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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
Presenting Our Authors
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
Sor-hoon Tan Cultural Crossings Against Ethnocentric Currents: Toward a Confucian Ethics of Communicative Virtues
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Despite contemporary Confucianism’s aspirations to be a world philosophy, there is an ethnocentric strand within the Confucian tradition, most glaringly exemplified in Han Yu’s attacks on Buddhism. This paper re-assesses Confucian ethnocentrism in the context of contrary practices that indicate a more pragmatic attitude among Confucians toward cross-cultural interactions. It argues that while the ethnocentric tendency serves as constant reminder of the need for vigilance, and recognition of the difficulties of crossing cultural boundaries, there are nevertheless resources within Confucianism for constructing an ethics of communication that is urgently needed to deal with the moral problems of cultural pluralism. The paper analyses the role of various common Confucian virtues such as ren(benevolence, co-humanity), yi (appropriateness), li (ritual), zhi (wisdom) in communication, and argues that a virtue of flexibility is implicit in Confucius’s insistence of bugu and could contribute significantly to a Confucian ethics of communicative virtues.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
Brian G. Henning Saving Whitehead’s Universe of Value: An “Ecstatic” Challenge to the Classical Interpretation
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While most scholars readily recognize that Alfred North Whitehead had deep and penetrating misgivings about the substantial view of individuality, fewer note that these misgivings stem as much from axiological considerations as ontological ones. I contend that, taken in the context of the “classical interpretation” of his metaphysics, Whitehead’s bold affirmation that actuality and value are coextensive introduces a potentially serious problem for the adequacy and applicability of his axiology. For if actuality is coextensive with valuebut actuality is itself limited to subjects of experience, then the objective world can have no intrinsic value. My aim is to demonstrate that, in order to respond to the very serious challenge which the problem of subjectivism represents and save Whitehead’s intendeduniverse of value, we must seek an alternative to the classical interpretation of Whitehead’s metaphysics. I refer to this alternative as the “ecstatic interpretation.”
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
Manuel Arriaga Richard Rorty’s Anti-Foundationalism and Traditional Philosophy’s Claim of Social Relevance
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The paper is a critical examination of Rorty’s argument against foundationalism, on which depends his view of the social irrelevance of traditional philosophy. I try to demonstrate the incoherence and speciousness of his reasoning against foundationalism and in the process refute his view that traditional philosophy is a tool which can and should be cast off from the public, and even from the private, sphere of human life and that its universal concepts can therefore be circumvented. This demonstration is accomplished in twocomplementary stages. First, I provide a general justification of my “argumentative” style in engaging Rorty’s position against his objection to this approach, while showing that what he calls his strategy of “re-description” is really nothing but a form of logical argumentation. Second, I attempt to show how, in order to substantiate his rejection of traditional philosophy’s claim of social relevance, Rorty’s “re-description” of the motivation underlying traditional philosophy is no different from the strategy of unmasking that he has called into question as an instance of a radical or foundationalist critique. I show that, despite his protestations to the contrary, “unmasking” is precisely what—at least on a number of occasions—Rorty quite inconsistently does in demonstrating that the claim of social relevance arises from a form of self-deception engaged in by the traditional philosopher. I further show that theanti-foundationalist stance that defines his characteristic manner of extricating himself from such self-reference problems is based on faulty reasoning and lands him in a deeper incoherence. Since his depoliticization of traditional philosophy depends on the cogency ofthis anti-foundationalist view, I conclude that this depoliticizing project fails.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
Thierry Meynard Religion and Its Modern Fate: The Shaping of the Concept between the West and China
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“Religion” is usually thought of as a Western concept that has penetrated into China in the modern era. This paper, however, argues that the modern concept of religion was in fact shaped through the mutual exchange between the West and China. Three moments of this exchange are examined: (1) the late-Ming and early-Qing periods, when Western missionaries discovered in China a reality that compelled them to invent the term of “civil religion”; (2) the Enlightenment in Europe, which seized and transformed the new concept; finally, (3) the end of Qing dynasty and Republican era in China, when the concept of religion was re-introduced. This historical enquiry may help us to examine critically the boundaries usually fixed between the secular and the religious.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
R. Michael Olson Real Apprehension in Newman’s An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent
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In An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, John Henry Newman articulates his fundamental philosophical orientation by giving priority to real apprehension over notional apprehension. He distinguishes between the two by saying that notional apprehension hasto do with things internal to the mind and admits of exactness and clarity whereas real apprehension has to do with things external to the mind and does not admit of the same degree of clarity and exactness. I argue that the connection between “inside the mind” and “clarity and exactness” lies in the constructive activity underlying notional thinking. Real apprehension, on the other hand, involves a given apprehension of unity, mainly, the concrete unity of intelligent life, which includes but cannot be reduced to the constructive activity of notional thinking. Thus, I argue, Newman’s realism undercuts any form of modern transcendentalism and evinces a form of classical human realism.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
John W. M. Krummel Praxis of the Middle: Self and No-Self in Early Buddhism
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This paper considers the controversy surrounding the Buddhist doctrine of “no-self” (anattā, anātman), and especially the question of whether the Buddha himself meant by it unequivocally the ontological denial of the self. The emergence of this doctrine is connected with the Buddha’s attempt to forge a “middle way” that avoids the extreme views of “eternalism” in regards to the soul and “annihilationism” of the soul at bodily death. By looking at the earliest works of the Pāli canon, three of the five Nikāyas (Dīgha, Majjhima, and Sayutta) along with later Abhidharmist developments, my discussion shows that its original intent was not explicitly ontological. The intent was more practical than theoretical, with the aim of bringing about a freedom from attachment to such theories as eternalism and annihilationism. The Buddha’s “middle” position was, hence, a praxis towards freedom rather than a theoria about the existence or non-existence of the self.
feature book review
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
John Marenbon Aquinas
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book reviews and notices
9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
James L. Marsh Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 45 > Issue: 4
Terence Cuneo Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance
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