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articles
1. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Massimo Mugnai Leibniz and ‘Bradley’s Regress’
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In a text written during his stay in Paris, Leibniz, to deny ontological reality to relations, employs an argument well known to the medieval thinkers and which later would be revived by Francis H. Bradley. If one assumes that relations are real and that a relation links any property to a subject – so runs the argument – then one falls prey to an infinite regress. Leibniz seems to be well aware of the consequences that this argument has for his own metaphysical views, where the relation of inherence (‘inesse’) plays such a central role. Thus, he attempts first to interpret the relation of inherence as something ‘metaphoric’, originating from our ‘spatial way’ of looking at the surrounding world; and then he tries to reduce it to the part-whole relation which clearly he considers weaker, from the ontological point of view, than that of ‘being in’.
2. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Paul Lodge The Empirical Grounds for Leibniz’s ‘Real Metaphysics’
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In discussion of Leibniz’s philosophical methodology Donald Rutherford defends the view that Leibniz regarded metaphysics as an a priori demonstrative science. In the course of this discussion Rutherford isolates and tries to deflect a significant challenge for his view, namely the observation that in many of his mature writings on metaphysics Leibniz appears to defend his views by means of a posteriori arguments. I present some prima facie difficulties with Rutherford’s position and then offer an alternative account of how Leibniz thought he needed to establish metaphysical claims. My suggestion is that the challenge that Rutherford poses may be best answered by attending to the fact that Leibniz recognized a kind of metaphysical enquiry, ‘real metaphysics’, that is essentially a posteriori, in virtue of the fact that it is concerned not just with possible kinds of beings, but with the kinds of beings that God actually created.
book reviews
3. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
R. C. Sleigh, Comments on Dan Garber’s Book, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad
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4. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Robert Merrihew Adams Continuity and Development of Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Body: A Response to Daniel Garber’s Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad
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5. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Daniel Garber Reply to Robert Sleigh and Robert Adams
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6. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Patrick Riley L’Angelologia Leibniziana
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7. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Justin E. H. Smith Leibniz, le vivant et l’organisme
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8. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Patrick Riley Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe
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leibniz texts
9. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Massimo Mugnai Leibniz’s “Schedae de novis formis syllogisticis” (1715): Text and Translation
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discussion
10. The Leibniz Review: Volume > 20
Tamar Levanon A Reply to Anja Jauernig’s article, ‘Leibniz on Motion and the Equivalence of Hypothesis,’ The Leibniz Review, Vol. 18, 2008
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