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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Presenting Our Authors
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Richard J. Colledge Kierkegaard’s Subjective Ontology: A Metaphysics of the Existing Individual
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In the context of the contemporary emergence of a “postmodern Kierkegaard,” I take issue with the idea that Kierkegaardian thought involves an anti-essentialist rejection of ontology. I argue that Kierkegaard’s keynote existential analysis is paralleled by, if not tacitly set within, a less developed yet explicit ontology of human being. This “subjective ontology” is at once an ontology of the existing subject and a subjectization of ontology. Thus, the essay has two aims. First, I seek to revive and advance debate concerning the structure of the Kierkegaardian self by tracing something of its dynamic three-fold relational structure and various metaphysical polarities. Spirit, anxiety, and despair need to be understood in their ontological dimensions and not just as existential possibilities. Second, I propose a way of bringing together Kierkegaardian existentiality (the three stages) with his ontology (the three relations). Despite important asymmetries between these two structures, the unity of Kierkegaard’s approach can only be appreciated through viewing them synoptically.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
William Hasker The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique
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This paper discusses the “constitution view” of human persons, as set forth by Lynne Rudder Baker in her book, Persons and Bodies. The metaphysical notion of constitution is explained and briefly defended. It is shown, however, that the view that human persons are constituted by their bodies faces difficulties in specifying the “person-favorable conditions” under which a human body constitutes a person. Furthermore, none of the arguments in support of the claim that humans are constituted by (but not identical with) their bodies is persuasive. It is proposed that the mind-body theory of “emergent dualism” offers many of the benefits of the “constitution view” without sharing in its drawbacks.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
James D. Madden Aristotle, Induction, and First Principles
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Modern Empiricists are typically troubled by the two following problems: (1) There is an epistemic gap between experience of individuals and understanding universals such that empiricist accounts of concept formation seem to beg the question. (2) There needs to be an answer to the skeptic who denies that sensory experience warrants our belief in the existence of the material substances that underlie sensible qualities. Although Aristotle’s account of induction is subject to these problems prima facie, his theory of perception, his teleologically driven reliabilism about the senses, and his broader metaphysical views concerning the relation between substance and accident serve to insulate his account of induction from the pitfalls of modern empiricism. The resolution to these problems proposed in this paper allows for a consistent reading of otherwise controversial Aristotelian texts, while recommending a defense of realism about material substance against the claims of the Humean skeptic.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Aaron Stalnaker Rational Justification in Xunzi: On His Use of the Term Li
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Thinkers justify their views in a variety of ways. Operating in an alien intellectual milieu, the early Confucian Xunzi (c. 310–215 B.C.E.) provides an intriguing counterpoint to familiar contemporary options for such reasoned support. This essay examines an idea thatis crucial to Xunzi’s justification of his larger philosophical vision, and which has been the object of incompatible and misleading interpretations. This key term of art is li, meaning “order” or “pattern,” which some scholars have translated as “principle,” and others more recently as “reason” or “rationale.” Examining how, for Xunzi, li never means “reason” in the sense of a faculty of the mind, or a warrant for an action or belief, nor “rationale” in the sense of a justifying account, helps us to grasp the distinctive ways he conceived of thinking and arguing. It also illuminates his understanding of the cosmos and human relations with and within it.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
John Peterson Truth and Exemplarism
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Something is called true because it conforms to some measure. Since what measures is logically prior to what it measures, the latter is always secondarily speaking true. Further, what is secondarily speaking true pictures its measure. In all there are six types of such picturing. Since “true” is inherently referential and the latter is the mark of mind, truth is properly speaking mind-dependent. Besides, truth has the same status as falsity, and falsity is mind-dependent. That implies that the measures in truth are mind-dependent. That mind is either human or divine. All mind-independent things are improperly speaking true. They are called true only because they bear some relation to what is strictly speaking true. But not all that is secondarily speaking true is improperly speaking true. Judgments are secondarily speaking true since they are measured by facts but are nonetheless properly speaking true. A nominalist alternative to this assay is traced to Aristotle. It is too narrow to catch all types of truth. A conceptualist analysis implicates its defenders in a dilemma in which what they say is either false or contradictory.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Paul E. Hoyt-O’Connor Virtue and the Practice of Medicine
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Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma analyze the virtues that are especially relevant to the practice of good medicine. Their account of the virtues and medicine is complemented by Alasdair MacIntyre’s recent analysis of human development and the acquisition of the moral and intellectual virtues. These two accounts contribute toward analyzing the historical constitution of social practices and relationships in medicine. In particular, the moral and intellectual virtues characteristic of good medicine are acquired and exercised within those healing relationships featured in Pellegrino’s and Thomasma’s phenomenology of medicine. Examining their account of medical practice in light of MacIntyre’s more recent work suggests, however, that their theory of the good of the patient and their understanding of the relation of virtue to altruism and self-interest stand in need of further development.
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8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
T. H. Irwin Aristotle on Meaning and Essence
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Bruce W. Brower Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Brian Davies Thomas Aquinas: A Summary of Philosophy
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