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1. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Ross D. Inman Editor’s Introduction
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2. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Gregory E. Trickett, David Williams, Bradley Palmer, John B. Howell III In Memoriam
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articles
3. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
R. T. Mullins The Divine Timemaker
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Christian theism claims that God is in some sense responsible for the existence and nature of time. There are at least two options for understanding this claim. First, the creationist option, which says that God creates time. Second, the identification view, which says that time is to be identified with God. Both options will answer the question, “what is time?” differently. I shall consider different versions of the creationist option, and offer several objections that the view faces. I will also consider different versions of the identification view, and argue that the objections it faces can be refuted.
4. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Rad Miksa Deny the Kalam’s Causal Principle, Embrace Absurdity
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One objection against the kalam is that while the standard arguments for its causal premise (everything that begins to exist has a cause) apply to things in the universe, they do not apply to the universe itself. Thus, universes could come into existence uncaused from nothing. This objection, however, creates a situation where an absurd universe is as likely to come into existence uncaused as a normal universe is. This then generates serious skepticism about the reliability of our cognitive faculties, the truth of our sensory inputs, and our past knowledge, thus creating a reductio ad absurdum against the objection.
5. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Zachary Breitenbach A Case for How Eschatological and Soteriological Considerations Strengthen the Plausibility of a Good God
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This article contends that considerations of continued human existence beyond this earthly life are advantageous both for defending against a key challenge to the existence of a good God (the evidential problem of evil) and for making a positive moral case for theism. On the defensive side, I address the charge that the amount and alleged gratuitousness of evil render God’s existence unlikely. On the offensive side, I leverage postmortem considerations to bolster a positive case for a good God by offering new arguments that God and an afterlife are key to making sense of moral rationality and morality’s overridingness.
6. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
John Jefferson Davis Chalcedon Contemporized: Jesus as Fully Person—without Nestorianism; the Hypostatic Union as Nested Relation
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This article argues that within the framework of historic Chalcedonian Christology, Jesus should be recognized not only as a fully divine Person, as the incarnation of the Logos, but also as a fully human person, and that this recognition of the full human personhood of Jesus does not constitute a new form of Nestorianism. It is further argued that the concept of the human hypostasis of Jesus nested within the divine hypostasis of the Logos provides a plausible explanation of how Jesus’s human lack of knowledge of the time of the second coming can be consistent with the omniscience of the divine Logos.
7. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Randall K. Johnson Molinism and the Person-Will Paradigm
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The traditional Molinist scheme implies that God is one center of consciousness, knowledge, and will. The person-will paradigm, however, claims there are three centers of consciousness, knowledge, and will in the Godhead. I argue that the Molinist ought to reject the person-will paradigm, and thus reject both monothelitism and social trinitarianism. I begin by presenting standard accounts of Molinism, monothelitism, and social trinitarianism. Then I consider three approaches to reconciling Molinism and the person-will paradigm. I show that each approach is fraught with difficulties.
8. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Spencer Case Small Evils and Live Options: A New Strategy against the Argument from Evil
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Many philosophers have thought that aggregates of small, broadly dispersed evils don’t pose the same sort of challenge to theism that horrendous evils like the Nazi Holocaust do. But there are interesting arguments that purport to show that large enough aggregates of small evils are morally and axiologically equivalent to horrendous evils. Herein lies an intriguing and overlooked strategy for defending theism. In short: small evils, or aggregates of such evils, don’t provide decisive evidence against theism; there’s no relevant difference between horrendous evils and aggregates of small evils; hence horrendous evils must not provide decisive evidence against theism, either.
philosophical notes
9. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
C. P. Ruloff Theism, Explanation, and Mathematical Platonism
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Dan Baras has recently argued for the claim that Theistic Mathematical Platonism (TMP) fares no better than Mathematical Platonism (MP) with respect to explaining why our mathematical beliefs are correlated with mind-independent mathematical truths. In this paper I argue that, insofar as TMP provides a proximate or local explanation for this truth-tracking correlation whereas MP fails to offer any corresponding explanation, Baras’s claim that TMP fares no better than MP with respect to explaining this correlation is false.
10. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Michael DeVito Abduction, Imagination, and Science: An Argument against Ontological Naturalism
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In this essay, I argue that developments in Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism—specifically, Thomas Crisp’s argument against a naturalistic metaphysics—have likely undermined the project of science for naturalists who are scientific realists. Scientific theorizing requires the use of abductive reasoning. A central component of abductive reasoning is the use of one’s imagination. However, Crisp’s argument provides us reason to doubt the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties as it relates to the imaginative abilities necessary for complex abductive reasoning.
book reviews
11. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
James N. Anderson Steven J. Duby, God in Himself: Scripture, Metaphysics, and the Task of Christian Theology
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12. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
James C. McGlothlin Walter J. Schultz, Jonathan Edwards’ Concerning the End for which God Created the World: Exposition, Analysis, and Philosophical Implications
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13. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Robert Larmer Jeffrey Koperski, Divine Action, Determinism, and the Laws of Nature
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14. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
Dan Kemp Joseph Minich, ed., Philosophy and the Christian: The Quest for Wisdom in the Light of Christ
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15. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
K. Lauriston Smith Philip J. Ivanhoe, Oneness: East Asian Conceptions of Virtue, Happiness, and How We Are All Connected
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16. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 2
News and Announcements
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17. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Ross D. Inman Editor’s Introduction
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symposium on theistic evolution
18. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Michael J. Murray, John Ross Churchill Mere Theistic Evolution: A Review of Theistic Evolution, Edited by Moreland, Meyer, Shaw, Gauger, and Grudem
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A key takeaway from the recent volume Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique is that no version of theistic evolution that adheres largely to consensus views in biology is a plausible option for orthodox Christians. In this paper we argue that this is false: contrary to the arguments in the volume, evolutionary theory, properly understood, is perfectly compatible with traditional Christian commitments. In addition, we argue that the lines between Intelligent Design and theistic evolution are not as sharp as most scholars have assumed, such that many who self-identify as Intelligent Design adherents would also qualify as theistic evolutionists.
19. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
Thomas H. McCall On Mere Theistic Evolution
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What Michael J. Murray and John Ross Churchill offer as “Mere Theistic Evolution” is an intriguing proposal that should be taken seriously by Christians who are convinced of the truth of classical Christian theology while also engaged in respectful and appreciative dialogue with the natural sciences. In this essay, I argue that the main theological arguments against theistic evolution put forth in the influential volume Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique are not decisive against mere theistic evolution. The proposal raises many interesting and important issues, and it deserves further engagement.
20. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 22 > Issue: 1
William Lane Craig Response to “Mere Theistic Evolution”
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Murray and Churchill argue correctly that theistic evolution as they define it is theologically compatible with orthodox Christian doctrines concerning divine providence, natural theology, miracles, and immaterial souls. I close with some reflections on mutual misunderstandings of Intelligent Design proponents and theistic evolutionists that arise because each sees the other as a distorted mirror image of himself.