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Displaying: 1-20 of 58 documents


articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Arnold Cusmariu Toward a Semantic Approach in Epistemology
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Philosophers have recognized for some time the usefulness of semantic conceptions of truth and belief. That the third member of the knowledge triad,evidence, might also have a useful semantic version seems to have been overlooked. This paper corrects that omission by defining a semantic conception of evidence for science and mathematics and then developing a semantic conception of knowledge for these fields, arguably mankind’s most important knowledge repository. The goal is to demonstrate the advantages of having an answer to the more modest question “What is necessary and sufficient for introducing a knowledge predicate into scientific and mathematical languages?” – as contrasted with the ambitious Platonic question “What is knowledge?” After presenting the theory, the paper responds to a wide range of objections stemming from traditional philosophical concerns.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Barry Lam Justified Believing is Tracking your Evidential Commitments
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In this paper, I give an account of the conditions for rationally changing your beliefs that respects three constraints; 1) that rational believing is a matter ofrespecting your evidence, 2) that evidence seems to have both objective and subjective features, and (3) that our set of beliefs seem to rationally commit us to certain propositions, regardless of the evidential support we have for these propositions. On the view I outline, rationally believing or giving up a belief is a matter of your inferences tracking your rational commitments, and that these rational commitments account for the evidence you must respect. These rational commitments are subjective in that they are relative to the totality of your beliefs, but also objective in the sense that what counts as a commitment is true for everyone everywhere.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Rachel R. McKinnon What I Learned in the Lunch Room about Assertion and Practical Reasoning
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It is increasingly argued that there is a single unified constitutive norm of both assertion and practical reasoning. The most common suggestion is that knowledge is this norm. If this is correct, then we would expect that a diagnosis of problematic assertions should manifest as problematic reasons for acting. Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that assertions epistemically grounded in isolated second-hand knowledge (ISHK) are unwarranted. I argue that decisions epistemically grounded in premises based on ISHK also seem inappropriate. I finish by suggesting that this finding has important implications for the debates regarding the norms of assertion and practical reasoning.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Luis Rosa Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis
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In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified beliefto be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Gabriel Târziu Quantum vs. Classical Logic: The Revisionist Approach
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Quantum logic can be understood in two ways: as a study of the algebraic structures that appear in the context of the Hilbert space formalism of quantummechanics; or as representing a non-classical logic in conflict with classical logic. My aim in this paper is to analyze the possibility to sustain, at least in principle, a revisionist approach to quantum logic, i.e. a position according to which quantum logic is ‘the real logic’ which should be adopted instead of classical logic.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Gal Yehezkel Contingency and Time
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In this article I offer an explanation of the need for contingent propositions in language. I argue that contingent propositions are required if and only if there is aneed for propositions which can be both true and false in different circumstances. Indexical expressions enable the same proposition to be expressed in different contexts, thus allowing it to be both true and false. Examination of the different indexical expressions shows that temporal indexical expressions are the ones that do this. Furthermore, describing the change in the temporal A-determinations of past, present, or future, requires using contingent propositions. The conclusion of this article is that change in the temporal A-determinations is the explanation for the need for contingent propositions in language.
debate
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Christopher Bobier The Conciliatory View and the Charge of Wholesale Skepticism
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If I reasonably think that you and I enjoy the same evidence as well as virtues and vices, then we are epistemic peers. What does rationality require of usshould we disagree? According to the conciliatory view, I should become less confident in my belief upon finding out that you, whom I take to be my peer, disagree with me. Question: Does the conciliatory view lead to wholesale skepticism regarding areas of life where disagreement is rampant? After all, people focusing on the same arguments and possessing the same virtues commonly disagree over religion, politics, ethics, philosophy and other areas. David Christensen and Adam Elga have responded that conciliationism does not lead to wholesale skepticism. I argue that Christensen and Elga cannot avoid the charge of wholesale skepticism. But I also argue that if they could avoid skepticism, then the conciliatory view would become irrelevant since it would not inform us as to what rationality requires of us in every-day disagreement. Thus either way the conciliatory view is saddled with unintuitive consequences.
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Rachael Briggs, Daniel Nolan Epistemic Dispositions: Reply to Turri and Bronner
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We reply to recent papers by John Turri and Ben Bronner, who criticise the dispositionalised Nozickian tracking account we discuss in “Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know.” We argue that the account we suggested can handle the problems raised by Turri and Bronner. In the course of responding to Turri and Bronner’s objections, we draw three general lessons for theories of epistemic dispositions: that epistemic dispositions are to some extent extrinsic, that epistemic dispositions can have manifestation conditions concerning circumstances where their bearers fail to exist, and that contrast is relevant to disposition attributions.
9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Mark McBride Saving Sosa’s Safety
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My purpose in this paper is to (begin to) defend safety as a necessary condition on knowledge. First, I introduce Ernest Sosa’s (1999) safety condition. Second,I set up and grapple with Juan Comesaña’s recent putative counterexample to safety as a necessary condition on knowledge; Comesaña’s case forces us to consider Sosa’s updated (2002) safety condition. From such grappling a principled modification to Sosa’s (2002) safety condition emerges. Safety is safe from this, and like, attacks.
