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Displaying: 1-5 of 5 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 12
David J. Chalmers Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism
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Cartesian arguments for global skepticism about the external world start from the premise that we cannot know that we are not in a Cartesian scenario such as an evil-demon scenario, and infer that because most of our empirical beliefs are false in such a scenario, these beliefs do not constitute knowledge. Veridicalist responses to global skepticism respond that arguments fail because in Cartesian scenarios, many or most of our empirical beliefs are true. Some veridicalist responses (suggested by Bouswma, Putnam, and Davidson) have been motivated using verificationism, externalism, and coherentism. I argue that a more powerful veridicalist response to global skepticism can be motivated by structuralism, on which physical entities are understood as those that play a certain structural role. I develop the structuralist response and address objections.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 12
Remco Heesen Why the Reward Structure of Science Makes Reproducibility Problems Inevitable
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Recent philosophical work has praised the reward structure of science, while recent empirical work has shown that many scientific results may not be reproducible. I argue that the reward structure of science incentivizes scientists to focus on speed and impact at the expense of the reproducibility of their work, thus contributing to the so-called reproducibility crisis. I use a rational choice model to identify a set of sufficient conditions for this problem to arise, and I argue that these conditions plausibly apply to a wide range of research situations. Currently proposed solutions will not fully address this problem. Philosophical commentators should temper their optimism about the reward structure of science.
book reviews
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 12
Paul Teller Catherine Z. Elgin: True Enough
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 12
New Books: Anthologies
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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 12
Index to Volume CXV
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