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1. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Robert Paul Churchill An Introduction to Honor Killing and Women in the Crossfire
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2. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Christian Matheis “Transformations of Shame and Honor: Ideology, Diagnostics, and Liberation from State Interests”: A response to Robert Paul Churchill’s Women in the Crossfire: Understanding and Ending Honor Killings
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3. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Candice L. Shelby A Complex Adaptive Systems Approach to Understanding the Honor Killer: Comments on Robert Paul Churchill’s Women in the Crossfire: Understanding and Ending Honor Killing
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4. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
James Snow Women in the Crossfire: A Reply to Robert Paul Churchill
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5. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Robert Paul Churchill Response to My Critics
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6. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Eddy Souffrant Some Approaches to an Ethics for Disaster
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We have witnessed, and in some instance from afar, disasters of all sorts that span the globe from the Caribbean, South and North America, Asia, to Australia and other affected regions of the world. Some of these destabilizing and at times fatal events have resulted in lives lost, forced migration, and a restructuring of the physical, social and economic architecture of the affected parts of the globe. Further, the disasters as massive restructuring of the physical and psychological status quo are at times human made and at others, natural.
7. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 25 > Issue: 2
Karen Lancaster The Robotic Touch: Why There is No Good Reason to Prefer Human Nurses to Carebots
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An elderly patient in a care home only wants human nurses to provide her care – not robots. If she selected her carers based on skin colour, it would be seen as racist and morally objectionable, but is choosing a human nurse instead of a robot also morally objectionable and speciesist? A plausible response is that it is not, because humans provide a better standard of care than robots do, making such a choice justifiable. In this paper, I show why this response is incorrect, because robots can theoretically care as well as human nurses can. I differentiate between practical caring and emotional caring, and I argue that robots can match the standard of practical care given by human nurses, and they can simulate emotional care. There is growing evidence that people respond positively to robotic creatures and carebots, and AI software is apt to emotionally support patients in spite of the machine’s own lack of emotions. I make the case that the appearance of emotional care is sufficient, and need not be linked to emotional states within the robot. After all, human nurses undoubtedly ‘fake’ emotional care and compassion sometimes, yet their patients still feel adequately cared for. I show that it is a mistake to claim that ‘the human touch’ is in itself a contributor to a higher standard of care; ‘the robotic touch’ will suffice. Nevertheless, it is not speciesist to favour human nurses over carebots, because carebots do not (currently) suffer as the result of such a choice.