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Displaying: 1-4 of 4 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Ethan Jerzak Two Ways to Want?
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I present unexplored and unaccounted for uses of ‘wants’. I call them advisory uses, on which information inaccessible to the desirer herself helps determine what she wants. I show that extant theories by Stalnaker, Heim, and Levinson fail to predict these uses. They also fail to predict true indicative conditionals with ‘wants’ in the consequent. These problems are related: intuitively valid reasoning with modus ponens on the basis of the conditionals in question results in unembedded advisory uses. I consider two fixes, and end up endorsing a relativist semantics, according to which desire attributions express information-neutral propositions. On this view, ‘wants’ functions as a precisification of ‘ought’, which exhibits similar unembedded and compositional behavior. I conclude by sketching a pragmatic account of the purpose of desire attributions that explains why it made sense for them to evolve in this way.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Richard Holton Lying About
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We do not report lies with that-clauses but with about-clauses: he lied about x. It is argued that this is because the content of a lie need not be the content of what is said, and about-clauses give us the requisite flexibility. Building on the work of Stephen Yablo, an attempt is made to give an account of lying about in terms of partial content and topic.
comments and criticism
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Raphael van Riel Lying beyond a Conversational Purpose: A Critique of Stokke's Assertion-Based Account of Lying
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In this paper, I argue that a particular assertion-based account of lying, which rests on Stalnaker’s theory of assertions, proposed by Andreas Stokke, is both too broad and too narrow. I tentatively conclude that the account fails because lying does not necessarily involve a conversational purpose.
book reviews
4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Zoltán Gendler Szabó Barry Schein: 'And': Conjunction Reduction Redux
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