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1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 9
William MacAskill Smokers, Psychos, and Decision-Theoretic Uncertainty
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In this paper I propose an approach to decision theory that I call metanormativism, where the key idea is that decision theory should take into account decision-theoretic uncertainty. I don’t attempt to argue in favor of this view, though I briefly offer some motivation for it. Instead, I argue that if the view is correct, it has important implications for the causal versus evidential decision-theory debate. First, it allows us to make rational sense of our seemingly divergent intuitions across the Smoking Lesion and The Psychopath Button cases. Second, it generates strong new arguments for preferring the causal approach to decision-theory over the evidential approach.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 9
Renaud-Philippe Garner A Tale of Two Moralities
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In this paper, I seek to close a gap in Michael Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers. Specifically, I seek to show that Walzer’s argument for the moral equality of soldiers depends upon an implicit analysis of the function of excuses. I provide this analysis of excuses: a triadic relationship between moral norms, a background of normality and excuses. I then use this analysis to show that Jeff McMahan’s argument for the moral inequality of soldiers rest upon an implausible view of excuses, namely that the conditions of war merely constitute excuses for failing to comply with ordinary, or peacetime, morality. I argue that the conditions of war are best understood as providing a new background of normality rather than a set of excuses. To show this, I identify five conditions that separate the normality of war from the normality of peace.
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3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 9
Shao-Pu Kang Somatoparaphrenia, the Body Swap Illusion, and Immunity to Error through Misidentification
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Sydney Shoemaker argues that a certain class of self-ascriptions is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. In their “Self-Consciousness and Immunity,” Timothy Lane and Caleb Liang question Shoemaker’s view. Lang and Liang present a clinical case (somatoparaphrenia) and an experiment (the Body Swap Illusion) and argue that they are counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. This paper is a response to Lane and Liang’s challenge. I identify the desiderata that a counterexample to Shoemaker’s view must meet and show that somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illusion fail to meet those desiderata. Thus, despite being puzzling phenomena, somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illusion are not counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view.
book reviews
4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 9
Daniel Deasy Ross Cameron: The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and Ontology
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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 9
New Books: Translations
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