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Displaying: 1-10 of 11873 documents


1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 4
Marc Lange What Would Normative Necessity Be?
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Fine and Rosen have argued that normative necessity is distinct from and weaker than metaphysical necessity. The first aim of this paper is to specify what it would take for this view to be true—that is, what normative necessity (as weaker than metaphysical necessity) would have to be like. The author argues that in order for normative necessity to be weaker than metaphysical necessity, the metaphysical necessities must all be preserved under every counterfactual antecedent with which they are all collectively logically consistent—even when their preservation requires that a normative necessity fail to be preserved. By exhibiting some examples that fail to display this pattern of counterfactual invariance, the author argues against the view that normative necessity is weaker than (and perforce distinct from) metaphysical necessity. To give this argument (and to address some possible replies to it) is the second aim of this paper.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 4
Kevin J. Lande The Perspectival Character of Perception
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You can perceive things, in many respects, as they really are. For example, you can correctly see a coin as circular from most angles. Nonetheless, your perception of the world is perspectival. The coin looks different when slanted than when head-on, and there is some respect in which the slanted coin looks similar to a head-on ellipse. Many hold that perception is perspectival because you perceive certain properties that correspond to the “looks” of things. I argue that this view is misguided. I consider the two standard versions of this view. What I call the PLURALIST APPROACH fails to give a unified account of the perspectival character of perception, while what I call the PERSPECTIVAL PROPERTIES APPROACH violates central commitments of contemporary psychology. I propose instead that perception is perspectival because of the way perceptual states are structured from their parts.
comments and criticism
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 4
Mihnea D. I. Capraru Note on the Individuation of Biological Traits
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Bence Nanay has argued that we must abandon the etiological theory of teleological function because this theory explains functions and functional categories in a circular manner. Paul Griffiths argued earlier that we should retain the etiological theory and instead prevent the circularity by making etiologies independent of functional categories. Karen Neander and Alex Rosenberg reply to Nanay similarly, and argue that we should analyze functions in terms of natural selection acting not on functional categories, but merely on lineages. Nanay replies that these lineages cannot be individuated except by reference to functional categories. Worryingly, Neander and Rosenberg themselves have previously argued persuasively that homology often depends on function. This article addresses their arguments and shows how to escape them: Regardless whether the arguments are right about long-term homological categories, they do not apply to generation-to-generation homology. The latter, moreover, is sufficient for individuating the lineages needed to explain teleological functions.
4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 4
New Books
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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
Keren Gorodeisky, Eric Marcus Aesthetic Rationality
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We argue that the aesthetic domain falls inside the scope of rationality, but does so in its own way. Aesthetic judgment is a stance neither on whether a proposition is to be believed nor on whether an action is to be done, but on whether an object is to be appreciated. Aesthetic judgment is simply appreciation. Correlatively, reasons supporting theoretical, practical and aesthetic judgments operate in fundamentally different ways. The irreducibility of the aesthetic domain is due to the fact that aesthetic judgment is a sensory-affective disclosure of, and responsiveness to, merit: it is a feeling that presents an object, and is responsive to it, as worthy of being liked. Aesthetic judgment is thus shown to be, on the hand, first personal and non-transferable; and, on the other hand, a presentation of reality. We thereby capture what is right in both subjectivist and objectivist conceptions of aesthetic judgment.
6. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
Andrew Peet, Eli Pitcovski Normal Knowledge: Toward an Explanation-Based Theory of Knowledge
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In this paper we argue that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief. We argue that an adequate approach to epistemic luck must not involve indexing to methods of belief formation, but rather to explanations for belief. This shift is problematic for several prominent approaches to the theory of knowledge, including virtue reliabilism and proper functionalism (as normally conceived). The view that knowledge is characteristically safe true belief is better able to accommodate the shift in question.
review essays
7. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
Bob Hale Paolo Mancosu: Abstraction and Infinity
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8. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 3
New Books
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9. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 2
Bryan Pickel, Moritz Schulz Quinean Updates: In Defense of "Two Dogmas"
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Quine challenged traditional views of the a priori by appealing to two key premises: that any statement may be held true “come what may” and that no statement is immune to revision in light of new experience. Chalmers has recently developed a seemingly compelling response to each of these claims. The critique is particularly threatening because it seems to rest on the Bayesian premise that upon acquiring evidence E, a rational agent will update her credence in any statement S to equal her prior conditional credence in S given E. We argue that Chalmers’s criticisms misfire. When properly understood, Quine’s two theses are largely consistent with Bayesianism.
10. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 115 > Issue: 2
Kieran Setiya Must Consequentialists Kill?
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Opposing conventional wisdom, I argue that the ethics of killing and saving lives is best described by agent-neutral consequentialism, not by appeal to agent-centered restrictions. It does not follow that killings are worse than accidental deaths or that you should kill one to prevent more killings. The upshot is a puzzle about killing and letting die.