Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-20 of 67 documents


1. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1/2
Peter J. Hutchings Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by


2. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1/2
Chris Fleming, Orcid-ID Jean-Pierre Dupuy

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
3. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1/2
Nicole Loraux, Alex Ling, Jean Andreau, Etienne Balibar, Eliane de Latour, Michel Dobry, Alain Guillerm, Alain Joxe, Denis Peschansky, Emmanuel Terray

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
4. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1/2
Fritz Mauthner, Thomas Hainscho Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Fritz Mauthner’s essay Die Philosophie und der Krieg, published in October 1914, is among the nationalist writings of Mauthner written during the First World War. The essay explores the question of returning to philosophy after the war. Asking this question, Mauthner examines the relationship between war and philosophy and argues that the two concepts do not share any substantial points of contact. During his discussion, an unspoken premise of the question about the return to philosophy is revealed: as the science of reason, philosophy cannot understand war. The profession of philosophy can neither contribute to a military victory nor end the people’s suffering. Hence, philosophers should remain silent in times of war. Mauthner himself did not adhere to his demand. In 1914, he believed that Germany would be victorious, and emphasised in his essay that war reveals a new meaning of life by giving a meaning to death.
5. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1/2
Debra Bergoffen

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Detailing the logic of Clausewitz’s depiction of war as the violent pursuit of the politics of submission, I read the recent protests in Iran as a feminist revolt against Iran’s fundamentalist Islamic war on women. This war is institutionalized in the war-like violence of veiling, gender apartheid, and marriage and family law. Rebelling under the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom” the people of Iran tie the destiny of women to the destiny of all. The government has crushed the uprising. It has not quelled the protestors’ demands. Signs of resistance continue as the rebellion inhales the hope of a time to come of freedom.
6. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1/2
Gary Browning

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Hegel sees war as contributing positively to the experience of social and political life. Of course, his support for war is qualified in that the overall aim is to maintain peace and to mitigate the violence and destruc­tion of warfare. Nonetheless Hegel takes individual citizens to appreciate the achievement of social and political life in the light of war, and how the patriotism evidenced in war reinforces their recognition of the freedom and unity of public life. Hegel’s support for war arises in part out of a real­ism that he shares with Hobbes. But he also considers the significance of war on more general philosophical grounds. War, like the life and death struggle between individuals that is set out in the Phenomenology, plays a role in the development of recognition. If the life and death struggle brings out the sociality of recognition, war is a graphic reminder of the social and public operation of freedom. While Hegel’s philosophical justification of war and death make sense in the context of his wider philosophy, his dramatic depiction of death and war tends to supersede the systematic style of his philosophy. It is excessive in a way that is similar to how the figurative language of Hobbes’s Leviathan supersedes Hobbes’s own sense of the limits of language.
7. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1/2
Gregory Fried

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Classical liberalism stipulates that individuals may only reliably escape a state of war by joining a body politic whose unity is consolidated and preserved by the formation of a sovereign government. Frederick Douglass, through his own experience of slavery and then as a radical abolitionist critiquing the racialized laws and society of the United States, shows that there is an inherent scandal, a schism in the very idea of a body politic. This scandal cannot be overcome, but Douglass enacts a treatment for it through a polemical ethic that endeavors to reconstruct political community, expansively and inclusively understood, by ever again bringing the ideal, as a regulative idea, into confrontation with the real. By putting Douglass and the historical situation of his time into dialogue with the natural law tradition of Aquinas, Locke, and the American Founding, this essay argues that Douglass’s thought and example provide a fresh way to address the crisis of liberal democracy in our time. This requires understanding the instability of the body politic as a source of strength rather than weakness, if properly confronted in a polemical ethics.
8. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1/2
Nick Mansfield Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Nothing is more definitive of war than its relationship with peace. But what is peace? This paper investigates the problematic nature of peace in the philosophical discourse on war, by investigating two key strands of thinking. Firstly, Hobbes and Foucault see peace as the place where the impulses that give rise to war can be re-directed and even satisfied, often in disguise. Another strand, in Kant and Levinas, different but not fully separable from the first, sees peace as what lies beyond war, though war must be endured in order to reach it. These different accounts present war and peace not as binary opposites, nor even as fully distinguishable from one another. Instead, they are shown to be mutually dependant and entangled with one another. The paper ends with a brief analysis of the January 6, 2021 insurrection in the United States, in order to illustrate this complex entanglement between war and peace and reveal the obscure, even hallucinatory nature of the concept of peace.


9. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1/2

view |  rights & permissions | cited by


10. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
Jacinta Sassine, Orcid-ID Dennis Schmidt Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by


11. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
Michael Naas

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This essay takes as its point of departure Jacques Derrida’s analysis of the phantasm of a mother tongue in his recently published seminar from 1995–1996 on hospitality (Hospitalité I, Éditions du Seuil, 2021). The essay begins by showing that Derrida’s analysis of this phantasm is per­fectly consistent with several of his most important works of the 1960s (from Of Grammatology to Voice and Phenomenon) on the auto-affection of speech and the phantasm of self-presence to which it gives rise. But the essay then demonstrates how those earlier analyses of language and voice are supplemented in Hospitalité by important reflections on what were then very new teletechnologies—including the cell or mobile phone—that do not, as we might have thought, deflate the phantasm of self-presence and of a natural mother tongue but actually lend themselves to it. What these teletechnologies thus end up underscoring, according to Derrida, is the original exappropriation at the heart of all language, including the so-called mother tongue.
12. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
Richard Polt

