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Displaying: 1-10 of 22 documents

1. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Craig J. Hazen Editor’s Introduction
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2. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
R. J. Snell Thomism and Noetic Sin, Transposed: A Response to Neo-Calvinist Objections
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In this essay I argue that Thomas Aquinas is not as naively optimistic about the noetic effects of sin as is often portrayed by standard neo-Calvinist objections. Still, his metaphysics of the human person requires some development to better explain the mind’s impairment by sin, a development made possible by the work of Bernard Lonergan and the resulting Lonergan/Aquinas (L/A) model of the noetic effects of sin.
3. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
John B. Howell III Forgiveness and Kierkegaard’s Agapeistic Ethic
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In this essay I examine the notion of forgiveness as found in Søren Kierkegaard’s Works of Love. After detailing the work of forgiveness in hiding the multitude of sins, I examine forgiveness as an example of Kierkegaard’s concept of redoubling. Then I relate Kierkegaard’s concept of forgiveness to his concept of hope. Throughout I emphasize the relation between forgiveness and neighbor love, which Kierkegaard views as an essential component of forgiveness. This emphasis counters the prevailing notion in the literature on forgiveness, which views forgiveness as solely concerned with the relinquishing of negative emotions. For Kierkegaard, while this relinquishing is no doubt part of forgiveness, true forgiveness must include love for one’s neighbor.
4. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Aaron Bunch The Resurrection of the Bodyas a “Practical Postulate”: Why Kant Is Committed toBelief in an Embodied Afterlife
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I argue that Kant’s own views—his commitment to happiness as part of a transcendent highest good, his view of the afterlife as a place of moral striving, and his conception of the “absolute unity” of rational and animal natures in a human person—commit him to belief in an embodied afterlife. This belief is just as necessary for conceiving the possibility of the highest good as the beliefs in personal immortality, freedom, and God’s existence, and thus it too is a “practical postulate” in Kant’s sense.
5. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Shawn Bawulski Annihilationism, Traditionalism,and the Problem of Hell
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Logically consistent responses to the problem of hell are readily available. The Christian theologian should seek to go beyond these minimal criteria, providing a response that is also plausible and is harmonious with both Scripture and the tradition. In this paper I will examine annihilationism and two forms of traditionalism, assessing each view’s success not only in defending against the logical problem of hell, but also success with these additional criteria. I will suggest that a refined version of the traditional view best succeeds.
6. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Stephen Kershnar Hell, Threshold Deontology, and Abortion
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In this paper, I argue that Threshold-Hell Christianity conflicts with the pro-life position on abortion. The specific type of Christianity is that which also accepts threshold deontology and the existence of hell. Threshold deontology is the view that ordinarily moral duties consist of nonconsequentialist side-constraints on the pursuit of the good but that in some cases these side-constraints are overridden. My strategy is to establish that a person who brings about an abortion guarantees that the aborted individual goes to heaven and that it is morally permissible to guarantee someone goes to heaven. It follows that if Threshold-Hell Christianity is true, then abortion is morally permissible.
7. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Walter Schultz Toward a Realist Modal Structuralism: A Christian Philosophy of Mathematics
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The aim of this paper is to propose a philosophy of mathematics that takes structures to be basic. It distinguishes between mathematical structures and real structures. Mathematical structures are the propositional content either of consistent axiom systems or (algebraic or differential) equations. Thus, mathematical structures are logically possible structures. Real structures—and the mathematical structures that represent them—are related essentially to God’s plan in Christ and ultimately grounded in God’s awareness of his ability. However, not every mathematical structure has a correlative real structure. Mathematical structures are either true or fictional, yet all are possible.
8. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Stephen C. Dilley Philosophical Naturalism and Methodological Naturalism: Strange Bedfellows?
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This essay argues that philosophical naturalists who draw epistemic support from science for their worldview ought to set aside methodological naturalism in certain historical sciences. When linked to methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism opens itself to several problems. Specifically, when joined with methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism can never be scientifically disconfirmed but will nearly always be confirmed, no matter what the empirical evidence. Theistic-friendly “God hypotheses,” on the other hand, can never be scientifically confirmed—again, no matter what the evidence—but are routinely said to be disconfirmed. Methodological naturalism not only leads to this self-serving dynamic, but does not appear to serve a meaningful epistemic purpose in the contest between philosophical naturalism and theism and so, for these reasons, ought to be set aside.
9. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Edward Feser Teleology: A Shopper’s Guide
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Teleology features prominently in recent discussions in the philosophy of mind, action theory, philosophy of biology, and in the dispute between Intelligent Design theorists and Darwinian naturalists. Unfortunately, discussants often talk past each other and oversimplify the issues, failing to recognize the differences between the several theories of teleology philosophers have historically put forward, and the different natural phenomena that might be claimed to be teleological. This paper identifies five possible theories of teleology, and five distinct levels of nature at which teleology might be said to exist. Special attention is paid to the differences between Aristotelian-Thomistic and ID theoretic approaches to teleology.
10. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Troy Nunley Fishnets, Firing Squads, and Fine-Tuning (Again): How Likelihood Arguments Undermine Elliot Sober’s Weak Anthropic Principles
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Elliot Sober has recently attempted to reformulate and defend a standard objection to fine-tuning arguments, the objection from the “weak anthropic principle.” The key to his reformulated defense is his likelihoodist epistemology conjoined to a well-known “fishnet analogy.” Although recent rebuttals from Weisberg and Monton fall short of exposing the flaws in Sober’s objection, I show that Sober’s likelihoodist epistemology and analogy serve instead to undermine weak anthropic principles and objections based upon them.