NTU Philosophical Review

According to the common conception of argument, the virtues of arguments turn, in part, on the virtues of assertion of their premises. I suggest that, on plausible Gricean assumptions about cooperative conversation, the common conception yields the claim that it is never appropriate to advance arguments in cooperative conversations. But that claim is absurd! Holding on to the Gricean assumptions, I reject the common conception of argument in favour of an alternative conception, on which all that matters, as far as premises go, for the virtue of arguments, is whether those premises belong to the arguments’ targets: interlocutors’ beliefs, theories, etc.

Generally speaking, when it comes to Taoism’s attitude toward knowledge, people usually think that Taoism doesn’t grant knowledge positive value and meanings. However, it is an obvious fact that artistry fables related to bodies and knowledge appear frequently in works of Zhuangzi. It seems that even though knowledge doesn’t always involve the highest level, it is absolutely necessary in life. Through these impeccable performances of techniques, undoubtedly, Zhuangzi confirms knowledge occupies an intermediary stage that can’t be ignored. The philosophy of these labor professions of artistry, centered on bodies, (Qi as bodies) emphasizes the interconnection between practicing details of movements (Hearts, Hands, Tools, Objects) and immersive experiences that support each other, and uses it as the model of being alive in the world.

Under the impact of the post-modern trend of ideas, the concept of subjectivity in the Enlightenment era has been greatly challenged. While the excessive emphasis on the subject may easily lead to the oppression of others and the formation of violence of homogenization, advocating de-subjectivation tends to lead to the emptiness of life and the weakness of practice. Moreover, it becomes difficult to establish ethical responsibility. After all, the subject is a prerequisite for responsibility. This study suggests that when faced with the contemporary crisis of subjectivity, Zhuangzi’s “Yang Sheng Zhu”（養生主） provides a brand-new perspective which can create a more appropriate concept of subjectivity for the contemporary era. As an important philosophical concept, “Yang Sheng Zhu” is not limited to maintaining physical and spiritual health but also points to a personality of life that manages an ethical relationship (caring for relatives). “Yang Sheng Zhu” is a practical process using Qi（氣） and mind cultivation as the key, and the ethical subject achieved by this practice will remain open to the differences of others. This practice no longer only emphasizes the sameness of the subject. However, how to implement such a practice in the context of life is also an important issue. This study probes into Tai Chi, a martial art with classical cultural connotations, and uses the concept of Zhuangzi’s “Yang Sheng Zhu” to interpret the ethical subject achieved by the invisible practice of “understanding of power,” “shenming,” “complete Qi,” “sacrificing oneself to serve others,” and “accepting every encounter” in Tai Chi. This study also uses “extremely soft, and then extremely rigid” to explain that such an invisible practice is not only “de-subjectivation” but also the realization of “subjectivation.” In other words, the ethical subject formed under the interweaving of “de-subjectivation” and “subjectivation” can be regarded as a possible response to the contemporary crisis of subjectivity.

Nietzsche’s naturalism or Nietzsche as a naturalist could be regarded as one of the hottest research topics in Anglo-American Nietzsche studies in the past twenty years. Of all the related works, Christian Emden’s Nietzsche’s Naturalism is indispensable in the field of Nietzsche studies for its excellent historical contextualization and keen attention to philosophical problems. In this book, he reconstructs Nietzsche’s philosophical naturalism in the context of early neo-Kantianism and the life sciences in the nineteenth century and interprets Nietzsche’s genealogy as a philosophical critique that delivers a natural history of normativity. This review will begin with a brief introduction of the debate around Nietzsche’s naturalism in Anglo-American and German scholarship, then give an overview of the chapters in Emden’s book. After introducing and commenting on Emden’s core ideas, it will conclude with a brief reflection on contemporary Nietzsche studies.

Tze-wan Kwan’s The Way betwixt Being and Man: On Heidegger’s Philosophical Detours contains a total of eleven long essays, the most notable of which are the three long essays that have never been published. All three articles deal with Heidegger’s entire intellectual career, but in terms of philosophical orientation, they focus mainly on Heidegger’s later interests. Therefore, they are worth reading and discussing as a whole because of the continuity in content. Through the exposition of the three new essays, it can be seen that this book does not discuss Heidegger’s philosophy merely for the purpose of interpreting his concepts and statements. After sorting out the various themes and meanings in Heidegger’s philosophy, which are extremely diverse and even close to esoteric, the theoretical consequences are revealed concretely and objectively, and, in addition, the author provides an extremely comprehensive, profound, and severe critique of them. The overall criticism of Heidegger is mainly about two points: first, Heidegger’s criticism of subjectivity is too strict and, consequently, he underestimates the personal responsibility constituted by individual spontaneity; second, Heidegger is too distrustful of human reason. These two points, while more explicitly stated in some chapters, animate the whole book. I argue that the criticism comes from the perspective of a humanist with the spirit of modern enlightenment.

