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1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 4
Helen E. Longino

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A thin conception of the social pervades much philosophical writing in social epistemology. A thicker form of sociality is to be found in scientific practice, as represented in much recent history and philosophy of science. Typical social epistemology problems, such as disagreement and testimony, take on a different aspect when viewed from the perspective of scientific practice. Here interaction among researchers is central to their knowledge making activities and disagreement and testimony are resources, not problems. Whereas much of the disagreement and testimony literature assumes some conception of evidence, or that it is obvious what evidence is, a focus on scientific practice reveals that determining what counts as evidence and for what is determined through the discursive interactions among researchers. This paper concludes with questions about the assumptions about knowledge, cognitive agents, and the right starting point for epistemological reflection that shape the mainstream social epistemological approaches.
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2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 4
David Boylan, Ginger Schultheis

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The Qualitative Thesis says that if you leave open P, then you are sure of if P, then Q just in case you are sure of the corresponding material conditional. We argue the Qualitative Thesis provides compelling reasons to accept a thesis that we call Conditional Locality, which says, roughly, the interpretation of an indicative conditional depends, in part, on the conditional’s local embedding environment. In the first part of the paper, we present an argument—due to Ben Holguín—showing that, without Conditional Locality, the Qualitative Thesis is in tension with a margin for error principle on rational sureness. We show Conditional Locality reconciles the Qualitative Thesis with the margin for error principle. In the second part, we argue the full range of data supports what we call the Strong Qualitative Thesis. Without Conditional Locality, the Strong Qualitative Thesis has unacceptable consequences. But with Conditional Locality, it is tenable.
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3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 4

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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 4

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