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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 2
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 2
Gregory Hoskins Elements of a Post-metaphysical and Post-secular Ethics and Politics: Albert Camus on Human Nature and the Problem of Evil
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My thesis is that Albert Camus offers key elements of a viable nonmetaphysical, post-secular ethical and political anthropology and explanation of evil. Idefend my thesis in two parts. First, I explicate and analyze Camus’s remarks on human nature and injustice primarily in his political essay The Rebel (1951). Camus offers a nonmetaphysical picture of human nature, inspired by the Greeks, as that out of which rebellion to oppression springs but also as that which frustrates any final resolution to the problems of history. Secondly, I offer a reading of The Fall (1956). I argue that Camus’s depiction of human nature in this work, contrary to typical readings, highlights his appreciation of the insight and pragmatically desirable consequences of the Christian concept of sin. I show thatCamus depicts the possibility of a “healthy” guilt, a guilt linked to the pursuit of freedom and a responsibility to self and to others.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 2
Christian Lotz Cognitivism and Practical Intentionality: A Critique of Dreyfus’s Critique of Husserl
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Hubert L. Dreyfus has worked out a critique of what he calls “representationalism” and “cognitivism,” one proponent of which, according to Dreyfus, is Husserl. But I think that Dreyfus misunderstands the Husserlian conception of practical intentionality and that his characterization of Husserl as a “representationalist” or as a “cognitivist” is thereby wrongheaded. In this paper I examine Dreyfus’s interpretation by offering a Husserlian critique of Dreyfus’s objections to Husserl, and then by outlining Husserl’s account of practical intentionality and the practical lived Body. I sketch the critique and the approach of Dreyfus in three steps. First, I deal with his objections against Husserl’s theory by arguing that Dreyfus understands neither the role of the reduction nor the function of background-awareness in Husserl’s phenomenology. Second, I elucidate the central role that the “practical lived Body” plays in practical intentionality for Husserl, and, third, I highlight the consequences that follow from the analyses offered in the previous sections.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 2
Kevin Hoffman Kierkegaard, Compassion, and the Descent of Love
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This article presents a close reading of Kierkegaard’s Works of Love in light of the question whether neighborly aspirations are sensitive to the worth of close personal relationships and to the importance of the material well-being of fellow citizens. The interpretive analysis is set within the larger debate overKierkegaard’s critique of preferential love and his apparently apolitical focus on inward authenticity, and it concludes that neighborly love is far more emotionally vulnerable and sensitive to the particulars of individuals and their social and material standing than isolated passages suggest. Kierkegaard’s work thus contributes to the current preoccupation with the moral relevance of emotions and their place within public life.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 2
David B. Hershenov The Memory Criterion and the Problem of Backward Causation
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Lockeans, as well as their critics, have pointed out that the memory criterion is likely to mean that none of us were ever fetuses or even infants due to the lack of direct psychological connections between then and now. But what has been overlooked is that the memory criterion leads to either backward causation and a violation of Locke’s own very plausible principle that we can have only one origin, or backward causation and a number of overlapping people where we thought there was just one. I will argue that such problems cannot be avoided by replacing direct psychological connections with overlapping chains of connectedness—what has been called “psychological continuity.”
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 2
Edward M. Engelmann The Mechanistic and the Aristotelian Orientations toward Nature and Their Metaphysical Backgrounds
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Any cognitive orientation toward nature is interconnected with how the metaphysical structure of nature itself is understood. In the Aristotelian tradition, the primary unit of being is considered to be the substantial form, which constitutes the being and essence of entities. In the mechanistic tradition, the primary units are considered to be minute particles out of which larger entities are constructed. Correspondingly, Aristotelian scientific methodology seeks to gain insight into the substantial forms through a study of the outer properties of entities. This is accomplished in demonstration. On the other hand, scientific methodology inthe mechanist tradition seeks to reduce entities to their smallest particles in order to determine how properties are produced through the interaction of such particles. This paper shows how, through certain transformations in Aristotelian techne, mechanistic metaphysics arose with its attendant methodological stance of seeking an operational knowledge of nature.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 2
Greg Hodes Lonergan and Perceptual Direct Realism: Facing Up to the Problem of the External Material World
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In this paper I call attention to the fact that Lonergan gives two radically opposed accounts of how sense perception relates us to the external world and of how we know that this relation exists. I argue that the position that Lonergan characteristically adopts is not the one implied by what is most fundamental in his theory of cognition. I describe the initial epistemic position with regard to the problem of skepticism about the external material world that is in fact implied by his theory of cognition, and I sort out some confusion about various forms of direct and representative perceptual realism. The paper concludes with a critique of Lonergan’s theory of description and explanation in empirical science that makes evident the difficulties into which he is led by lack of clarity in his theory of perception.
contemporary currents
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 2
Michael W. Austin Fundamental Interests and Parental Rights
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I argue for a moderate view of the justification and the extent of the moral rights of parents that avoids the extremes of both children’s liberationism and parental absolutism. I claim that parents have rights qua parents, and that these prima facie rights are grounded in certain fundamental interests that both parents and children possess, namely, psychological well-being, intimate relationships, and the freedom to pursue that which brings satisfaction and meaning to life. I also examine several issues related to public policy and the moral dimensions of the family—child abuse, children divorcing their parents, and the religious upbringing of children—and consider what implications the argument has for these issues. I conclude that the argument’s implications with respect to these issues further increases its plausibility.
book reviews and notices
9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 2
Brendan Sweetman Religion in the Liberal Polity—ed. Terence Cuneo
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 2
Brendan Palla The Way toward Wisdom—Benedict M. Ashley, O.P.
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