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Logos & Episteme

Volume 10
Epistemology’s Ancient Origins and New Developments

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Displaying: 1-20 of 44 documents


research articles
1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Scott Aikin, Brian Ribeiro Skeptical Theism and the Creep Problem
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Skeptical theism is the view that human knowledge and understanding are severely limited, compared to that of the divine. The view is deployed as an undercutting defeater for evidential arguments from evil. However, skeptical theism has broader skeptical consequences than those for the argument from evil. The epistemic principles of this skeptical creep are identified and shown to be on the road to global skepticism.
2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Tommaso Ostillio, Michal Bukat The Knobe Effect with Probable Outcomes and Availability Heuristic Triggers
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This paper contributes to the existing philosophical literature on the Knobe Effect (KE) in two main ways: first, this paper disconfirms the KE by showing that the latter does not hold in contexts with probable outcomes; second, this paper shows that KE is strongly sensitive to the availability heuristic bias. In particular, this paper presents two main findings from three empirical tests carried out between 2016 and 2018: the first finding concerns the fact that if the issuer of a decision with consequences on third parties is unlikely to be perceived as unfriendly, then KE is reduced or absent; the second finding regards instead the fact that if an action has two possible outcomes (one likely to obtain with strong intensity and one likely to obtain with less intensity), then KE does not obtain for decisions whose side-effects have limited consequences on third parties.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Seungbae Park Surrealism Is Not an Alternative to Scientific Realism
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Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it is true. I argue that the surrealist explanation merely clarifies the concept of empirical adequacy, whereas the realist explanation makes an inductive inference about T. Therefore, the surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the realist explanation is an empirical one, and the former is not an alternative to the latter.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Hans Rott Unstable Knowledge, Unstable Belief
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An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not be stable either. The second claim does not follow from the first, even if we take knowledge to be a special kind of rational belief. ‘Stability’ is an ambiguous term that has an internally conditional structure.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Michael J. Shaffer The Availability Heuristic and Inference to the Best Explanation
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This paper shows how the availability heuristic can be used to justify inference to the best explanation in such a way that van Fraassen's infamous "best of a bad lot" objection can be adroitly avoided. With this end in mind, a dynamic and contextual version of the erotetic model of explanation sufficient to ground this response is presented and defended.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Xintong Wei The Permissible Norm of Truth and “Ought Implies Can”
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Many philosophers hold that a norm of truth governs the propositional attitude of belief. According to one popular construal of normativity, normativity is prescriptive in nature. The prescriptive norm can be formulated either in terms of obligation or permission: one ought to or may believe that p just in case p is true. It has been argued that the obligation norm is jointly incompatible with the maxim ought implies can and the assumption that there exists some truth that we cannot believe. The problem of the incompatible triad has motivated some to adopt the permissible norm of truth. I argue that the permissible norm faces an analogous problem of the incompatible triad.
discussion notes/debate
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Moti Mizrahi Factivity and Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to Sankey
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This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the factivity of knowledge does entail that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Howard Sankey Why Must Justification Guarantee Truth?: Reply to Mizrahi
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This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect to the interpretation of the phrase “p cannot be false”.
9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
James Simpson Knowledge Doesn’t Require Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to Mizrahi
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In a recent discussion note in this journal, Moti Mizrahi offers us the following argument for the conclusion that knowledge requires epistemic certainty:1) If S knows that p on the grounds that e, then p cannot be false given e.2) If p cannot be false given e, then e makes p epistemically certain.3) Therefore, if S knows that p on the grounds that e, then e makes p epistemically certain.I’ll argue that (2) of Mizrahi’s argument is false, and so, Mizrahi’s argument is unsound.
10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Notes on the Contributors
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11. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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12. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 4
Notes to Contributors
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research articles
13. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Víctor Fernández Castro Inner Speech and Metacognition: A Defense of the Commitment-Based Approach
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A widespread view in philosophy claims that inner speech is closely tied to human metacognitive capacities. This so-called format view of inner speech considers that talking to oneself allows humans to gain access to their own mental states by forming metarepresentation states through the rehearsal of inner utterances (section 2). The aim of this paper is to present two problems to this view (section 3) and offer an alternative view to the connection between inner speech and metacognition (section 4). According to this alternative, inner speech (meta)cognitive functions derivate from the set of commitments we mobilize in our communicative exchanges. After presenting this commitment-based approach, I address two possible objections (section 5).
14. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
James M. Joyce, Brian Weatherson Accuracy and the Imps
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Recently several authors have argued that accuracy-first epistemology ends up licensing problematic epistemic bribes. They charge that it is better, given the accuracy-first approach, to deliberately form one false belief if this will lead to forming many other true beliefs. We argue that this is not a consequence of the accuracy-first view. If one forms one false belief and a number of other true beliefs, then one is committed to many other false propositions, e.g., the conjunction of that false belief with any of the true beliefs. Once we properly account for all the falsehoods that are adopted by the person who takes the bribe, it turns out that the bribe does not increase accuracy.
15. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
N. Gabriel Martin What Is the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement?
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Over the past decade, attention to epistemically significant disagreement has centered on the question of whose disagreement qualifies as significant, but ignored another fundamental question: what is the epistemic significance of disagreement? While epistemologists have assumed that disagreement is only significant when it indicates a determinate likelihood that one’s own belief is false, and therefore that only disagreements with epistemic peers are significant at all, they have ignored a more subtle and more basic significance that belongs to all disagreements, regardless of who they are with—that the opposing party is wrong. It is important to recognize the basic significance of disagreement since it is what explains all manners of rational responses to disagreement, including assessing possible epistemic peers and arguing against opponents regardless of their epistemic fitness.
16. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Jesús Navarro Bridging the Intellectualist Divide: A Reading of Stanley’s Ryle
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Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, and then I focus on Jason Stanley’s reading of Ryle’s position. I show that Ryle has been seriously misconstrued in this discussion, and then revise Ryle’s original arguments in order to show that the confrontation between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists may not be as insurmountable as it seems, at least in the case of Stanley, given that both contenders are motivated by their discontent with a conception of intelligent performances as the effect of intellectual hidden powers detached from practice.
discussion notes/debate
17. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
John Biro Reply to Forrai: No Reprieve for Gettier “Beliefs”
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In a recent paper in this journal, Gabor Forrai offers ways to resist my argument that in so-called Gettier cases the belief condition is not, as is commonly assumed, satisfied. He argues that I am mistaken in taking someone's reluctance to assert a proposition he knows follows from a justified belief on finding the latter false as evidence that he does not believe it, as such reluctance may be explained in other ways. While this may be true, I show that it does not affect my central claim which does not turn on considerations special to assertion.
18. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Howard Sankey Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi
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This note is a comment on a recent paper in this journal by Moti Mizrahi. Mizrahi claims that the factivity of knowledge entails that knowledge requires epistemic certainty. But the argument that Mizrahi presents does not proceed from factivity to certainty. Instead, it proceeds from a premise about the relationship between grounds and knowledge to the conclusion about certainty.
19. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
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20. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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