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Displaying: 1-10 of 11 documents


research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Mihai Hîncu Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement
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In this paper, I focus on the disputes arising in regions of discourse in which bare sentences with predicates of personal taste occur. After I introduce, in thefirst section, the distinction between the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning objective matters of fact and those arising in regions of discourse about subjective matters of personal taste, I present, in the second section, the solutions which the main semantic theories have offered to the puzzle of faultless disagreement. In the third and the fourth section of the paper, I discuss the proposal advocated by truth perspectivalism, according to which the disputes concerning matters of personal taste constitute faultless disagreements. After I present the solution proposed by Kölbel to an argument whose conclusion establishes that no disagreement can be faultless, I show that this solution presents major disadvantages for truth perspectivalism. These disadvantages highlight the fact that the disputes concerning matters of personal taste, as they are construed in truth perspectivalism, do not constitute authentic examples offaultless disagreements, and that the coherence of the semantic program which truth perspectivalism advocates, with regard to sentences from regions of discourse about matters of personal taste, must be put in doubt.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Erik Krag Coherentism and Belief Fixation
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Plantinga argues that cases involving ‘fixed’ beliefs refute the coherentist thesis that a belief’s belonging to a coherent set of beliefs suffices for its havingjustification (warrant). According to Plantinga, a belief cannot be justified if there is a ‘lack of fit’ between it and its subject’s experiences. I defend coherentism by showing that if Plantinga means to claim that any ‘lack of fit’ destroys justification, his argument is obviously false. If he means to claim that significant ‘lack of fit’ destroys justification, his argument suffers a critical lack of support. Either way, Plantinga’s argument fails and coherentism emerges unscathed.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Horia-Roman Patapievici The ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis.’ A Reappraisal of Duhem’s Discovery of the Physics of the Middle Ages
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Pierre Duhem is the discoverer of the physics of the Middle Ages. The discovery that there existed a physics of the Middle Ages was a surprise primarily forDuhem himself. This discovery completely changed the way he saw the evolution of physics, bringing him to formulate a complex argument for the growth and continuity of scientific knowledge, which I call the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ (not to be confused either with what Roger Ariew called the ‘true Duhem thesis’ as opposed to the Quine-Duhem thesis, which he persuasively argued is not Duhem’s, or with the famous ‘Quine-Duhem Thesis’ itself). The ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ consists of five sub-theses (some transcendental in nature, some other causal, factual, or descriptive), which are not independent, as they do not work separately (but only as a system) and do not relate to reality separately (but only simultaneously). The famous and disputed ‘continuity thesis’ is part, as a sub-thesis, from this larger argument. I argue that the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ wraps up all of Duhem’s discoveries in the history of science and as a whole represents his main contribution to the historiography of science. The ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ is the central argument of Pierre Duhem's work as historian of science.
discussion notes/debate
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Juan Comesaña, Carolina Sartorio Easy Knowledge Makes No Difference: Reply to Wielenberg
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We have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in cases of ‘easy-knowledge.’ Erik Wielenberg argues that there are cases of easy knowledge thatour proposal cannot handle. In this note we reply to Wielenberg, arguing that our proposal does indeed handle his cases.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Andrew Naylor On Inferentially Remembering that p
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Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one’s memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) memory that q. Bernecker’s account of non-inferentially remembering-that is shown to be inadequate. A remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Gregory Stoutenburg Cartesianism, Neo-Reidianism, and the A Priori: Reply to Pust
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Joel Pust has recently challenged the Thomas Reid-inspired argument against the reliability of the a priori defended by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff,William Alston, and Michael Bergmann. The Reidian argument alleges that the Cartesian insistence on the primacy of a priori rationality and subjective sensoryexperience as the foundations of epistemic justification is unwarranted because the same kind of global skeptical scenario that Cartesians recognize as challenging the legitimacy of perceptual beliefs about the external world also undermine the reliability of a priori rationality. In reply, Pust contends that some a priori propositions are beyond doubt and that fact can be used to support the overall reliability of reason. This paper challenges Pust’s argument. I argue that while Pust successfully undermines a radical skeptical view of reason, he does not refute a more modest skepticism. I conclude with some suggestions for Cartesian a priorists.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Daniel Whiting Knowledge is Not Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason
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Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces aproblem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases.
reviews
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Thomas Dabay Jaroslav Peregrin: Inferentialism. Why Rules Matter
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9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
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10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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