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Displaying: 1-20 of 12139 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 5
Trevor Teitel

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The consensus among spacetime substantivalists is to respond to Leibniz’s classic shift arguments, and their contemporary incarnation in the form of the hole argument, by pruning the allegedly problematic metaphysical possibilities that generate these arguments. Some substantivalists do so by directly appealing to a modal doctrine akin to anti-haecceitism. Other substantivalists do so by appealing to an underlying hyperintensional doctrine that implies some such modal doctrine. My first aim in this paper is to pose a challenge for all extant forms of this consensus position. My second aim is to show what form substantivalism must take in order to uphold the consensus while addressing this challenge. The result is a novel “plenitudinous” substantivalist view, which predicts that certain modal facts about spacetime are vague or indeterminate. I then argue against this view on independent grounds, concluding that substantivalists should reject the consensus position. The paper also discusses the way forward for substantivalists in light of this conclusion.
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2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 5
Caleb Perl Orcid-ID

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This paper shows how to formulate moral error theories given a contextualist semantics like the one that Angelika Kratzer pioneered, answering the concerns that Christine Tiefensee developed.
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3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 5

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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 5

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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 4
Helen E. Longino

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A thin conception of the social pervades much philosophical writing in social epistemology. A thicker form of sociality is to be found in scientific practice, as represented in much recent history and philosophy of science. Typical social epistemology problems, such as disagreement and testimony, take on a different aspect when viewed from the perspective of scientific practice. Here interaction among researchers is central to their knowledge making activities and disagreement and testimony are resources, not problems. Whereas much of the disagreement and testimony literature assumes some conception of evidence, or that it is obvious what evidence is, a focus on scientific practice reveals that determining what counts as evidence and for what is determined through the discursive interactions among researchers. This paper concludes with questions about the assumptions about knowledge, cognitive agents, and the right starting point for epistemological reflection that shape the mainstream social epistemological approaches.
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6. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 4
David Boylan, Ginger Schultheis

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The Qualitative Thesis says that if you leave open P, then you are sure of if P, then Q just in case you are sure of the corresponding material conditional. We argue the Qualitative Thesis provides compelling reasons to accept a thesis that we call Conditional Locality, which says, roughly, the interpretation of an indicative conditional depends, in part, on the conditional’s local embedding environment. In the first part of the paper, we present an argument—due to Ben Holguín—showing that, without Conditional Locality, the Qualitative Thesis is in tension with a margin for error principle on rational sureness. We show Conditional Locality reconciles the Qualitative Thesis with the margin for error principle. In the second part, we argue the full range of data supports what we call the Strong Qualitative Thesis. Without Conditional Locality, the Strong Qualitative Thesis has unacceptable consequences. But with Conditional Locality, it is tenable.
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7. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 4

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8. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 4

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9. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 3
Daniel Hoek Orcid-ID

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Choices confront us with questions. How we act depends on our answers to those questions. So the way our beliefs guide our choices is not just a function of their informational content, but also depends systematically on the questions those beliefs address. This paper gives a precise account of the interplay between choices, questions and beliefs, and harnesses this account to obtain a principled approach to the problem of deduction. The result is a novel theory of belief-guided action that explains and predicts the decisions of agents who, like ourselves, fail to be logically omniscient: that is, of agents whose beliefs may not be deductively closed, or even consistent.
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10. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 3
Andrew J. Latham, Orcid-ID Hannah Tierney Orcid-ID

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Many manipulation arguments against compatibilism rely on the claim that manipulation is relevantly similar to determinism. But we argue that manipulation is nothing like determinism in one relevant respect. Determinism is a "universal" phenomenon: its scope includes every feature of the universe. But manipulation arguments feature cases where an agent is the only manipulated individual in her universe. Call manipulation whose scope includes at least one but not all agents "existential manipulation." Our responsibility practices are impacted in different ways by universal and existential phenomena. And this is a relevant difference, especially on Strawsonian approaches to moral responsibility, which take facts about our responsibility practices to be deeply connected to the nature of responsibility itself. We argue that Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility are immune to manipulation arguments, and no attempt to modify the scope of manipulation or determinism featured in these arguments will help incompatibilists secure their desired conclusion.
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11. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 3
Andreja Novakovic Orcid-ID

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12. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 3

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13. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 3

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14. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 2
David James Barnett

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An action is unratifiable when, on the assumption that one performs it, another option has higher expected utility. Unratifiable actions are often claimed to be somehow rationally defective. But in some cases where multiple options are unratifiable, one unratifiable option can still seem preferable to another. We should respond, I argue, by invoking a graded notion of ratifiability.
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15. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 2
Marija Jankovic, Kirk Ludwig

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We argue that there is a variety of convention, effective coordinating agreement, that has not been adequately identified in the literature. Its distinctive feature is that it is a structure of conditional we-intentions of parties, unlike more familiar varieties of convention, which are structures of expectations and preferences or obligations. We argue that status functions (i.e., social functions like being a pawn, a president, or a dollar bill) constitutively involve this variety of convention, and that what is special about it explains, and gives precise content to, the central feature of status functions, namely, that objects with status functions can perform their functions only insofar as they have been collectively accepted as having them.
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16. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 2

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17. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 1
Kyle Blumberg, Orcid-ID John Hawthorne

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The analysis of desire ascriptions has been a central topic of research for philosophers of language and mind. This work has mostly focused on providing a theory of want reports, that is, sentences of the form ‘S wants p’. In this paper, we turn from want reports to a closely related but relatively understudied construction, namely hope reports, that is, sentences of the form ‘S hopes p’. We present two contrasts involving hope reports and show that existing approaches to desire fail to explain these contrasts. We then develop a novel account that combines some of the central insights in the literature. We argue that our theory provides an elegant account of our contrasts and yields a promising analysis of hoping.
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18. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 1
Sam Baron, Orcid-ID Baptiste Le Bihan Orcid-ID

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According to a number of approaches in theoretical physics, spacetime does not exist fundamentally. Rather, spacetime exists by depending on another, more fundamental, non-spatiotemporal structure. A prevalent opinion in the literature is that this dependence should not be analyzed in terms of composition. We should not say, that is, that spacetime depends on an ontology of non-spatiotemporal entities in virtue of having them as parts. But is that really right? On the contrary, we argue that a mereological approach to dependent spacetime is not only viable, but promises to enhance our understanding of the physical situation.
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19. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 1

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20. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 119 > Issue: 1

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