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Displaying: 1-10 of 411 documents

1. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Scott F. Aikin Introduction: Epistemology’s Ancient Origins and New Developments
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2. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Harald Thorsrud Sextus Empiricus on the Siren Song of Reason and the Skeptical Defense of Ordinary Life
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By understanding the sense in which Sextus thinks reason is deceptive we may clarify his attitude towards ordinary life. The deception, like that of the Siren's song, is practical rather than epistemic. It is not a matter of leading us to assent to false or unjustified conclusions but is rather a distraction from, or even corruption of, ordinary life.
3. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Timothy Roche The Practical Life, the Contemplative Life, and the Perfect Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 10.7-8
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Two views continue to be defended today. One is that the account of eudaimonia in EN 10 is inconsistent with claims made about it in other books of the work. The other view is that the account in EN 10 is consistent with other claims made in the other books because Aristotle presents one account of perfect eudaimonia by portraying it as consisting solely in contemplative activity. I call this view the intellectualist interpretation. I then argue that neither view is correct because although Aristotle’s position is consistent, he does not hold that the perfect eudaimonia for a human being involves nothing but excellent theoretical activity. His philosopher possesses and exercises the moral excellences and practical wisdom and so some portion of his happiness consists in these activities as well as contemplative activity.
4. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Maureen Eckert Euthyphro and the Logic of Miasma
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Euthyphro is a Socratic interlocutor claiming enormous religious expertise, while his portrayal in the eponymous dialogue raises questions the reliability of his beliefs. This paper closely examines how Euthyphro justifies his case against his father, identifying an argument that relies on the concept of miasma (pollution). In so far as miasma is considered in isolation, Euthyphro has a good argument. Unfortunately, there is more than miasma at stake when considering why one could prosecute one’s own parent. Introducing the other relevant concepts, honor and shame, we find his case reflects a dilemma at the source of ancient Greek religious thought. It would not be possible for Euthyphro or anyone else to know what to do in his case.
5. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Allysson V.L. Rocha Boundless Skepticism and the Five Modes
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There is a difference between the tasks of interpreting Sextus Empiricus and contesting his arguments. Usually, one does the latter relying on some version of the former. Though this seems obvious, it is easy to make mistakes in this endeavor. From this point, I draw two basic recommendations which we should follow, lest we take Sextus to hold implausible positions regarding his Five Modes. However, these recommendations lead us to interpret Sextus’ Pyrrhonism as a limited skepticism. In the final section, as I suggest a counter-example to this commitment, I reconsider the notion of infinite (apeiron) in the Five Modes to better explain interpretation and criticism of Sextus’ arguments.
6. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Daniel Larkin A Gift from the Gods: Socratic Knowledge in Plato’s Late Dialogues
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While much attention has been paid to the role of divine inspiration in the case of Socrates within Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, this paper examines Plato’s late period works and argues that despite the drastic changes in methodology found in dialogues such as the Sophist and Philebus, Plato still acknowledges, and emphasizes, the role played by divine inspiration in regard to Socratic knowledge.
7. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Brian Ribeiro Skeptical Fideism in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum
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The work of Richard H. Popkin both introduced the concept of skeptical fideism and served to impressively document its importance in the philosophies of a diverse range of thinkers, including Montaigne, Pascal, Huet, and Bayle. Popkin’s landmark History of Scepticism, however, begins its coverage with the Renaissance. In this paper I explore the roots of skeptical fideism in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, with special attention to Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, the oldest surviving text to clearly develop a skeptical fideist perspective.
8. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Andrew Cling Meno’s Paradox is an Epistemic Regress Problem
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I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that (1) acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and (2) any knowledge must be acquired. (1) is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic priority of knowledge about what X is . (1) and (2) jointly imply a regress-generating principle which implies that knowledge always requires an infinite sequence of known reasons. Plato’s response to the problem is to accept (1) but reject (2): some knowledge is innate. He argues from this to the conclusion that the soul is immortal. This argument can be understood as a response to an Eleatic problem about the possibility of coming into being that turns on a regress-generating causal principle analogous to the regress-generating principle presupposed by Meno’s paradox.
9. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Notes on the Contributors
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10. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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