research sets for itself to show up Husserl’s early theory of action in its two forms—as scientific ethics and theory of values and as phenomenology of will. The author focuses his attention on two points: a problem of parallelism between logic and ethic and the question of how independent from the conceptual and methodical presuppositions of transcendental phenomenology is Husserl in his comprehension of ethical problems and in the elaboration of the idea of practical reason—or, on the contrary, how dependent he is on these presuppositions.