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Displaying: 1-8 of 8 documents


research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 3
Michael J. Shaffer Internalism, Evidentialism and Appeals to Expert Knowledge
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Given the sheer vastness of the totality of contemporary human knowledge and our individual epistemic finitude it is commonplace for those of us who lack knowledge with respect to some proposition(s) to appeal to experts (those who do have knowledge with respect to that proposition(s)) as an epistemic resource. Of course, much ink has been spilled on this issue and so concern here will be very narrowly focused on testimony in the context of epistemological views that incorporate evidentialism and internalism, and which are either reductivist or non-reductivist in nature. Also, as the main question about testimony addressed here is whether or not testimony can provide any basic justification at all, attention will be narrowly focused on the simple case where one is presented with testimony that something is the case from only one source and on one occasion. It turns out that there are some seriously odd epistemic features of such appeals to expertise that arise both for those who intend to accept internalism, evidentialism and reductivism about justification by testimony and for those who intend to accept internalism, evidentialism and non-reductivism about justification by testimony.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 3
Marc Andree Weber Epistemic Peerhood, Likelihood, and Equal Weight
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Standardly, epistemic peers regarding a given matter are said to be people of equal competence who share all relevant evidence. Alternatively, one can define epistemic peers regarding a given matter as people who are equally likely to be right about that matter. I argue that a definition in terms of likelihood captures the essence of epistemic peerhood better than the standard definition or any variant of it. What is more, a likelihood definition implies the truth of the central thesis in the debate on peer disagreement, the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give the opinions of our peers the same weight we give our own. Adopting a likelihood definition, however, does not end the debate on peer disagreement, because the alleged theoretical alternatives to the Equal Weight View, reinterpreted in the light of a likelihood definition, can in fact be shown to be compatible with this view—though the reinterpreted versions may appear less plausible than the original ones.
discussion notes/debate
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 3
Philip Atkins Getting Gettier Right: Reply to Mizrahi
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Moti Mizrahi has argued that Gettier cases are misleading, since they involve a certain kind of semantic failure. In a recent paper, I criticized Mizrahi’s argument. Mizrahi has since responded. This is a response to his response.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 3
Landon D. C. Elkind A New Metaphysics of Sense-Data
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I critically discuss a new proposal for a metaphysics of sense-data. This proposal is due to Peter Forrest. Forrest argues that, if we accept Platonism about universals, sense-data are best understood as structured universals–in particular, as structured universals with temporal and spatial properties as components. Against this proposal, I argue sense-data as structured universals are not universals at all.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 3
Mark Schroeder The Epistemic Consequences of Forced Choice
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In “Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge,” I used a variety of cases, including cases of forced choice, to illustrate my explanation of how and why some pragmatic factors, but not others, can affect whether an agent knows. In his recent contribution, Andy Mueller argues that cases of forced choice actually pose a dilemma for my account. In this paper I reply.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
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7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 3
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 3
Notes to Contributors
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