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Displaying: 1-4 of 4 documents

1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 1
Wayne Wu Shaking Up the Mind’s Ground Floor: The Cognitive Penetration of Visual Attention
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This paper discusses the cognitive penetration of visual attention by intention, a form of top-down modulation where cognitive states directly influence visual processing. In the current literature, the case for cognitive penetration is largely made based on behavioral data. However, in the case of attention, the plausibility of cognitive penetration is secured by unpacking the nature of attention in the context of a computational model of attention-related visual processing. Attention thus provides the best empirical case for cognitive penetration. Additionally, the paper highlights the epistemic consequences of the cognitive penetration of vision by a subject’s cognitive and other biases.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 1
Luc Lauwers, Peter Vallentyne A Tree Can Make a Difference
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We show that it is not possible to extend the ranking of one-stage lotteries based on their weak-expectation (Easwaran 2008) to a reflexive and transitive (but possibly incomplete) relation on the collection of one- and two-stage lotteries that satisfies two basic axioms, the minimal value axiom and the reduction axiom. We propose an extension that satisfies only the first axiom. This ranking takes payoffs, their probabilities, and the tree structure into account.
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3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 1
Oliver R. Marshall Giaquinto on Acquaintance with Numbers
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Marcus Giaquinto claims that finite cardinal numbers are sensible properties, and that the smallest ones are known by acquaintance. In this paper I compare Giaquinto’s epistemology to the Russellian one with which it invites comparison, before showing how it is subject to a version of Jody Azzouni’s “epistemic role” objection. Then I argue that the source of this problem is Giaquinto’s misconception that numbers, like quantities, are sensible properties. Finally, I offer a sketch of a theory of how we grasp finite cardinals on the assumption that they are not sensible, and show why this is not subject to the epistemic role objection.
4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 1
In Memoriam: Derek Parfit
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