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Displaying: 1-10 of 11997 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 3
David Shoemaker Hurt Feelings
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In introducing the reactive attitudes “of people directly involved in transactions with each other,” P. F. Strawson lists “gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings.” To show how our interpersonal emotional practices of responsibility could not be undermined by determinism’s truth, Strawson focused exclusively on resentment, specifically on its nature and actual excusing and exempting conditions. So have many other philosophers theorizing about responsibility in Strawson’s wake. This method and focus has generated a host of quality of will theories of responsibility. What I show in this paper is that if Strawson—and his followers—had focused on hurt feelings instead of resentment, not only would quality of will theories of responsibility be disfavored, but none of our other theories of responsibility could adequately account for them. I conclude by exploring what a conundrum this poses for our methods and starting points in theorizing about responsibility.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 3
Michael Ridge Relaxing Realism or Deferring Debate?
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In this paper I argue that so-called “Relaxed Realism” of the sort defended by T. M. Scanlon fails on its own terms by failing to distinguish itself from its putative rivals—in particular, from Quasi-Realism. On a whole host of questions, Relaxed Realism and Quasi-Realism give exactly the same answers, and these answers make up much of the core of the view. Scanlon offers three possible points of contrast, each of which I argue is not fit for purpose. Along the way I argue that Quasi-Realists can provide a better account of practical rationality than Relaxed Realists can, so insofar as they are distinct Quasi-Realism is superior.
book reviews
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 3
Maureen Donnelly Geoffrey Hellman and Stewart Shapiro: Varieties of Continua: From Regions to Points and Back
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 3
New Books: Translations
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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Ethan Jerzak Two Ways to Want?
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I present unexplored and unaccounted for uses of ‘wants’. I call them advisory uses, on which information inaccessible to the desirer herself helps determine what she wants. I show that extant theories by Stalnaker, Heim, and Levinson fail to predict these uses. They also fail to predict true indicative conditionals with ‘wants’ in the consequent. These problems are related: intuitively valid reasoning with modus ponens on the basis of the conditionals in question results in unembedded advisory uses. I consider two fixes, and end up endorsing a relativist semantics, according to which desire attributions express information-neutral propositions. On this view, ‘wants’ functions as a precisification of ‘ought’, which exhibits similar unembedded and compositional behavior. I conclude by sketching a pragmatic account of the purpose of desire attributions that explains why it made sense for them to evolve in this way.
6. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Richard Holton Lying About
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We do not report lies with that-clauses but with about-clauses: he lied about x. It is argued that this is because the content of a lie need not be the content of what is said, and about-clauses give us the requisite flexibility. Building on the work of Stephen Yablo, an attempt is made to give an account of lying about in terms of partial content and topic.
comments and criticism
7. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Raphael van Riel Lying beyond a Conversational Purpose: A Critique of Stokke's Assertion-Based Account of Lying
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In this paper, I argue that a particular assertion-based account of lying, which rests on Stalnaker’s theory of assertions, proposed by Andreas Stokke, is both too broad and too narrow. I tentatively conclude that the account fails because lying does not necessarily involve a conversational purpose.
book reviews
8. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 2
Zoltán Gendler Szabó Barry Schein: 'And': Conjunction Reduction Redux
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9. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 1
Florian Steinberger Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative
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According to tradition, logic is normative for reasoning. Gilbert Harman challenged the view that there is any straightforward connection between logical consequence and norms of reasoning. Authors including John MacFarlane and Hartry Field have sought to rehabilitate the traditional view. I argue that the debate is marred by a failure to distinguish three types of normative assessment, and hence three ways to understand the question of the normativity of logic. Logical principles might be thought to provide the reasoning agent with first-personal directives; they might be thought to serve as third-personal evaluative standards; or they might underwrite our third-personal appraisals of others whereby we attribute praise and blame. I characterize the three normative functions in general terms and show how a failure to appreciate this threefold distinction has led disputants to talk past one another. I further show how the distinction encourages fruitful engagement with and, ultimately, resolution of the question.
10. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 116 > Issue: 1
Peter Tan Counterpossible Non-vacuity in Scientific Practice
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The longstanding philosophical orthodoxy on counterfactuals holds, in part, that counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents (“counterpossibles”) are indiscriminately vacuously true. Drawing on a number of examples from across scientific practice, I argue that science routinely treats counterpossibles as non-vacuously true and also routinely treats other counterpossibles as false. In fact, the success of many central scientific endeavors requires that counterpossibles can be non-vacuously true or false. So the philosophical orthodoxy that counterpossibles are indiscriminately vacuously true is inconsistent with scientific practice. I argue that this provides a conclusive reason to reject the orthodoxy.