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Displaying: 1-3 of 3 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 11
Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras, Robert Sugden A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning
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John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome’s central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of rationality requirements: consistency requirements, completeness requirements, and closedness requirements. Many standard rationality requirements fall under this typology. Based on three theorems, we argue that reasoning is successful in achieving closedness requirements, but not in achieving consistency or completeness requirements. We assess how far our negative results reveal gaps in Broome's theory, or deficiencies in choice theory and behavioral economics.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 11
Isaac Wilhelm The Ontology of Mechanisms
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I propose a metaphysical theory of mechanisms based on the notion of causation. In particular, I use causation to formulate existence, identity, and parthood conditions for mechanisms. These conditions provide a sound metaphysical basis for accounts of mechanistic explanation, mechanistic organization, and for more restrictive theories of mechanisms.
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3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 11
Matthew McGrath Jessica Brown: Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge
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