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
“Irrealis” grammatical moods, such as the subjunctive, provoke linguistic, literary, and phenomenological questions. What is the ontological status of the domain revealed by irrealis moods? How does it solicit signification? Is it a mere illusion or a distraction from the real? I propose not only that our ventures into the irreal are indispensable ways of making sense of things, but that the irreal is necessary to the being of language and to our own being.
13. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
Barbara Cassin, Orcid-ID Alex Ling Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
By Aristotle’s own admission, homonymy and amphiboly, or syntactic homonymy, are unlikely to be accidental features of the Greek language (nor of any language, nor of language as such), but rather a radical evil that can at best be subdued, through recourse to categories, for example. Or we could choose to follow the sophists and exploit it by aiming at an essentially sonorous consensus. But then such texts would constitute a radical evil for translation.
14. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ian Alexander Moore

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
15. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
Ian Alexander Moore

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Addressing the place of the Austrian poet, Georg Trakl, in the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, this article turns in particular to Trakl’s poem “A Winter Evening” in order to unfold a sense of language in dialogue with the poet. This engagement equally becomes the occasion for Gadamer to confront Heidegger, whose own reading of Trakl becomes both an inspiration and a challenge.
16. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
David Farrell Krell

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Hans-Georg Gadamer reads Georg Trakl’s “Ein Winterabend” (“A Winter Evening”) almost in the way Martin Heidegger does, but he alters Heidegger’s interpretation of a single image in the poem. Whereas Heidegger sees the image “Golden blooms the tree of grace” in terms of candlelight on a church altar, Gadamer sees it as the glow of a kerosene lantern, perhaps in a country inn. That one alteration, this essay argues, brings Gadamer closer to the Trakl-world than Heidegger ever manages to be.
17. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
Bret W. Davis

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
What is the relationship between language and experience? This question was a central concern of the eminent Kyoto School philosopher and lay Zen master Ueda Shizuteru (1926–2019). In fact, this question has long been a focal issue of the Zen tradition. Famously, if also paradoxically, the Zen tradition has claimed to “not to rely on words and letters” even while producing volumes of texts: poetry and didactic discourses as well as encounter dialogues (mondō) and kōan collections. Critics have accused Zen of being self-contradictory in this regard, yet Ueda demonstrates that Zen’s paradoxical ambivalence toward language is not a problem, but rather the point. Moreover, he explains how Zen teachings and practices can help us radically rethink the relationship between language and experience after the “linguistic turn” in philosophy. In this article, I examine Ueda’s contributions to the philosophy of language by bringing his thought into critical dialogue with Continental philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Gadamer as well as with some scholars of Zen. In short, Ueda rejects both the view that we are trapped within the bounds of language and the view that we could meaningfully dwell in a world outside of language. Rather, he argues, in everyday life as well as—in an intensified manner—in Zen practice and poetic expression, we are called on to engage in a ceaseless movement of “exiting language and exiting into language.”
18. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
María del Rosario Acosta López

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper proposes a reading of Walter Benjamin’s “The Storyteller” in connection to what Nelly Richard, in her diagnosis of traumatic forms of violence, has called “catastrophes of meaning.” Written, like Freud’s theory of trauma, in the wake of the first World War, I argue that Benjamin sees in storytelling the experience of an imparting or communication (Mitteilung) capable of conveying trauma without betraying its paradox—and thus, without either interpreting its excesses as meaningless or reducing its absences to mere silences. Storytelling and the community of listeners it both depends on and institutes with its imparting, develops the possibility of a grammar of listening that would attend to what Richard diagnoses as the silences in traumatic testimony, the moments of rupture and breakdown that communicate the truth of its experience. Reading Benjamin along with Richard, the paper argues that Benjamin’s theory of storytelling is an attempt to search out new ways of truly listening to the fractures and shattering of language resulting from traumatic forms of violence, rather than merely filling the gaps left by their discontinuities and absences of “meaning.”
19. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
Drew A. Hyland

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The guiding suggestion of this article is intimated in the title: “Platonism,” that set of “philosophical positions” supposedly present in the Platonic dialogues (pre-eminently the “theory of forms,” but also “Plato’s metaphysics,” his “epistemology,” his “moral theory,” his “political theory” etc.) are not so much discovered in the dialogues as they are invented out of a very specific (mis) reading of those dialogues. And the first great “misreader” was Aristotle, who, I argue, first made possible the set of assumptions about philosophy and about philosophic writing that, in turn, made anything like “Platonism” possible.
20. Journal of Continental Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1/2
Pierre Hadot, Chris Fleming

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, Pierre Hadot examines the late philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the so-called “linguistic turn” in philosophy and the social sciences. Although certain interpreters of Wittgenstein have thought that Philosophical Investigations shows philosophy to be predicated on a series of confusions based on the misuse of language, Hadot argues contrarily that an understanding of Wittgenstein’s idea of “language games”—far from ending philosophy—allows us to see it anew and to discern the source of some of its deepest perplexities. Of particular concern is the notion of the ancient idea of philosophical discourse as intrinsically connected to various forms of apprenticeship or spiritual formation. It is in this context that the supposed inconsistencies and unusual repetitions of ancient philosophy can be understood. Only from the Middle Ages do philosophical language games begin slowly to become detached from certain kinds of training, of pedagogies connected to forms of life, and become texts—and “systems”—in the sense of being written for the purposes of merely conventional reading.