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1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 9
Shannon Spaulding Imagination, Desire, and Rationality
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We often have affective responses to fictional events. We feel afraid for Desdemona when Othello approaches her in a murderous rage. We feel disgust toward Iago for orchestrating this tragic event. What mental architecture could explain these affective responses? In this paper I consider the claim that the best explanation of our affective responses to fiction involves imaginative desires. Some theorists argue that accounts that do not invoke imaginative desires imply that consumers of fiction have irrational desires. I argue that there are serious worries about imaginative desires that warrant skepticism about the adequacy of the account. Moreover, it is quite difficult to articulate general principles of rationality for desires, and even according to the most plausible of these possible principles, desires about fiction are not irrational.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 9
Michael Zhao Intervention and the Probabilities of Indicative Conditionals
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A few purported counterexamples to the Adams thesis have cropped up in the literature in the last few decades. I propose a theory that accounts for them, in a way that makes the connections between indicative conditionals and counterfactuals clearer.
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3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 9
Diana B. Heney Reality as Necessary Friction
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In this paper, I argue that Huw Price’s widely read “Truth as Convenient Friction” overstates the onerousness, and underrates the utility, of the ontological commitments involved in Charles S. Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth. This argument comes in three parts. First, I briefly explain Peirce’s view of truth, and relate it to his account of assertion. Next, I articulate what I take Price’s grievance against Peirce’s view to be, and suggest that this criticism misses the target. Finally, I argue that Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth has greater explanatory power than the narrowly linguistic version put forward by Price, such that even the ontology-averse should accept it.
4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 9
New Books
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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 112 > Issue: 9
New Books: Anthologies
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