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1. The Monist: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Erratum
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2. The Monist: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Francesco Berto, Frederick Kroon, Alberto Voltolini, Metaontology: Introduction
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3. The Monist: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Graham Priest, Sein Language
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4. The Monist: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Jody Azzouni, Freeing Talk of Nothing from the Cognitive Illusion of Aboutness
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Rejecting Quine’s criterion, strictly speaking, yields the neutralist interpretation of the quantifiers. Quantifiers, by virtue of their logical role, impose no metaphysical conditions whatsoever. According to neutralism, the bare (or formal) quantifier-role can be supplemented with varous metaphysical constraints, or none. A comparison between Pure Metaphysical Deflationism (a position directly motivated by the neutralist interpretation of the quantifiers) and Aboutness Meinongianism is undertaken. Evaluating the evidential role of aboutness intuitions is the primary tool for determining whether Aboutness Meinongianism is rightabout there being an aboutness relationship between the cognitive experience of what does not exist (and aboutness relations of nonreferring quantifiers and terms) and what does not exist.
5. The Monist: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Chris Daly, David Liggins, In Defence of Existence Questions
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6. The Monist: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Peter Van Inwagen, Fictionalist Nominalism and Applied Mathematics
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7. The Monist: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Cian Dorr, Quantifier Variance and the Collapse Theorems
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8. The Monist: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Kyle Mitchell, Pragmatism, Joint-Carving, and Ontology
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9. The Monist: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Giorgio Lando, Giuseppe Spolaore, Transcendental Disagreement
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In metaphysical theorizing, it is common to use expressions whose function is that of denoting or being true of absolutely everything. Adopting a scolastic term, these may be called ‘transcendentals’. Different metaphysical theories may adopt different transcendentals, the most usual candidates being ‘thing’, ‘entity’, ‘object’, ‘be’, ‘exist’, and their counterparts in various languages dead or alive. We call ‘transcendental disagreement’ any dissent between philosophical theories or traditions that may be described as a disagreement in the choice of transcendentals. Examples of transcendental disagreement include the debate about Lewis’s conception of actuality and a number of recent discussions between Meinongians and their ‘Quinean’ rivals. A case is made for the conclusion that, as such, transcendental disagreements are purely terminological in character. It is argued that transcendental disagreements are generally to be assessed on pragmatic rather than on metaphysical grounds. Finally, the paper makes a start in the analysis of those pragmatic grounds which include the pursuit of univocity, fairness, and ease of comparison between theories.
10. The Monist: Volume > 97 > Issue: 4
Scope of Forthcoming Issues
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