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1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 2
Isaac Wilhelm Orcid-ID The Counteridentical Account of Explanatory Identities
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Many explanations rely on identity facts. In this paper, I propose an account of how identity facts explain: roughly, the fact that A is identical to B explains another fact whenever that other fact depends, counterfactually, on A being identical to B. As I show, this account has many virtues. It avoids several problems facing accounts of explanatory identities, and when precisified using structural equations, it can be used to defend interventionist accounts of causation against an objection.
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2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 2
Daniel Muñoz The Rejection of Consequentializing
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Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means killing one to save five. “Consequentializers” reply: this act is wrong, but it is not for the best, since killing is worse than letting die. I argue that this reply undercuts the “compellingness” of consequentialism, which comes from an outcome-based view of action that collapses the distinction between killing and letting die.
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3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 2
Nathan Howard Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons
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I argue that Davidson’s conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 118 > Issue: 2
Call for Submissions: The Isaac Levi Prize
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