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The Monist

Volume 96, Issue 1, January 2013
Constitution and Composition

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Displaying: 1-8 of 8 documents


articles
1. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 1
Roberta De Monticelli Constitution and Unity: Lynne Baker and the Unitarian Tradition
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Lynne Baker’s Constitution Theory seems to be the farthest-reaching and yet the most subtly elaborated antireductive metaphysics available today. Its original theoretical contribution is a nonmereological theory of material constitution, which yet has a place for classical and Lewisian mereology (this formalized version of Materialism). Constitution Theory hence apparently (i) complies with modern natural science, and yet (ii) rescues the concrete everyday world, and ourselvesin it, from ontological vanity or nothingness, and (iii) does it by avoiding dualism. Why, then, does it meet so many opponents—or rather, why are its many opponents so stubbornly resisting the very idea of constitution, in Baker’s form? One of the most resisted claims is (iii). Is unity without identity—the feature distinguishing the relation between constituting and constituted things—the only nondualist way to oppose reductionism? What would be the price to pay for unity with identity—without reduction? What I (jokingly) call the Unitarian Tradition, going back to Plato, keeps working out the original Platonic way of constructing acomplex object as a Unity comprising a Collection, as opposed to the Aristotelian suggestion of opposing Collections and Substances. For once you have split things apart ontologically, unifying them again may prove a very hard task.
2. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 1
Lynne Rudder Baker Technology and the Future of Persons
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3. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 1
Amie L. Thomasson The Ontological Significance of Constitution
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4. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 1
Tessa Jones The Constitution of Events
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Donald Davidson argues that ‘the stabbing of Caesar’ and ‘the killing of Caesar’ are two descriptions of the one event whereas Jaegwon Kim contends events are more fine-grained and two events occurred, related by supervenience. I argue that neither solution is satisfactory and, inspired by Lynne Rudder Baker, I develop a constitution relation governing cooccurring, co-located events such that the stabbing of Caesar comes to constitute the killing of Caesar when the stabbing occurs in the appropriate circumstances. According to my view, the stabbing of Caesar is metaphysically distinct from the killing of Caesar such that the killing is dependent on the stabbing, yet is not identical to it.
5. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 1
Ingvar Johansson Constitution as a Relation within Mathematics
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6. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 1
Harold Noonan Moderate Monism, Sortal Concepts, and Relative Identity
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7. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 1
E.J. Lowe Mereological Extensionality, Supplementation, and Material Constitution
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8. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 1
Andrew Newman On the Constitution of Solid Objects out of Atoms
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