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論 著 / articles
1. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2004 > Issue: 27
何建 興 Ho, Chien-hsing
商羯羅論不可說者的言說
Śaṅkara on Saying the Unsayable

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對印度教吠檀多不二論的宗師商羯羅(Wavkara)而言,作為萬 有本體以及吾人真性的大梵或真我(梵我,brahman-ātman),不具 有任何屬性,也超越一切思想與言詮,易言之,梵我是非語言思 議所能臻及的“不可說者”。問題是,以語言指涉終極真實一事 似乎無可避免,此外,商氏推崇的《奧義書》等聖典也於梵我多 所言說。如是,對商羯羅而言,我人應如何理解聖典語言的指涉 作用?我人還能否以任何方式言說那不可說者?在簡略介紹商羯羅的不二論哲學之後,本文探討《奧義書》 與商羯羅本人以梵我不可言詮的理由。其次,我們依序論述商氏 所採取,語言之於不可說者的三種表示法,亦即:(1)訴諸否定語的遮撥法。(2)訴諸間接肯定語辭的指示法。(3)訴諸明言的增益及其否定的隨說隨掃法。其後,本文參就「增益及其否定」一概念,討論這三種表示法的 異同關係。我們認為,商羯羅對於「如何言說不可說者」一課題 所提出的語言哲學進路頗具深意,也有極大的參考價值。
2. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2004 > Issue: 27
Hans Lenk Hans Lenk
Towards a Technologistic Methodology and Philosophy of Science
邁向技術取向的方法論和科學哲學

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For the past several decades, philosophers of science such as Hacking and Giere, instead of focusing attention on scientific theories and seeing them as just linguistic entities, have been thinking about philosophy of science from the standpoint of experimental manipulation and model-construction. Both Hacking’sexperimentalism and Giere’s modelism have played a great part in giving birth to an action-oriented and technology-shaped philosophy of science. In this paper, it is argued that philosophy of science can benefit from the technological approach and correlatively, the methodology of general technology might profit from taking into consideration the refinements and novel developments of philosophy of science. It is argued, besides, not only that different methodological approaches have to be integrated into a rather general theory of scheme-interpretation, but also that action-“grasping”-knowledge is shaped by interpretations and by perspectives.
3. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2004 > Issue: 27
Ruey-Lin Chen 陳瑞 麟
Testing through Realizable Models
透過可落實模型來檢驗科學理論

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How is a scientific theory, especial a classical physical theory, tested? This problem has a long history. In this paper I’ll propose a theory of testing based on but differentiated from Giere’s studies on the structure of scientific theories (Giere 1988, 1994, 1999). I will show, from both theoretical and historical perspectives, that a scientific theory can always be understood as one contains a classified model population, including both higher-level models and realizable models, and that scientists always test a theory through its realizable models. To transmit the consequences of testing realizable models to a higher-level model is a very complicated mechanism. Therefore, it is unlikely that a whole theory could ever be completely confirmed or falsified, even if some of its realizable models havebeen conclusively confirmed or falsified. Finally, I’ll illustrate such a theory of testing can give an adequate account of the testing history of a scientific theory, for example, the Newtonian theory. This theory of testing is a rational reconstruction, in Lakatosian sense, of the process of scientific testing.