Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-10 of 24 documents


articles
1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 42 > Issue: 4
Presenting Our Authors
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 42 > Issue: 4
Greg P. Hodes Intentional Structure and the Identity Theory of Knowledge in Bernard Lonergan: A Problem with Rational Self-Appropriation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bernard Lonergan has argued for a theory of cognition that is transcendentally secure, that is, one such that any plausible attempt to refute it must presuppose its correctness, and one that also grounds a correct metaphysics and ontology. His proposal combines an identity theory of knowledge with an intentional relation between knower and known. It depends in a crucial way upon an appropriation of one’s own cognitional motives and acts, that is, upon “knowing one’s own knowing.” I argue that because of conflicts between the identity and intentionality components of the theory, rational self-appropriation (RSA) cannot, as Lonergan claims, be an iteration of just the same acts by which we acquire other sorts of knowledge. I propose an amended theory in which the relation between intending-subject and intended-object of first-level cognition becomes, in RSA, a numerical identity of knower and known and of the epistemic and the ontological.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 42 > Issue: 4
William F. Vallicella No Self?: A Look at a Buddhist Argument
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Central to Buddhist thought and practice is the anattā doctrine. In its unrestricted form the doctrine amounts to the claim that nothing at all possesses self-nature. This article examines an early Buddhist argument for the doctrine. The argument, roughly, is that (i) if anything were a self, it would be both unchanging and self-determining; (ii) nothing has both of these properties; therefore, (iii) nothing is a self. The thesis of this article is that, despite the appearance of formal validity, the truth of (i) is inconsistent with the truth of (iii).
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 42 > Issue: 4
Thomas P. Sherman Human Happiness and the Role of Philosophical Wisdom in the Nicomachean Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Aristotle describes human happiness as a life of virtuous activity in Book One of the Nicomachean Ethics but as a life of contemplative activity and a life of ethically virtuous activity in Book Ten. In which kind of life does Aristotle ultimately believe that happiness consists? The answer lies in the role of philosophical wisdom within ethically virtuous activity. I argue that philosophical wisdom has a dual role: its exercise is the end of ethically virtuous activity and the virtue by which that end is rationally apprehended. Just as ethically virtuous activity depends on the exercise of philosophical wisdom in this dual way, so human happiness can be understood as a single life of virtuous activity whose end is the exercise of philosophical wisdom in contemplative activity. The exercise of philosophical wisdom will include ethically virtuous activity as an end that includes what is desired for its sake.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 42 > Issue: 4
Mark Bevir What Is a Text?: A Pragmatic Theory
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The paper defends a principle of procedural individualism according to which meanings are always subjective or inter-subjective. Texts do not have meanings in themselves, but rather are objects to which individuals attach various meanings. The paper then deploys this analysis of meaning to address debates about textuality. It considers the stability of the text: although texts are indeterminate in that future individuals might attach unforeseen meanings to them, they have determinate content at any given time in that the meanings people have attached to them are fixed. And it considers the relationship of textual meaning to authorial meaning: authors and readers alike attach meanings to texts, with confusions arising when philosophers assume that one or the other must constitute the meaning of the text itself.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 42 > Issue: 4
Michael J. White The Unclear, the Inconsequential, and Aristotelian Agency
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The “Aristotelian” conception of human agency and responsibility locates agency and responsibility in the exercise of practical reason in deliberation. A characteristic of such deliberation is that it must pertain to matters that can be decided either one way or the other. Some of Aristotle’s texts suggest an interpretation of deliberation that appears to yield the paradoxical result that agents are most responsible for (or act most freely with respect to) choices that are least determined, to the exclusion of other possible choices, by the practical reasoning issuing in those choices. This essay explores this strand of thought in Aristotle. It then proceeds to examine the response to the “paradox” in a middle-Platonist work, the De fato of Pseudo-Plutarch, and in the thought of the eminenttwentieth-century neo-Thomist, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 42 > Issue: 4
John Caruana Lévinas’s Critique of the Sacred
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Lévinas’s harsh criticisms of the sacred have irked not just his critics but even some who sympathize with his work. Taken at face value, some of Lévinas’s comments concerning the sacred appear prejudicial towards non-monotheistic religions. But a closer reading of his analysis of the sacred shows that his preoccupation with the sacred has to do with a questionable “temptation” or disposition found in every human being. Drawing on the insights of the Bible, Shakespeare, and Lévy-Bruhl, Lévinas shows how this temptation involves a primitive wish to escape one’s responsibilities as a human being. For Lévinas, the phenomenon of the sacred promotes the illusion of a direct and immediate experience of the absolute or the Infinite. Genuine transcendence, for Lévinas, is possible only within the ethical drama of self and Other. The apex of human life involves not the eclipsing of the self—the fundamental motivation behind the sacred—but a heightening of the self’s radical uniqueness that only moral engagement makes possible.
book reviews and notices
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 42 > Issue: 4
H. O. Mounce Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 42 > Issue: 4
John Churchill Philosophy Matters
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 42 > Issue: 4
William S. Hamrick Ethics and the Between
view |  rights & permissions | cited by