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Displaying: 1-4 of 4 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
Keren Gorodeisky, Eric Marcus Aesthetic Rationality
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We argue that the aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality, but does so in its own way. Aesthetic judgment is a stance neither on whether a proposition is to be believed nor on whether an action is to be done, but on whether an object is to be appreciated. Aesthetic judgment is simply appreciation. Correlatively, reasons supporting theoretical, practical and aesthetic judgments operate in fundamentally different ways. The irreducibility of the aesthetic domain is due to the fact that aesthetic judgment is a sensory-affective disclosure of, and responsiveness to, merit: it is a feeling that presents an object, and is responsive to it, as worthy of being liked. Aesthetic judgment is thus shown to be, on the hand, first personal and non-transferable; and, on the other hand, a presentation of reality. We thereby capture what is right in both subjectivist and objectivist conceptions of aesthetic judgment.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
Andrew Peet, Eli Pitcovski Normal Knowledge: Toward an Explanation-Based Theory of Knowledge
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In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not involve indexing to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief. This shift is problematic for several prominent approaches to the theory of knowledge, including virtue reliabilism and proper functionalism (as normally conceived). The view that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief is better able to accommodate the shift in question.
review essays
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
Bob Hale Paolo Mancosu: Abstraction and Infinity
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
New Books
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