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Displaying: 1-10 of 11825 documents

1. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 3
Ivan Hu, The Epistemology of Immunity to Error through Misidentification
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This paper offers several new insights into the epistemology of immunity to error through misidentification, by refining James Pryor’s distinction between de re misidentification and wh-misidentification. This is crucial for identifying exactly what is at issue in debates over the Immunity thesis that, roughly, all introspection-based beliefs about one’s own occurrent psychological states are immune to error through misidentification. I contend that the debate between John Campbell and Annalisa Coliva over whether the phenomenon of thought insertion provides empirical evidence against claims like Immunity has wrongly focused on de re misidentification and largely overlooked the role of wh-misidentification. I argue that, once we properly distinguish the two notions, subjects of thought insertion can be seen to make an error of wh-misidentification in their judgments. I argue that this disproves the Immunity thesis, properly understood, and show what broader implications this has for our understanding of IEM and the first person.
2. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 3
Boyd Millar, Thinking with Sensations
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If we acknowledge that a perceptual experience’s sensory phenomenology is not inherently representational, we face a puzzle. On the one hand, sensory phenomenology must play an intimate role in the perception of ordinary physical objects; but on the other hand, our experiences’ purely sensory element rarely captures our attention. I maintain that neither indirect realism nor the dual component theory provides a satisfactory solution to this puzzle: indirect realism is inconsistent with the fact that sensory phenomenology typically goes unnoticed by perceivers; while, the dual component theory cannot do justice to the important role that sensory phenomenology plays in our perceptual awareness of physical objects. I argue that in order to avoid the difficulties with each of the standard alternatives, we must characterize sensory phenomenology as functioning in the way that linguistic symbols function in thought.
book reviews
3. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 3
Billy Dunaway, The Meaning of ‘Ought’: Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics
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4. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 3
Thomas Blanchard, How Physics Makes Us Free
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5. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 2
Damiano Costa, The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence
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This paper develops a endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, insofar as a semantic analysis of our temporal talk favors it over rivals. It is metaphysically fruitful, insofar as the theory of persistence that can be built around it – the transcendentist theory of persistence, to give it a name – requires neither temporal parts nor the problematic commitments to which all extant forms of endurantism are committed, such as the possibility of extended simples or multilocation.
6. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 2
Christoph Kelp, Mona Simion, Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion
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In this paper, we develop a general normative framework for criticisability, blamelessness and blameworthiness in action. We then turn to the debate on norms of assertion. We show that an application of this framework enables champions of the so-called knowledge rule of assertion to offer a theoretically motivated response to a number of putative counterexamples in terms of blamelessness. Finally, we argue that, on closer inspection, the putative counterexamples serve to confirm the knowledge rule and disconfirm rival views.
7. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 2
Joe Horton, The All or Nothing Problem
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There are many cases in which, by making some great sacrifice, you could bring about either a good outcome or a very good outcome. In some of these cases, it seems wrong for you to bring about the good outcome, since you could bring about the very good outcome with no additional sacrifice. It also seems permissible for you not to make the sacrifice, and bring about neither outcome. But together, these claims seem to imply that you ought to bring about neither outcome rather than the good outcome. And that seems very counterintuitive. In this paper, I develop this problem, propose a solution, and then draw out some implications both for how we should understand supererogation and for how we should approach charitable giving.
book reviews
8. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 2
Kenny Easwaran, Reasons without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time
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9. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 2
New Books
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10. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 114 > Issue: 1
Wayne Wu, Shaking Up the Mind’s Ground Floor: The Cognitive Penetration of Visual Attention
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This paper discusses the cognitive penetration of visual attention by intention, a form of top-down modulation where cognitive states directly influence visual processing. In the current literature, the case for cognitive penetration is largely made based on behavioral data. However, in the case of attention, the plausibility of cognitive penetration is secured by unpacking the nature of attention in the context of a computational model of attention-related visual processing. Attention thus provides the best empirical case for cognitive penetration. Additionally, the paper highlights the epistemic consequences of the cognitive penetration of vision by a subject’s cognitive and other biases.