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Displaying: 1-4 of 4 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 1
Weng Kin San Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles
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Fitch’s Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. Standard diagnoses identify the factivity/negative infallibility of the knowledge operator and Moorean contradictions as the root source of the result. This paper generalises Fitch’s result to show that such diagnoses are mistaken. In place of factivity/negative infallibility, the weaker assumption of any ‘level-bridging principle’ suffices. A consequence is that the result holds for some logics in which the “Moorean contradiction” commonly thought to underlie the result is in fact consistent. This generalised result improves on the current understanding of Fitch’s result and widens the range of modalities of philosophical interest to which the result might be fruitfully applied. Along the way, we also consider a semantic explanation for Fitch’s result which answers a challenge raised by Kvanvig.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 1
Lucas Rosenblatt Maximal Non-trivial Sets of Instances of Your Least Favorite Logical Principle
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The paper generalizes Van McGee's well-known result that there are many maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema to a number of non-classical theories of truth. It is shown that if a non-classical theory rejects some classically valid principle in order to avoid the truth-theoretic paradoxes, then there will be many maximal non-trivial sets of instances of that principle that the non-classical theorist could in principle endorse. On the basis of this it is argued that the idea of classical recapture, which plays such an important role for non-classical logicians, can only be pushed so far.
book reviews
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 1
R. Jay Wallace Margaret Gilbert: Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 1
Call for Submissions: The Isaac Levi Prize
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