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Philosophy in the Contemporary World

Volume 11
Feminist Apporoaches to the Body

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1. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Thorsten Botz-Borstein Virtual Reality and Dreams: Towards the Autistic Condition?
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The virtual annuls all suspension of time that could, through its tragic or stylistic character, confer to time an existential value. This condition is contrasted with time as it functions in dreams. On the grounds of these observations it is shown that there are resemblances between “autistic” symptoms and the virtual world.
2. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Chienchih Chi A Mistaken Sense in Consciousness
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There is a mistaken sense in consciousness or phenomenal property. I propose that as a general term phenomenal property has no ontological status. When we understand consciousness as phenomenal properties in general to claim the irreducibility of the mind, we simply fall into a trap constructed by a mistaken concept.
3. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Forrest Clingerman Beyond the Flowers and the Stones: “Emplacement” and the Modeling of Nature
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Using the example of a small oak savanna located in Iowa, I begin by presenting some of the problems that confront us in attempting to describe nature. Finding ourselves in a paradox in an attempt to model nature, I then suggest that modeling nature through the use of the concept of “emplacement” offers us the best way forward. To better define “emplacement,” the argument then turns to an exposition of Paul Ricoeur’s idea of “emplotment.” I conclude by detailing how one might use “emplacement” to construct a model of a specific place of nature.
4. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Kevin Dodson Omission, Commission, and Blowback: A Response to Honderich
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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have generated a number of responses by philosophers, perhaps the most controversial of which has been Ted Honderich’s book After the Terror. There Honderich inquires into the question of American responsibility for the events of September 11, 2001. Honderich argues that due to our acts of both commission and omission, we Americans bear partialresponsibility for the terrorist atrocities committed on that day. In this paper, I shall take issue with Honderich’s argument and propose an alternative to it based on the concept of blowback.
5. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Michael Forest Hierarchy and the Animals
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Thomism and hierarchical metaphysical systems generally have rejected the moral status of animals. This paper demonstrates that a commitment to a hierarchical system involves the twin claim of being and goodness. This implies that grades of goodness perfuse the created order and also implies the proportional goodness of animals and other living beings. These implications have been consistently overlooked in traditional treatments of our moral relations to animals, yet such hierarchical systems provide an optimal grounding for such evaluations. An application is made to the practice of killing animals for food and a prescription for vegetarianism is advocated.
6. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Rick Anthony Furtak Estrangement and Moral Agency
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By taking seriously the state of moral estrangement, we may learn something about the conditions of moral participation. Yet analytic discussions of this topic (for instance, by Hare and Nagel) have frequently been handicapped by an inadequate understanding of the intentionality of emotion. In the work of Albert Camus, we find a superior appreciation of the sense in which the individual’s revolt against prevailing values could be a justified response to objective conditions. Although a sense of the absurd is itself a hindrance to moral agency, it provides us with some insight into our subjective capacity for wholehearted involvement in the world.
7. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Soraj Hongladarom, Michael R. Kelly Time, Technology and Globalization
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8. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Sergio Koc-Menard Just War Tradition, Liberalism, and Civil War
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The just war tradition assumes that civil war is a possible site of justice. It has an uneasy relationship with liberalism, because the latter resists the idea that insurgency and counterinsurgency can be justified in moral terms. The paper suggests that, even if this is true, these two schools of thought are closer to each other than often appears to be the case. In particular, the paper argues that insurgency and counterinsurgency can be justified using the liberal assumptions that nonviolent opposition is the proper non-institutional technique to fight oppressive regimes, and that law enforcement is the appropriate response to unjustified rebellions. Given these assumptions, insurgent warfare is limited to circumstances in which, firstly, nonviolent resistance is no longer a reasonable course of action; and secondly, insurgents have the intention to create the political conditions that are needed to make it a coherent option again.Counter insurgent warfare, in turn, is restrained to those situations in which, first, there is a rebellion or revolution even though the use of nonviolent strategies for conflict and change remains a reasonable choice; and second, police agencies lack the resources that arerequired for managing and suppressing rebel activities. Of course, these requirements should be taken as presumptions, and there may be cases when they do not hold.
9. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
John-Michael Kuczynski Two Arguments Against the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions
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According to one point of view, emotions are recognitions of truths of a certain kind -- most probably valuative truths (truths to the effect that something is good or bad). After giving the standard arguments for this view, and also providing a new argument of my own for it, I set forth two arguments against it. First, this position makes all emotions be epistemically right or wrong. But this view is hard to sustain where certain emotions (especially desire) are concerned. Second, this position is guilty of presupposing what it is meant to explain; for it makes emotions be a pre-requisite for the very value judgments with which emotions are supposed, according to that theory, to be identical.
10. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Paul Newberry The Three Dimensions of Forgiveness
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Recent philosophical literature contains several definitions of ‘forgiveness.’ These fail because the meaning of one part of a complex notion is taken as the meaning of the whole. Ordinary language use indicates three kinds of sufficient conditions for forgiveness where by people canforgive by meeting any one of those conditions.