Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-10 of 1002 documents


1. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Craig J. Hazen Editor’s Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
forum on erik j. wielenberg’s robust ethics
2. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Adam Lloyd Johnson Introduction to the American Academy of Religion Panel Forum on Erik Wielenberg’s Robust Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Erik Wielenberg is the most important contemporary critic of theistic metaethics. Wielenberg maintains that God is unnecessary for objective morality because moral truths exist as brute facts of the universe that have no, and need no, foundation. At times his description of these brute facts make them sound like abstract objects or Platonic forms. At the American Academy of Religion’s annual meeting in Boston in November of 2017, we organized an Evangelical Philosophical Society panel to discuss Erik Wielenberg’s book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. All five papers presented there are included in this journal.
3. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
William Lane Craig Erik Wielenberg’s Metaphysics of Morals
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Focusing on Erik Wielenberg’s metaphysic of morals, I argue that his moral Platonism is, given the presumption against the existence of abstract objects, unmotivated. Moreover, Godless Normative Realism is implausible in light of the mysterious causal relations said to obtain between concrete objects and moral abstracta. His appeals to theism in order to motivate such causal connections is nugatory. If Wielenberg walks back his moral Platonism, then his metaphysics of morals collapses and Godless Normative Realism becomes explanatorily vacuous.
4. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Tyler Dalton McNabb Wile E. Coyote and the Craggy Rocks Below: The Perils of Godless Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
William Lane Craig has defended the following two contentions: (1) If theism is true, we have a sound foundation for morality, and, (2) If theism is false, we do not have a sound foundation for morality. Erik Wielenberg rejects (2). Specifically, Wielenberg argues that naturalists have resources to make sense of objective moral values, moral duties, and moral knowledge. In response to Wielenberg, I defend Craig’s second contention by arguing that Wielenberg’s theory fails to robustly capture our moral phenomenology as well as make intelligible robust moral knowledge.
5. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Mark C. Murphy No Creaturely Intrinsic Value
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In Robust Ethics, Erik Wielenberg criticizes all theistic ethical theories that explain creaturely value in terms of God on the basis that all such formulations of theistic ethics are committed to the denial of the existence of creaturely intrinsic value. Granting Wielenberg’s claim that such theistic theories are committed to the denial of creaturely intrinsic value, this article considers whether theists should take such a denial to be an objectionable commitment of their views. I argue that theists should deny the existence of creaturely intrinsic value, and that such a denial is not an objectionable commitment of theism.
6. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Adam Lloyd Johnson Fortifying the Petard: A Response to One of Erik Wielenberg’s Criticisms of the Divine Command Theory
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Erik Wielenberg argued that William Lane Craig’s attack against nontheistic ethical models is detrimental to Craig’s Divine Command Theory (DCT) as follows: Craig claims it is unacceptable for ethical models to include logically necessary connections without providing an explanation of why such connections hold. Yet Craig posits certain logically necessary connections without providing an explanation of them. Wielenberg concluded that “Craig is hoisted by his own petard.” In this paper I respond to Wielenberg’s criticism by clarifying, and elaborating on, the DCT. I will attempt to provide a preliminary explanation for the logically necessary connections included in the DCT.
7. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Erik J. Wielenberg Reply to Craig, Murphy, McNabb, and Johnson
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In Robust Ethics, I defend a nontheistic version of moral realism according to which moral properties are sui generis, not reducible to other kinds of properties (e.g., natural properties or supernatural properties) and objective morality requires no foundation external to itself. I seek to provide a plausible account of the metaphysics and epistemology of the robust brand of moral realism I favor that draws on both analytic philosophy and contemporary empirical moral psychology. In this paper, I respond to some objections to my view advanced by William Craig, Mark Murphy, Tyler McNabb, and Adam Johnson.
articles
8. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Jonathan Mark Threlfall The Imago Dei and Blaise Pascal’s Abductive Anthropological Argument
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Blaise Pascal argued abductively for Christianity by presenting Christian anthropology as the best explanation for the existential paradoxes of human greatness and wretchedness. Surprisingly, however, the doctrine of the imago Dei never surfaces in his Pensées. I argue that considerations arising from the doctrine of the imago Dei strengthen Pascal’s abductive argument by providing more details for and encompassing more instances of humans’ paradoxical duality. Specifically, the imago Dei helps explain the existential paradoxes of happiness and misery, certainty and uncertainty, and human greatness and smallness within the cosmos. Further, its explanatory scope encompasses perplexing behavior and beliefs, including Freud’s Todestriebe, false altruism, conflicting beliefs about the divine, and our search for self-knowledge.
9. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Elliott R. Crozat Does the Purpose Theory of the Meaning of Life Entail an Irrational God?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this essay, I address an objection to purpose theory (PT). PT holds that fulfilling the purpose God has assigned for humans is a way for human life to be objectively meaningful. According to the objection, PT entails the absurdity that God is irrational. There are at least two versions. I refer to them as Irrationality Objection-1 (IO-1), raised elsewhere by Thaddeus Metz, and Irrationality Objection-2 (IO-2), which I raise in this essay. I summarize IO-1 and replies to it by Metz. I then articulate IO-2 and support the following thesis: if God has middle knowledge (MK), IO-2 fails.
10. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Robert Larmer Theistic Evolution, Intelligent Design, and the Charge of Deism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Christians who are theistic evolutionists and Christians who are proponents of intelligent design very frequently criticize one another on the basis that the other’s position is theologically suspect. Ironically, both camps have accused the other of being deistic and thus sub-Christian in their understanding of God’s relation to creation. In this paper, I consider the merit of these charges. I conclude that, although each position has both deistic and nondeistic forms, theistic evolution in its treatment of life’s history is typically deistic, whereas intelligent design typically is not.