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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 3
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 3
Rafal K. Wilk Human Person and Freedom according to Karol Wojtyła
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Karol Wojtyła—the future pope John Paul II—chose the human being, especially in its personalistic dimension, as the main point of his philosophical research. Inaccordance with the metaphysical rule agere sequitur esse, he investigated the dynamisms proper to a human being: the reactive dynamism of the human body, the emotive dynamism of the human psyche, and the personalistic dynamism associated with free choice of the will. These allowed him to experience and understand the human being as a complex yet integrated entity. The personal structure of the human being is manifest in terms of selfpossession, self-determination, and self-governance. Thanks to self-possession, human beings experience freedom of the will, which expresses itself in each free act. Being endowed with a free will, the human being is able to grow in freedom but can also lose his freedom. Wojtyła’s philosophical investigations are innovative by way of the use that he made of the philosophy of being according to Thomas Aquinas and the philosophy of consciousness articulated by Husserl. He not only pointed out man’s structure but also presented man as an objective entity in an objective world. Each human being is constituted by his or her inner self, which is absolutely exceptional because it is completely irreducible to anything else in the world.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 3
David Ciavatta On Burying the Dead: Funerary Rites and the Dialectic of Freedom and Nature in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
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Hegel’s specific interpretation of burial rituals in the Phenomenology is an important part of his general understanding of the development of human freedom and of spirit. For Hegel, freedom is not something immediately given, but something that must be realized by way of the self’s ongoing practical engagement with the world, and in particular by way of the self’s transformation of the otherwise meaningless realm of nature into a vehicle for realizing a specifically human meaning. The practice of burial rites is construed as accomplishing such a transformation, and thereby as a crucial manner in which this dialectic between freedom and nature is played out. Attention is paid to Hegel’s conception of the earth as the material condition for freedom’s self-realization, and the symbolic dimension of burial rites is shown to have implications for Hegel’s overall theory of human agency.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 3
Catherine Jack Deavel Relational Evil, Relational Good: Thomas Aquinas and Process Thought
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I first demonstrate that certain process philosophers and Aquinas hold extremely similar notions of evil. Whitehead and Hartshorne parallel Aquinas in understanding evil as relational, as a conflict of goods, and as a necessary element in a larger good. On this last point, process philosophers contend that traditional theists must either reject the claim of God’s omnipotence or admit that an omnipotent God would be responsible for evil, including moral evil. I respond that Aquinas’s distinction between physical and moral evil moves beyond the process position and avoids the conclusion that God’s omnipotence must be abandoned. I argue that (1) the process position does not take proper account of Aquinas’s claim that the cause of evil is a negation and (2) the initial criticism relies on a distinction between moral and physical evil that process philosophy cannot make.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 3
A. T. Nuyen Confucian Ethics as Role-Based Ethics
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For many commentators, Confucian ethics is a kind of virtue ethics. However, there is enough textual evidence to suggest that it can be interpreted as an ethics based on rules, consequentialist as well as deontological. Against these views, I argue that Confucian ethics is based on the roles that make an agent the person he or she is. Further, I argue that in Confucianism the question of what it is that a person ought to do cannot be separated from the question of what it is to be a person, and that the latter is answered in terms of the roles that arise from the network of social relationships in which a person stands. This does not mean that Confucian ethics is unlike anything found in Western philosophy. Indeed, I show that many Western thinkers have advanced a view of ethics similar to the Confucian ethics as I interpret it.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 3
Richard DeWitt, R. James Long Richard Rufus’s Reformulations of Anselm’s Proslogion Argument
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In a Sentences Commentary written about 1250 the Franciscan Richard Rufus subjects Anselm’s argument for God’s existence in his Proslogion to the most trenchant criticism since Gaunilon wrote his response on behalf of the “fool.” Anselm’s argument is subtle but sophistical, claims Rufus, because he fails to distinguish between signification and supposition. Rufus therefore offers five reformulations of the Anselmian argument, which we restate in modern formal logic and four of which we claim are valid, the fifth turning on a possible scribal error. Rufus’s final conclusion is that the formulation in Proslogion, chapter 3, is convincing, but not that of chapter 2.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 3
Aaron Szymkowiak Hutcheson’s Painless Imagination and the Problem of Moral Beauty
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A peculiar feature of Hutcheson’s system is his claim that there exist no original pains in the imagination, and hence no real displeasures concerning form or beauty. This position, when set against a clear emphasis upon the pains of the moral sense in apprehending evil, seems to render tenuous his frequent analogies between the experiences of beauty and goodness. In light of this apparent discrepancy in Hutcheson’s argument, the repeated use of the term “moral beauty” presents interpretive difficulties, particularly on the matter of whether, and in what way, goodness is itself a species of beauty. These problems can be surmounted by way of close attention to Hutcheson’s connection and ordering of the various “senses.” On the present interpretation, Hutcheson denies formal displeasure aspart of a broader theological argument concerning the moral function of the imagination. On this view, “moral beauty” is a special type of imaginative pleasure.
book reviews and notices
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 3
Thomas Sherman, S.J. Aristotle on Teleology—Monte Ransome Johnson
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 3
Glenn Statile The Difficult Good: A Thomistic Approach to Moral Confl ict and Human Happiness—Daniel McInerny
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 47 > Issue: 3
Torin Alter The Nature of Consciousness—Mark Rowlands
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