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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
William Franke On the Poetic Truth that is Higher than History: Porphyry and the Philosophical Criticism of Literature
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Porphyry‘s “On the Cave of the Nymphs” inaugurates a style of philosophicoallegorical interpretation of literary texts that flourished in antiquity and finds analogues in criticism down to the present. It is distinguished by its use of literary interpretation to think through speculative problems of philosophy and theology. Although it became suspect in terms of Enlightenment philological principles prescribing interpretation of the text “on its own terms,” this kind of criticism reveals the originally philosophical motives and purpose of literary criticism and restores to literature the vocation of disclosing a properly poetic truth higher than that of fact or history. The history of this type of speculative criticism stemming from Porphyry‘s reading of Homer is traced forward through Latin allegorical readings of epic revolving around Virgil. This itinerary highlights the perennial and inevitable tensions between philological and philosophical approaches to interpreting literature as a revelation of truth.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Jonathan J. Sanford Are You Man Enough? Aristotle and Courage
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There are four features to Aristotle’s account of courage that appear peculiar when compared to our own intuitions about this virtue: (1) his account of courage seems not, on its surface, to fit a eudaimonist model, (2) courage is restricted to a surprisingly small number of actions, (3) this restriction, among other things, excludes women and non-combatant men from ever exercising this virtue, and (4) courage is counted as virtuous because of its nobility and beauty. In this paper I explore Aristotle’s account of courage while being attentive to these features, and conclude with a brief consideration of how one might, without ignoring the peculiarities of his own treatment, apply Aristotle’s account of courage to a wider range of actions and actors than he would allow by employing analogoussenses of the terms “life” and “death.”
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Chad Engelland Unmasking the Person
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By showing how the person appears, this paper calls into question the Cartesian prejudice that restricts appearance to objects. The paper recapitulates the origin of the term “person,” which originally designated the masks and characters donned by actors and only subsequently came to designate each particular human being. By concealing a face, the mask establishes a character who speaks with words of his own. The mask points to the face and to speech as ways the person appears. It belongs to the very nature of the person not only to appear but also to be aware of how one appears, and to have the ability to modulate thatappearance as the situation requires. This ability means one thing in art and another in life, and the paper explores the significance of this contrast.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Steven J. Jensen Getting Inside the Acting Person
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John Finnis claims that in order to judge actions we must approach them from the perspective of the acting person, so that the moral evaluation of actions appears to become private. This paper examines Elizabeth Anscombe’s claim that interior intentions can be discovered through exterior actions. Because deliberation is shaped by the causal features of the world, these causal structures can, when viewed from the outside, serve as a window into the private life of the mind. Therefore, we can usually determine someone’s intention through his observable actions, so that the moral character of actions can become public by way of signs. Causal connections are both effects of intention and causes of intention. Neither of these relations by itself serves as an adequate sign of intention, but the combination of these two (causal structures both as effects and as causes of intention) can serve as signs of intention.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Julie Piering Irony and Shame in Socratic Ethics
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Socrates is both the first thoroughgoing moral philosopher and the first to employ irony as a philosophical tool. These innovative and foundational aspects of Socratic philosophy, however, lead to apparent inconsistencies and worrisome interactions. Socrates is charged with making his interlocutors look foolish, arrogant, self-serving, or ignorant. Worse still, he seems aware of these reactions. If Socrates knows his methods stir resentment, why does he continue with them? Furthermore, how should we view irony in light of Socratic ethics? I argue that Socrates uses irony and shame to bring about the desire for moral improvement. Socratic irony is of the riddling variety and the shame that it produces is not intended to belittle the interlocutor’s sense of self. Instead, shame is an appropriate response to the realization that one’s life is unexamined and possibly vicious. Therefore, the real problem with Socratic irony lies not with its use, but its failure rate.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Thomas L. Gwozdz Metaphysics and Ethics: Levinas, Clarke, and Maritain
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For Emmanuel Levinas the foundation of the moral “ought” is an important question. He is skeptical, however, about using human reason or any sort of metaphysics to ground ethics. Instead he resorts to the human face as to what motivates a person to act ethically toward another person. Levinas argues that it is the nature of the human face to oblige anyone to act in an ethical way. In short, the human face commands one to be ethical. I will argue that the metaphysics of being according to W. Norris Clarke and Jacques Maritain provide a corrective to Levinas’s metaphysical skepticism. Using Clarke’s metaphysics of person as the fullest expression of what it means to be, I maintain that what shines forth in the human face is the very depths of the human person. What grounds the ethical “ought” is the person. The human face is only the surface through which a deeper reality resonates. In this way, I argue for a metaphysical foundation for ethics.
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8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Mary Ellen Waithe Adoration and Annihilation: The Convent Philosophy of Port-Royal
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Curtis Hancock The Writings of Charles De Koninck
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 4
Glenn Statile Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science
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