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Displaying: 1-4 of 4 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 6
Lei Zhong Intervention, Fixation, and Supervenient Causation
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A growing number of philosophers are bringing interventionism into the field of supervenient causation. Many argue that interventionist supervenient causation is exempted from the fixability condition. However, this approach looks ad hoc, inconsistent with the general interventionist requirement on fixation. Moreover, it leads to false judgments about the causal efficacy of supervenient/subvenient properties. This article aims to develop a novel interventionist account of supervenient causation that respects the fixability requirement. The treatment of intervention and fixation that I propose can accommodate some theoretical constraints on causation and deliver correct causal verdicts in classic examples. It is also worth noting that this interventionist account offers a promising defense of mental causation without postulating mental-physical overdetermination.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 6
Matthew Mandelkern A Counterexample to Modus Ponenses
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McGee (1985) argued that modus ponens was invalid for the natural language conditional ‘If…then…’. Many subsequent responses have argued that, while McGee’s examples show that modus ponens fails to preserve truth, they do not show that modus ponens fails to preserve rational full acceptance, and thus modus ponens may still be valid in the latter informational sense. I show that when we turn our attention from indicative conditionals (the focus of most of the literature to date) to subjunctive conditionals, we find that modus ponens does not preserve either truth or rational full acceptance, and thus is not valid in either sense. In concluding I briefly consider how we can account for these facts.
review essays
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 6
Paul Conlan, Giovanni Merlo, Crispin Wright Eyes Directed Outward: Alex Byrne: Transparency and Self-Knowledge
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 6
Call for Submissions: The Isaac Levi Prize
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