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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 48 > Issue: 4
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 48 > Issue: 4
Ben Levey Truth, Identity, and Correspondence in Hegel’s Critique of Judgment
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Hegel, it has been claimed, conceives of truth as material. Such a conception of truth was far from dominant in the nineteenth century, and Hegel’s championing of it might be misinterpreted as indicating a willfully anachronistic, pre-Critical streak in his thought. I argue that this is not the case by exploring a principal motivating factor for Hegel’s position on truth. This factor is a problem concerning the general form of judgment—a problem that, for Hegel, precludes object-based correspondence from functioning as truth. Far from being willfully anachronistic or pre-Critical, Hegel’s conception of truth proves to be intimatelylinked to and informed by Kant’s Critical project.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 48 > Issue: 4
Patrick Stokes “Interest” in Kierkegaard’s Structure of Consciousness
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Kierkegaard’s identification of “consciousness” with “interest” (interesse) in his unfinished work Johannes Climacus adds a distinctive dimension to his phenomenology of subjectivity. Commentators, however, have largely identified interesse with lidenskab (“passion”), a conflation I argue to be mistaken, or have otherwise failed to note the structural implications of interesse for Kierkegaard’s account of cognition. I draw out these implications and argue that the Climacan account of interest as the experience of finding ourselves in-between ideality and reality implies, in the context of Kierkegaard’s trichotomous ontology of consciousness, a form of non-thetic self-referentiality built into cognition itself. This self-referentiality also has the intriguing implication of making consciousness itself inherently teleological.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 48 > Issue: 4
Tim Schoettle The Shocking Non Sequitur
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Analytic philosophy and phenomenology represent two major movements in the study of the mind. Both developed in the twentieth century, having roots that go back well before. Even though the two schools of thought have been in dialogue in the past, they are currently at an impasse. In this paper, I examine the origin of this impasse and suggest that at a crucial point in the conversation, right when the issues were clearly articulated and there was broad agreement on the key questions, analytic philosophy abruptly changed the subject. Early analytic philosophers, like Carnap and Schlick, sought to establish a sharp distinction between the objective content of one’s claims and beliefs and what is merely subjective or perspectival. Phenomenologists denied this distinction. When efforts to defend the distinction failed, analytic philosophy took the distinction to be obvious and in no need of defense. I call this a shocking non sequitur.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 48 > Issue: 4
Kym Maclaren The Role of Emotion in an Existential Education: Insights from Hegel and Plato
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Emotion is usually conceived as playing a relatively external role in education: either it is raw material reshaped by rational practices, or it merely motivates intellectual reasoning. Drawing upon the philosophy of Hegel and Plato’s Socrates, I argue, however, that education is a process of existential transformation and that emotion plays an essential, internal role therein. Through an analysis of Hegel’s master and slave dialectic, I argue that emotions have their own logic and that an individual can be propelled to increasingly rational emotional stances (her emotions can be educated) by the demands of the emotional situationitself, even in the absence of any intellectual reasoning or rational training. Appealing also to the structure and content of Socrates’ conversations, I argue that intellectual reasoning can lead to self-overcoming only insofar as it involves a particular emotional orientation towards the emotional challenges of genuine learning, that is, insofar as it is “conscientious reasoning.”
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 48 > Issue: 4
José Tomás Alvarado The Manifestation Argument Reconsidered
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Dummett’s Manifestation Argument against realism attempts to show that a realist conception of meaning cannot explain the understanding of truth-conditions transcendent to evidence. In this work the general structure of the argument is discussed along with several objections to it. This examination finds that the anti-realist is committed to a deflationary conception of the normative character of meaning that is unpalatable. This essay contends that the argument in its present form cannot have the metaphysical consequences it claims (at least not without begging the question).
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 48 > Issue: 4
Robert Currie The Antinaturalist Turn and Augustine’s Nullification of Will
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Arendt and others have regarded Augustine as “the first philosopher of the Will,” considered in a broadly naturalistic sense. However, the Stoicism that influenced the young Augustine has a better claim to have “invented” such a will. His own thinking about will was profoundly affected by the Neoplatonism that facilitated his reconversion to Christianity. On the one hand, Augustine envisaged the near negation of will through the irrationality of sin and the fall. On the other, he came to believe that through grace will could be re-identified with charity and with reason, human and divine. From a philosophical point of view, he thus rationalized, and in effect nullified, the concept of will with which he began.
book reviews and notices
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 48 > Issue: 4
Stephen Chamberlain Intentionality and Semiotics: A Story of Mutual Fecundation
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 48 > Issue: 4
John D. Gilroy The Drama of Possibility: Experience as the Philosophy of Culture
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 48 > Issue: 4
Roberta Bayer George Grant: A Guide to His Thought
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