This paper aims at solving the interpretive problem in the first chapter of Wu Xing of Guodian bamboo texts, majorly based on the text itself. It starts by categorizing different interpretations into three groups (the for-silk-texts, the for-bamboo-texts, and the reconciliatory), and points out the thinking patterns which have led the for-bamboo-texts to misinterpretation. It also analyzes the distinction among the virtuous conduct (dezhixing), conduct (xing), and virtue (de), and reexamines usages of the forming (xing) and sageness (sheng) of the Wu Xing to conclude that the concept of sageness includes two different meanings of forming. Therefore, the reason why the conduct of sageness should be regarded as virtuous conduct regardless of whether or not it forms “inwardly” is that the sageness, the supreme virtue, possesses both “imperceivable forming” (personal self-cultivation and transformation) and “societal forming” (interpersonal enlightenment and amelioration), which establishes the virtue of sageness in a unique position superior to the four cardinal virtues.

This paper offers a new interpretation of the following Zhuangzi fragment: “What we can point to are the faggots that have been consumed; but the fire is transmitted (elsewhere), and we know not that it is over and ended” (Yang Sheng Zhu, chapter 3). There are two commonly accepted interpretations. One points out the opposition of form (xing 形) and spirit (shen 神) and suggests taking care of and preserving spirit as a regimen. The other interpretation focuses on the change of everything and the endlessness of fire and suggests that one’s mind should not be affected by the living or dying of things. Both interpretations have a long pedigree and enjoy their own internal support. However, in both interpretations, there are remaining issues related to the use of phonetic loan characters, the connection between source and target domains in the metaphors used, and the interpretation of some word meanings. On the basis of the commentaries of Gao Heng and Liu Wu, I attempt to develop an alternative interpretation. While both of the interpretations introduced above regard faggot and fire as positive metaphors, I instead argue that these metaphors portray negative situations that should be avoided. This novel interpretation has its own unique value because it finds support in Zhuangzi and because it meets the problems of the former two interpretations.

At the time when Germany was defeated in the World War 2 (May 8, 1945), Heidegger wrote a dialogic essay to memorize the event. In the essay he differentiated two kinds of usefulness: non-Usefulness and usefulness. What merits our attention is that at the end of the essay he quoted the conversation between Zhuangzi and Huishi and proposed that Germany be “the nationality of non-usefulness” so as to lead the world in the future. For him the War resulted from the spirit of expansion of which ideology and worldview of “usefulness” lies at the heart. It is against such a background that this essay attempts to construct an account of Zhuangzi’s and Huishi’s ontologies by differentiating their views on “usefulness”, whereby Zhuangzi is read to represent “the ontology of non-usefulness” and Huishi to stand for “the ontology of usefulness”. Viewed in light of Heidegger’s differentiation of two kinds of “usefulness”, the essay hopes to explicate the contemporary significance of the dispute between Zhuangzi and Huishi, particularly Huishi’s emphasis on usefulness which I suggest can be related to the modern pursuit of usefulness.

This article attempts to elucidate the origin and formation of the “Chinese philosophy” or “Oriental philosophy” as an academic field which took form during the Meiji Era of Japan. The academic field called “Chinese philosophy” originated mainly from the incorporation of the discipline of philosophy into Tokyo University during the 1870s. The main scholars who contributed to the formation of this scholarly field were Ernest Fenollosa, Inoue Tetsujirō, and Shimada Chōrei. Fenollosa was the first teacher who taught the contents of Chinese thought from the viewpoint of philosophy. Inoue Tetsujirō was also the first instructor who took charge of the seminar under the title of “Oriental philosophy” in which he compared the “philosophical significance” of those early Chinese thinkers with those of their counterparts in the Western philosophical tradition. Shimada, succeeding Inoue, was another pioneer because he first taught the whole history of Chinese thought from the ancient to the Manchurian period, though Shimada himself had not received philosophy education in his youth. Their seminars have strengthened the philosophical image of traditional Chinese thinkers, and as a result, those thinkers have been all considered to be “philosophers” by the time of the early twentieth century. It was by this re-interpretation of the significance of traditional thought, especially from the perspective of ethics, that the contents of Confucian canonical studies of the Tokugawa period have been transformed into a new ideological ground for advocating the necessity of self-cultivation and so-called “national morality” in the following Taishō and Shōwa periods.

