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Logos & Episteme

Volume 8, Issue 4, 2017

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Displaying: 1-9 of 9 documents


research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 4
Peter Baumann If You Believe, You Believe: A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own Beliefs
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Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that p without believing that one believes that p.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 4
David Coss Contextualism and Context Internalism
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Contextualism is the view that the word ‘knows’ is context sensitive and shifts according to the relevant standards in play. I argue that Contextualism is best paired with internalism about contexts. That is to say, an attributor’s context is completely determined by mental facts. Consequently, in the absence of awareness, external facts do not lead to contextual shifts. I support this view by appealing to the typical cases contextualists employ, such as DeRose’s Bank Cases and Cohen’s Airport Case. I conclude by reflecting on the nature of attributor’s themselves, and suggest this also supports the view that Contextualism is internalistic about contextual shifts.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 4
Patrick Grim, Nicholas Rescher Limitations and the World Beyond
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This paper surveys our inescapable limits as cognitive agents with regard to a full world of fact: the well-known metamathematical limits of axiomatic systems, limitations of explanation that doom a principle of sufficient reason, limitations of expression across all possible languages, and a simple but powerful argument regarding the limits of conceivability. In ways demonstrable even from within our limits, the full world of fact is inescapably beyond us. Here we propose that there must nonetheless be a totality of fact, and that despite our limits we can know something of its general character. The world as the totality of fact must form a plenum, with a radically unfamiliar formal structure that contains distinct elements corresponding to each element of its own power set.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 4
Richard Pettigrew Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic
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How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of doxastic rationality? In this paper, we consider a range of putative logic-rationality bridge principles . These purport to relate facts about logical consequence to norms that govern the rationality of our beliefs and credences. To investigate these principles, we deploy a novel approach, namely, epistemic utility theory. That is, we assume that doxastic attitudes have different epistemic value depending on how accurately they represent the world. We then use the principles of decision theory to determine which of the putative logic-rationality bridge principles we can derive from considerations of epistemic utility.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 4
Maura Priest Why Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology has No Luck with Closure
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In Part I, this paper argues that Duncan Pritchard’s version of safety is incompatible with closure. In Part II I argue for an alternative theory that fares much better. Part I begins by reviewing past arguments concerning safety’s problems with closure. After discussing both their inadequacies and Pritchard’s response to them, I offer a modified criticism immune to previous shortcomings. I conclude Part I by explaining how Pritchard’s own arguments make my critique possible. Part II argues that most modal theories of knowledge will run into problems similar to those found in Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. I hence offer my own theory grounded in risk assessment and explain why and how it does much better.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 4
Michael J. Shaffer An Argument for the Safety Condition on Knowledge
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This paper introduces a new argument for the safety condition on knowledge. It is based on the contention that the rejection of safety entails the rejection of the factivity condition on knowledge. But, since we should maintain factivity, we should endorse safery.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 4
Notes on the Contributors
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8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 4
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 4
Notes to Contributors
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