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Displaying: 1-10 of 11797 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 8
Daniel Greco, Brian Hedden, Uniqueness and Metaepistemology
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We defend Uniqueness, the claim that given a body of total evidence, there is a uniquely rational doxastic state that it is rational for one to be in. Epistemic rationality doesn't give you any leeway in forming your beliefs. To this end, we bring in two metaepistemological pictures about the roles played by rational evaluations. Rational evaluative terms serve to guide our practices of deference to the opinions of others, and also to help us formulate contingency plans about what to believe in various situations. We argue that Uniqueness vindicates these two roles for rational evaluations, while Permissivism clashes with them.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 8
Fabrizio Cariani, Consequence and Contrast in Deontic Semantics
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Contrastivists view ought-sentences as expressing comparisons among alternatives. Deontic actualists believe that the value of each alternative in such a comparison is determined by what would actually happen if that alternative were to be the case. One of the arguments that motivates actualism is a challenge to the principle of agglomeration over conjunction—the principle according to which if you ought to run and you ought to jump, then you ought to run and jump. I argue that there is no way of developing the actualist insight into a logic that invalidates the agglomeration principle without also invalidating other desirable patterns of inference. After doing this, I extend the analysis to other contrastive views that challenge agglomeration in the way that the actualist does. This motivates skepticism about the actualist’s way of challenging agglomeration.
book reviews
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 8
Neal A. Tognazzini, Carolina Sartorio: Causation and Free Will
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 8
New Books: Anthologies
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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 7
Roy T. Cook, Philip A. Ebert, Frege's Recipe
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In this paper, we present a formal recipe that Frege followed in his magnum opus “Grundgesetze der Arithmetik” when formulating his definitions. This recipe is not explicitly mentioned as such by Frege, but we will offer strong reasons to believe that Frege applied it in developing the formal material of Grundgesetze. We then show that a version of Basic Law V plays a fundamental role in Frege’s recipe and, in what follows, we will explicate what exactly this role is and explain how it differs from the role played by extensions in his earlier book “Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik”. Lastly, we will demonstrate that this hitherto neglected yet foundational aspect of Frege’s use of Basic Law V helps to resolve a number of important interpretative challenges in recent Frege scholarship, while also shedding light on some important differences between Frege’s logicism and recent neo-logicist approaches to the foundations of mathematics.
comments and criticism
6. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 7
Knut Olav Skarsaune, Moral Deference and Authentic Interaction
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The article defends a mild form of pessimism about moral deference, by arguing that deference is incompatible with authentic interaction, that is, acting in a way that communicates our own normative judgment. The point of such interaction is ultimately that it allows us to get to know and engage one another. This vindication of our intuitive resistance to moral deference is upheld, in a certain range of cases, against David Enoch’s recent objection to views that motivate pessimism by appealing to moral autonomy or understanding. Enoch is right to point out that the value of autonomy or understanding cannot provide reason not to defer, if deferring would reduce the risk of treating others wrongly. But in the kind of case where we would want other people to act authentically towards us, even at the cost of a greater risk of wrongdoing, we should do the same towards them.
book reviews
7. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 7
Carolyn Brighouse, Frank Arntzenius: Space, Time, and Stuff
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8. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 7
New Books: Anthologies
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9. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 5/6
The Editors, Foreword
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10. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 113 > Issue: 5/6
Solomon Feferman, Parsons and I: Sympathies and Differences
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In the first part of this article, Feferman outlines his ‘conceptual structuralism’ and emphasizes broad similarities between Parsons’s and his own structuralist perspective on mathematics. However, Feferman also notices differences and makes two critical claims about any structuralism that focuses on the “ur-structures” of natural and real numbers: (1) it does not account for the manifold use of other important structures in modern mathematics and, correspondingly, (2) it does not explain the ubiquity of “individual [natural or real] numbers” in that use. In the second part, Feferman presents a summary of his reasons for the skepticism he has towards contemporary metamathematical investigations of set theory. That skepticism led him to reject the Continuum Problem as a definite mathematical one. He contrasts that attitude sharply to Parsons’s “great sympathy for the current explorations of higher set theory.”