羅森陶指出若意識被當作一種本有性質，它就會是單純與不可分析的，並且因此無法提供科學性的說明，因為科學性說明要求一種具有心靈的外在性質的關係式架構。我首先從概念分析的角度批評羅森陶反本有主義的論證。接著，逐一檢視羅森陶三個反本有主義的論證：及物與非及物意識區分的論證、報告與表達的論證，與個別化心靈狀態的論證。我建議將單一心靈狀態的內容視為一個訊息空間，可以用之來說明意識。我依據兩種不同型態的本有主義來反對羅森陶的立場：一種是包含自我表徵，另一種則不包含。我們將會發現這兩種類型的理論，在自然主義的視角下都擁有解釋的力量。

Validity is an orthodox way to distinguish between good and bad inferences, which says that when inferences are valid, we can derive true conclusions from true premises. But when inferences involve conditionals, validity does not seem to be a good criterion. Unsatisfied with the traditional view of validity, Adams(1965) and Stalnaker(1975) propose their modified criteria, which are called “reasonable inference” in this paper, to evaluate inferences involving conditionals. In this paper, Adams’ criterion is called “justification of assertibility”, which can derive a highly assertible conclusion from highly assertible premises. Stalnaker’s criterion is called “justification of strictness” in this paper, which can derive a strictly assertible conclusion from strictly assertible premises. This paper examines these two criteria and their consequences. First, by reexamining McGee’s(1985) counterexample to modus ponens, I argue that McGee’s example is an assertibility-justified but not a strictness-justified counterexample to modus ponens. Second, I explain why these two criteria have such a substantial divergence when inferences have conditional conclusions. Third, if my diagnosis is correct and complicated conditionals are allowed in inferences, then the justification of assertibility is too rigid to be satisfied. I conclude that the justification of strictness is a better criterionthan the justification of assertibility.

有些哲學家主張疼痛是一種處於身體部位的對象，理由是英文可以用定位句式說明疼痛是允許的。最近，Liu 與Klein 檢視中文對於說明疼痛的用法，指出中文不允許用定位句式說明疼痛。然而，我主張他們是錯的，我提供實例來論證如何在中文裡使用定位句式來說明疼痛。

The article rethinks the meaning of “Xiaoyao” in Guo Xiang’s philosophy. First, I provide a novel interpretation of Guo Xiang’s Commentary on Zhuangzi. Then, I analyze his Commentary by applying key concepts in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Guo Xiang incorporated Zhuangzi’s philosophy into his own. He believes that every individual can achieve “Xiaoyao,” but only if each person forgets both what is beyond the reach of one’s nature and desires not belonging to oneself. The Sage King does not impose his own ideas on the people, and thus he guides the people to achieve the state of “Xiaoyao.” Guo Xiang’s philosophy, by demonstrating that everyone can achieve “Xiaoyao” in articulating how the abstract reasoning in Zhuangzi has practical application, greatly contributed to the popularity of Taoist Philosophy.

Zhu Xi, remarkably, approved of Cheng Yi’s saying, “it is considered not benevolent （仁, “ren”） if one does not acknowledge justice (義, “yi”) and reason (理, “li”).” The purpose of this paper is to understand their agreement by explicating the deeper meaning of Cheng Yi’s concept of “yi and li” by reflecting on the practical aspects of this concept. Why is it not considered benevolent if one did not acknowledge yi and li？ What sort of yi and li relates to ren? And finally, in their relation to ren, how do yi and li relate to one another to be morally significant?This paper will first interpret the notion of yi in Confucius and Mencius to clarify its relation to ren. Then, on this basis, it will examine the sayings of Cheng Yi’s neo-Confucian comtemporaries, in particular, the arguments of Zhou Dun-Yi, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao, and Cheng Yi’s other teachers and friends. The purpose is to clarify, in the larger context of the development of neo-Confucianism, what Cheng Yi inherited from Pre-Qin thought on ren and yi, and what he transformed and elaborated.After the above preparation, this paper will discuss Cheng Yi’s interpretation of Mencius’ “cultivation of qi （ 氣, “energy” ） and the accumulation of yi” because the peculiarity of Cheng Yi’s theory of the Heaven-Man relationship comes to light in that interpretation. In other words, although Cheng Yi emphasized one principle with many manifestations which influenced the development of Zhu Xi’s doctrine of li and qi, from the perspective of cosmology, Cheng Yi’s framework, like Zhou Dun-Yi and Zhang Zai, also contains the potential of thinking Heaven as benevolent and humans as having the character of yi (i.e. the idea in Guanzi). Section four thus entertains this possibility and explores how Cheng Yi’s concept of “yi and li” can be articulated in terms of actualizing an individual principle of yi on earth with the universal principle of ren in Heaven in the background.The results of this study can address Wei Zheng-Tong’s critique that Cheng Hao’s doctrine of benevolence, in cancelling the subject-object relationship, neglects the practical question of when to sacrifice one’s life for the sake of yi. At the same time, “yi and li” in Cheng Yi crucially supplements and strengthens the understanding of how Cheng Hao’s doctrine of ren is effective as moral practice. This result provides the pivotal link that shows the systematic coherence of the samadhi skills “zhong-zheng（中正, “moderation”）, ren, and yi.”