10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Michael J. Shaffer Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion
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In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences ischallenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended.
11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
John Turri Preempting Paradox
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Charlie Pelling has recently argued that two leading accounts of the norm of assertion, the truth account and a version of the knowledge account, invite paradoxand so must be false. Pelling’s arguments assume that an isolated utterance of the sentence “This assertion is improper” counts as making an assertion. I argue that this assumption is questionable.
reviews
12. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Corina Daba-Buzoianu Ian Evans, Nicholas D. Smith, Knowledge
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13. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Notes on the Contributors
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14. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Logos & Episteme. Aims and Scope
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15. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4
Notes to Contributors
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articles
16. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Robert Albin Beyond Modes of Objectivity
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Frege, and others who followed him, stressed the role of fallibility as a means to defining ‘objectivity.’ By defining objective judgments as fallible, these philosophers contributed to the consolidation of a theory of objectivity which suggested interpreting epistemological, as well as other judgements, as being objective. An important philosophical implication of this theory lies in its disclosure of the interrelations between truth and objectivity. In light of this insight, and based on an analysis of instances of false (epistemological and other) judgments, I show that truth and objectivity go hand-in-hand, while falsity and objectivity do not. This finding alone indicates the necessity to revise the theory of objectivity.
17. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
George Bodi Discussion on the Characteristics of Archaeological Knowledge. A Romanian Exploratory Case-Study
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As study of knowledge, epistemology attempts at identifying its necessary and sufficient conditions and defining its sources, structure and limits. From this pointof view, until present, there are no applied approaches to the Romanian archaeology. Consequently, my present paper presents an attempt to explore the structural characteristics of the knowledge creation process through the analysis of the results of a series of interviews conducted on Romanian archaeologists. The interviews followed a qualitative approach built upon a semi-structured frame. Apparent data saturation was reached after four interviews within initial target group (senior researchers with institutional authority). Under these conditions a decision was made to continue the interviews within a secondary control group (young doctoral or post-doc researchers guided by members of the initial target group) in order to both verify the observed data saturation and to assess the impact of the attitude of senior researchers towards scientific research on the younger generation. The preliminary results allow to assert that Romanian archaeology is still caught in a highly conservative and intradisciplinarian manner of knowledge production with a negative effect on both new knowledgeproduction and future specialists’ education.
18. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Bogdan Boghițoi Evolution, Psychology, and Culture
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My goal is to clarify the type of relations one could hope can be established between psychology and the social sciences in general, on one side, and evolutionary biology, on the other. Thus, the paper analyzes one of the most remarkable contemporary attempts to forge such ties, namely that of John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, who explore the interface between the two domains and try to articulate a research methodology aimed at their better integration. Unfortunately, as I shall try to show, the position Tooby and Cosmides advance is undermined by adaptationist assumptions they don't manage to successfully defend. In doing so, my paper picks up the threads of the current adaptationism debate and seeks to draw some of the consequences it has for psychological research. Subsequently, I will attempt to generalize the chief results of my analysis, by emphasizing a few aspects of evolutionary theory I think are key for understanding its relation with human culture. On this grounds, I will argue for a position that makes social sciences autonomous in respect to evolutionary thinking, yet preserves solid ties with evolutionary thought, securing integration with the rest of science.
19. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Anthony Booth, Rik Peels Epistemic Justification, Rights, and Permissibility
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Can we understand epistemic justification in terms of epistemic rights? In this paper, we consider two arguments for the claim that we cannot and in doing so, we provide two arguments for the claim that we can. First, if, as many think, William James is right that the epistemic aim is to believe all true propositions and not to believe any false propositions, then there are likely to be situations in which believing (or disbelieving) a proposition serves one of these goals, whereas suspending judgement serves the other, equally important goal. Second, it is in principle always possible to have different epistemic standards for evaluating the evidence for the proposition in question, so that one can have a right to believe (or disbelieve) that proposition and a right to suspend judgement on it. Whereas the first consideration counts in favour of the idea that believing justifiedly is at least sometimes a matter of having an epistemic right, the latter consideration favours the view that believing justifiedly is always a matter of having an epistemic right.
20. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Jasper Doomen Understanding and Explaining
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The quest to provide a fundamental understanding and explanation of reality is an ambitious one. Perhaps it is too ambitious. The possible restrictions for suchan enterprise to be successful must be inquired in order to determine the issue. Section 1 explores one’s understanding in reaching (scientific) conclusions: to what extent does a successful account testify to understanding? Section 2 focuses on the other side of such an account: does it provide an explanation in a more fundamental sense than pointing out causes of phenomena, or is it restricted to such a task? A critical attitude vis-à-vis the (scientific) enterprise of unearthing reality’s structure remains necessary in order not to confuse a consistent and productive theory with one that demonstrates an understanding and explanation in the sense of this article.