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1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 11
Carolina Sartorio PAP-Style Cases
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Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model, which states that acting freely consists (at least partly) in being able to do otherwise, and, more recently, the actual-sequence model, which states that acting freely is exclusively a function of the actual sequence of events issuing in our behavior. In general, a natural strategy when trying to decide between two models of a certain concept is to look for examples that support one model and undermine the other. Frankfurt-style cases have been used for this kind of purpose, to challenge the alternative-possibilities view and support the actual-sequence view. In this paper I examine the prospects of the counterparts of Frankfurt-style cases: “PAP-style” cases, or cases that could be used to support the alternative-possibilities view and challenge the actual-sequence view. I argue that there are no successful PAP-style cases.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 11
Duncan Pritchard Epistemic Risk
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The goal of this paper is to mark the transition from an anti-luck epistemology to an anti-risk epistemology, and to explain in the process how the latter has advantages over the former. We begin with an account of anti-luck epistemology and the modal account of luck that underpins it. Then we consider the close inter-relationships between luck and risk, and in the process set out the modal account of risk that is a natural extension of the modal account of luck. Finally, we apply the modal account of risk to epistemology in order to develop an anti-risk epistemology, and then explore the merits of this proposal. In particular, it is shown that (i) this account can avoid a theoretical lacuna in anti-luck epistemology, and (ii) there is a stronger theoretical motivation for anti-risk epistemology compared with anti-luck epistemology, especially when it comes to explaining why environmental epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge.
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 11
Lei Zhong Physicalism, Psychism, and Phenomenalism
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The dominant way to define physical entities is by appeal to ideal physics (as opposed to current physics). However, it has been worried that physicalism understood in terms of ideal physics would be too liberal to rule out “psychism”, which is the view that mentality exists at the fundamental metaphysical level. In this article, I argue that whereas physicalism is incompatible with some psychist cases, such as the case of “phenomenalism” in which ideal physics adopts mental concepts to denote fundamental entities, physicalism should accommodate a certain type of psychist case in which fundamental mental entities are denoted by non-mental concepts in ideal physics. In so doing, I propose a distinctive account of physical entities, which is based on two plausible theses: 1) physical entities are entities denoted by physical concepts; and 2) physical concepts are non-mental natural concepts in ideal physics. Physicalism thus understood is expected to be neither too liberal nor too demanding.
4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 11
New Books: Translations
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