In this paper I discuss Xiangshan’s unity of two minds in order to explore its ethical implications and the roots of its philosophical history. The two minds mean Dao mind and human mind, and the so-called one mind is the unity of the two. And this unity in my paper is regarded as the one-mind’s rise or fall by the interpretation of Tang Junyi（唐君毅）, and as a concept of self to combine two minds in according to Xiangshan’s text, the unity is a self who makes a decision for or against his original mind, thus it is two beginnings of the same mind. In a word, the mind rises when the self’s decision conforms with his original mind, and the same mind falls when his decision violates it. In according to the concept of self the possibility of human’s moral norm and responsibility can be explained. The distinction between the two minds is established by a transcendental analysis of their respective conceptual content, and the point is to reveal the character of original mind. But the concept of original mind doesn’t demonstrate the whole but only a part of moral consciousness, because it doesn’t imply the possibility of evil and thus fails to explain the concept of evildoer and the possible responsibility for his evil. The concept of the self indicates the two beginnings of the human consciousness and as such constitute the whole of moral consciousness: the original mind is mine, and I am also the evildoer, thus the self is nothing but the ultimate subject for the possibility of good and evil. The above analysis is based on the Mencius text quoted by Xiangshan. That is, Xiangshan’s two minds in one, in both its ethical implications and philosophical history, is dependent on his interpretation of Mencius text.

This article examines three aporias (difficult problems) encountered by Zeng Tian-Zong (1910-2007) in his notion “Knowledge of Ideal of Truth” or “Philosophical Knowledge”, and proposes a possible answer to these problems based on the clues and guarantees he provides. On the reading proposed here, while these problems turn out to not be genuine difficulties, examination of these aporias in his knowledge of the ideal of truth, better elucidates the nature of his “Knowledge of Ideal of Truth” as well as the content and direction of his philosophical system of Aletheiology.

Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s recent work, Kant's Power of Imagination, is a response to the neglect of “the power of imagination” in the Kantian circle. In this 102-page book, Horstmann analyzes passages relevant to imagination in Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment in detail, with the aim of making Kant’s theory of imagination coherent. He argues for the unique contribution of imagination in the context of the constitution of cognitive objects. Horstmann proposes a “two-stage model of constructing cognitive objects” in his examination of the irreplaceable function and special position of imagination in the cognitive process, and from this, he argues that imagination is an independent, self-standing cognitive faculty. Since imagination is an independent cognitive ability, at least in the context of theoretical philosophy and epistemology, Kant scholars have no reason to ignore it.

It is easy for modern academic research to challenge and even reject the traditional views of Buddhism. The denial of certain sutras, and also the rejection of Mahayana Buddhism, are cases in point. Various Pan Jiao (判教, “doctrinal classifications”) are untenable under the inspection of historical and philological study; Wu Shi Jiao Pan in Tiantai Buddhism is an instance. This article attempts to present six points to further explore this. First, I argue that there is certainly a conflict between the orientation of academic research and the practice of faith. Second, in terms of level of knowledge, while the academic approach has the upper hand, it is not the sole valid perspective for understanding Buddhism. Third, the religiosity of Dharma is concerned with facilitating the extradition of different humans. In this sense, the timing in the “five-stage distinction” emphasizes causes and conditions no less than chronological order. Fourth, the traditional view toward Buddhist teachings still has its value, insofar as the logic of belief provides a rational basis for this view. Fifth, Quan (權) and Shi (實) form better evaluative standards and criteria than correctness and objectivity. Finally, this study argues that it is better to hold a pluralistic and open attitude for interpreting Buddhist history. In this way, the five-stage distinction, while a “historical distortion” for an objective scholar, is actually “religious correctness” for the Buddhist practitioner. Even if it is an error, it is a “beautiful error.”

The main topic of the paper concerns “research methodologies in Chinese philosophy.” It looks like we are talking about more than one methodology. In this paper, I point out that the researcher’s concern plays an important role in academic judgment. Different researchers’ concerns lead to different stances and methods. And different stances and methods in turn lead to different conclusions. What I coin as “the researcher’s concern” might be provisionally understood as a sort of meta-motivation (something that motivates motives). I suggest that among these different concerns we may seek something common. This something common could then be the basis for a public network, which functions as an integrative mechanism encompassing and addressing those different concerns. This paper argues that “seeking truth” should be the common concern of research. It further argues that with this as the basis, the traditional mode of research, being concerned with the meaning of the text, should be integrated with the present concern with how to practice Chinese philosophy after modernity.