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論 著 / articles
1. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2014 > Issue: 47
陳政 揚 Cheng-Yang Chen
王植對《注解正蒙》神化觀之批判 -以「太虛」三層義為進路
A Study of Wang Zhi’s Criticisms of the Deification in the Commentary of the Zhengmeng by an Analysis of the Three Aspectsin the Idea of “Ultimate Voidness (Taixu 太虛)”

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設若研讀哲學家的代表著作,是吾人探究其思想的必要條件之一,則逐句 解析張載思想論述的明清《正蒙》注,顯然是研究橫渠思想在明清哲學之發展 時,所無可忽視的一環。尤其歷來注解《正蒙》者,不乏高攀龍,王夫之等望 重士林,或在哲學史上具有獨創見解者。然而在當代張載學研究中,相關議題 似乎仍較少引起學者間的討論興趣。基於此,本文以清代《正蒙》學研究為論 述起點,旨在澄清李光地在《注解正蒙》中對張載神化觀的詮釋,以及王植在 《正蒙初義》中如何由釐清「太虛」概念,批判李《注》之非。全文共分為四 項研究環節:首先,由於王植以澄清「太虛」概念為解讀《正蒙》與衡定諸注 之關鍵,本文先扼要說明「太虛」之三層義。其次,本文將指出李《注》對「太 虛」之詮釋,以及王植對李《注》太虛義之批判。再者,由於李《注》不僅嘗 試解消「太虛」之本體義,而且以理氣二分的理論架構,詮釋橫渠虛氣一體之 神化觀。本文將指出李《注》對橫渠神化觀之新詮。最後,本文將藉太虛三層 義,指出《正蒙初義》的洞見以及李《注》神化觀的侷限。
2. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2014 > Issue: 47
Cheng-Hung Tsai 蔡政 宏
Technê and Understanding
技藝與理解

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How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practicaltechnê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, inconclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.
3. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2014 > Issue: 47
傅皓 政 Hao-Cheng Fu
非單調推論及預建:評洛特之反例
Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Defaults: On Rott’s Counterexamples

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此篇論文旨在以萊特於1980 年所提出的預建邏輯系統,消除洛特對 AGM 理論的單調性原則提出的反例。相較於古典邏輯,雖然AGM 理論主張 知識狀態具備均衡性,並建構基本函映的預設說明信念變遷,但是許多哲學 家認為該理論有某些基本原則值得質疑,洛特即指出AGM 理論主張原有知 識狀態的某個信念弱化之後,並不會影響原知識狀態的單調性並不成立。然 而,洛特的反例之所以成立,在於可能出現相同語句卻具有不同資訊價值的 情況,不過,洛特也並未提出適當的方式說明處理非單調的信念變遷過程。 因此,我在這篇論文中要以AGM 理論結合預建邏輯的方法消除洛特提出的 反例,亦即主張在AGM 理論中加入預建邏輯的推論規則,可以適當地處理 非單調的信念變遷過程。
4. NTU Philosophical Review: Year > 2014 > Issue: 47
Caleb Liang 梁益 堉
Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Vision Science
知覺的反個體主義與視覺科學

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I discuss the nature of visual perception from an interdisciplinary perspective. The target of investigation is Tyler Burge’s theory of perceptual anti-individualism, according to which perceptual states constitutively depend on relations between perceivers and the external world. Burge argues that this theory is presupposed by vision science. My goal is to argue that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only theoretical choice. First, I consider the notion of homeostasis and suggest how it may cast doubt on the perceptual norms in Burge’s theory. Second, I argue that many phenomena studied by vision science can be explained without positing Burge’s notions of veridicality and singular representation. Third, I consider some empirical theories and argue that vision science does not uniquely favor Burge’s theory. I conclude that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only framework for understanding visual perception.