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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Presenting Our Authors
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Brad Frazier Kierkegaard on Mastered Irony
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After extensively critiquing the stance of pure irony in the second half of The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard attempts to recover the “truth of irony,” as he puts it, in a brief but suggestive conclusion. A main feature of the “truth of irony” turns out to be that irony, when mastered, is an indispensable component in an ethical way of life. In this paper I attempt to clarify Kierkegaard’s account of mastered irony. I discuss the analogy that Kierkegaard offers between poets who skillfully use mastered irony in their work and persons who gainfully employ irony in their “individual existence.” Then I analyze four metaphors that Kierkegaard uses to clarify the advantages of mastered irony in ethical life. I also argue that, for Kierkegaard, irony is properly mastered through moral commitment.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Robert L. Perkins Habermas and Kierkegaard: Religious Subjectivity, Multiculturalism, and Historical Revisionism
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Kierkegaard’s views of knowledge and moral psychology provide insights into certain issues that Habermas treats at length: multiculturalism and the Historikerstreit. Kierkegaard’s concept of subjective truth sustains the universality necessary to oppose racism,sexism, nationalism, fundamentalism, and the economic imperialism characteristic of some postnational states. Habermas expands Kierkegaard’s ethical concept of “choosing oneself” to politics and historiography in the debate over the Holocaust. To be a self, onemust accept responsibility for one’s “good and evil.” Likewise a nation creates its national identity through the choice and enforcement of public policies, especially educational content, which subtly and pervasively create a sense of the nation. Thus a nation must acknowledge its wrongs and crimes. This robust choice enables persons to loyally witness against their nation’s history, free themselves from an inherited guilt-consciousness, and develop a freer and more cohesive politics.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Henry B. Piper Kierkegaard’s Non-Dialectical Dialectic or That Kierkegaard is not Hegelian
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This paper considers a series of Kierkegaard’s early “upbuilding discourses” in order to argue that Kierkegaard was never Hegelian. These discourses reveal a dialectical play of non-dialectical difference and tension rather than mediated resolution and progress.Thus Kierkegaard’s is not a logical dialectic of mediation but an existential dialectic of difference—of irremediable paradox. The divisions of existential dividedness do not resolve themselves because they cannot resolve at all; existential difference, as distinct from logical contradiction, is non-dialectical. Kierkegaard’s is a “one-way” dialectic that cannot resolve itself, for eternity, its only (in)conceivable resolution, is incommensurable with it. However, because eternity is not temporally before us as final cause but is rather within us and among us, the apparent simplicity of this one-way dialectic gives way, in the actuality of existence, to the desperate complexity of “redoubling repetition,” whereby the self comes to itself only in the halt of the lesson of death.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Genia Schönbaumsfeld No New Kierkegaard
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The aim of this paper is to contest an infl uential recent reading of one of Kierkegaard’s most important books, the pseudonymously written Concluding Unscientific Postscript. According to the reading offered by James Conant, the Postscript is an “elaborate reductio” of the very philosophical project in which it itself appears to be engaged, namely, the project of attempting to clarify the nature of Christianity. I show that Conant’s position depends upon four inter-related theses concerning Kierkegaard’s text, and I argue that noneof these theses is sustainable, either philosophically or exegetically. In the course of this critique, alternative and more convincing theses are developed, and I suggest that these theses are altogether better suited than Conant’s to account for, and to provide a defense of, Kierkegaard’s stature as a religious thinker.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Merold Westphal Kierkegaard’s Religiousness C: A Defense
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Against two recent critiques, I defend my thesis that such later writings of Kierkegaard as Works of Love and Practice in Christianity introduce an understanding of Christianity that I call Religiousness C, into which Religiousness B as presented in ConcludingUnscientific Postscript is teleologically suspended. For Religiousness B, Christ is the Paradox to be believed, while for Religiousness C, Christ is the Pattern, Paradigm, or Prototype to be imitated. In the former case, the offense to be overcome in becoming a Christian concerns the metaphysics and epistemology of the Incarnation. In the latter case, the offense involves the ethics and politics of the Incarnation. I argue that this Aufhebung is Hegelian only in a formal sense and, so far from compromising Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel, actually intensifies it.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Charlotte Cope Freedom, Responsibility, and the Concept of Anxiety
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While the concept of sin plays a pivotal role in the ethico-religious philosophies of Kierkegaard and Kant, both struggle to provide an adequate account of the nature of sin. Kant’s ethical interpretation improves signifi cantly on the traditional theological account by introducing the notion of individual responsibility, but it ultimately fails to provide an explanation of the psychological mechanisms of the fall. Kierkegaard tries to unite the Kantian conception of responsibility with an essentially Hegelian interpretation of the fall, using the concept of anxiety as the glue. Contrary to usual opinion, it is argued here that far from resolving the difficulties of the Kantian account, Kierkegaard’s interpretation only serves to multiply them. But it is also shown that Kierkegaard’s analysis of the phenomenon that he calls “anxiety about sin” does provide the materials for an alternative interpretation of the origin of moral evil in man.
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8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Gyula Klima On Kenny on Aquinas on Being: A Critical Review of Aquinas on Being
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
David Vincent Meconi Augustine and Modernity
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 44 > Issue: 4
Brian G. Henning Environmental Ethics: An Overview for the Twenty-First Century
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