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The Monist

Volume 96, Issue 2, April 2013
Formal and Intentional Semantics

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articles
1. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 2
Ian Rumfitt Sense and Evidence
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2. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 2
Martin Stokhof Formal Semantics and Wittgenstein: An Alternative?
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This paper discusses a number of methodological issues with mainstream formal semantics and then investigates whetherWittgenstein’s later work provides an alternative approach that is able to avoid these issues.
3. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 2
Terence Horgan Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality
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4. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 2
Anil Gupta The Relationship of Experience to Thought
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5. The Monist: Volume > 96 > Issue: 2
Laureano Luna Indefinite Extensibility in Natural Language
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The Monist’s call for papers for this issue ended: “If formalism is true, then it must be possible in principle to mechanize meaning in a conscious thinking and language-using machine; if intentionalism is true, no such project is intelligible.”We use the Grelling-Nelson paradox to show that natural language is indefinitely extensible, which has two important consequences: it cannot be formalized and model theoretic semantics, standard for formal languages, is not suitable for it. We also point out that object-object mapping theories of semantics, the usual account for the possibility of nonintentional semantics, do not seem able to accountfor the indefinitely extensible productivity of natural language.