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Displaying: 1-12 of 12 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 3
J. Dmitri Gallow The Causal Decision Theorist's Guide to Managing the News
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According to orthodox causal decision theory, performing an action can give you information about factors outside of your control, but you should not take this information into account when deciding what to do. Causal decision theorists caution against an irrational policy of "managing the news." But, by providing information about factors outside of your control, performing an act can give you two, importantly different, kinds of news. It can tell you that the world in which you find yourself is good, and it can tell you that the act itself is in a position to make the world better. While the first kind of news does not speak in favor of performing an act, I believe that the second kind of news does. I present a revision of causal decision theory which advises you to manage the news about the good you stand to promote, while ignoring news about the good the world has provided for you.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 3
David Mark Kovacs Constitution and Dependence
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Constitution is the relation that holds between an object and what it is made of: statues are constituted by the lumps of matter they coincide with; flags, one may think, are constituted by colored pieces of cloth; and perhaps human persons are constituted by biological organisms. Constitution is often thought to be a "dependence relation." In this paper, I argue that given some plausible theses about ontological dependence, most definitions of constitution don’t allow us to retain this popular doctrine. The best option for those who want to maintain that constitution is a dependence relation is to endorse a kind of mereological hylomorphism: constituted objects have their constituters as proper parts, along with a form, which is another proper part. The upshot is that constitution theorists who think of constitution as a dependence relation but are reluctant to endorse mereological hylomorphism ought to give up one of their commitments.
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 3
New Books
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 3
Call for Submissions: The Isaac Levi Prize
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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 2
William MacAskill, Owen Cotton-Barratt, Toby Ord Statistical Normalization Methods in Interpersonal and Intertheoretic Comparisons
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A major problem for interpersonal aggregation is how to compare utility across individuals; a major problem for decision-making under normative uncertainty is the formally analogous problem of how to compare choice-worthiness across theories. We introduce and study a class of methods, which we call statistical normalization methods, for making interpersonal comparisons of utility and intertheoretic comparisons of choice-worthiness. We argue against the statistical normalization methods that have been proposed in the literature. We argue, instead, in favor of normalization of variance: we claim that this is the account that most plausibly gives all individuals or theories ‘equal say’. To this end, we provide two proofs that variance normalization has desirable properties that all other normalization methods lack, though we also show how different assumptions could lead one to axiomatize alternative statistical normalization methods.
6. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 2
Christine Tiefensee "Ought" and Error
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The moral error theory generally does not receive good press in metaethics. This paper adds to the bad news. In contrast to other critics, though, I do not attack error theorists’ characteristic thesis that no moral assertion is ever true. Instead, I develop a new counter-argument which questions error theorists’ ability to defend their claim that moral utterances are (typically) meaningful assertions. More precisely: Moral error theorists lack a convincing account of the meaning of deontic moral assertions, or so I will argue.
7. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 2
Call for Submissions: The Isaac Levi Prize
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8. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 2
Memo to Authors
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9. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 1
Weng Kin San Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles
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Fitch’s Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. Standard diagnoses identify the factivity/negative infallibility of the knowledge operator and Moorean contradictions as the root source of the result. This paper generalises Fitch’s result to show that such diagnoses are mistaken. In place of factivity/negative infallibility, the weaker assumption of any ‘level-bridging principle’ suffices. A consequence is that the result holds for some logics in which the “Moorean contradiction” commonly thought to underlie the result is in fact consistent. This generalised result improves on the current understanding of Fitch’s result and widens the range of modalities of philosophical interest to which the result might be fruitfully applied. Along the way, we also consider a semantic explanation for Fitch’s result which answers a challenge raised by Kvanvig.
10. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 1
Lucas Rosenblatt Maximal Non-trivial Sets of Instances of Your Least Favorite Logical Principle
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The paper generalizes Van McGee's well-known result that there are many maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema to a number of non-classical theories of truth. It is shown that if a non-classical theory rejects some classically valid principle in order to avoid the truth-theoretic paradoxes, then there will be many maximal non-trivial sets of instances of that principle that the non-classical theorist could in principle endorse. On the basis of this it is argued that the idea of classical recapture, which plays such an important role for non-classical logicians, can only be pushed so far.
book reviews
11. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 1
R. Jay Wallace Margaret Gilbert: Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry
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12. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 117 > Issue: 1
Call for Submissions: The Isaac Levi Prize
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