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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Sarah Scott Knowing Otherness: Martin Buber’s Appropriation of Nicholas of Cusa
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Martin Buber wrote his 1904 dissertation on Nicholas of Cusa, but the relationship between the two has been little studied. This article focuses on four ways in which Buber appropriated Cusa’s ideas. (1) Cusa’s theory of participation argues for the absolute worth of the individual, foreshadowing Buber’s ethics of actualization. (2) Buber takes Cusa’s model of how one may know God as other through “learned ignorance” and applies it to how one may know and adequately respond to beings as others in his distinction between “I-Thou” and “I-It” relations. (3) Buber employs Cusa’s term “coincidence of opposites” to describe what happens in dialogue. Seeing the coincidence of opposites moves subjects to adopt intersubjective perspectives and give up unhealthy relations of conflict. (4) Buber’s 1938 criticism of Cusa for maintaining that selves evolve in isolation illuminates Buber’s creation of his own dialogic philosophy.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Kenneth Noe Intensive Magnitudes, Temporality, and Sensus Communis in Kant’s Aesthetics
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I offer a critique of Melissa Zinkin’s reading of Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment. She argues that in judgments of taste the imagination is freed from its determinate relation with the understanding because the form of intuition in which beauty is apprehended is different from the form of intuition employed in determinate judgment. By distinguishing between an extensive and intensive form of intuition, this interpretation is able to explain why the apprehension of beauty cannot be subsumed under a concept. But I contest Zinkin’s identification of the sensus communis with this intensive form of intuition. I then substantiate two interrelated claims: (1) that we can account for the genesis of the sensus communis by distinguishing between an intensive and an extensive form of time, and (2) that we can avoid making the sensus communis atemporal by showing that it resides within an intensive form of time as a condition for its possibility, thereby structuring Kant’s account of the sensus communis securely within the critical framework.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Richard T. Kim Human Nature and Animal Nature: The Horak Debate and Its Philosophical Significance
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Philosophical investigation of human nature has a long, distinguished, and multifaceted history. In the East some of the most heated philosophical disputes pertaining to issues concerning moral self-cultivation centered on disagreements about human nature. Within the Neo-Confucian tradition that developed out of Korea, issues concerning human nature took center stage in a dispute now known as the “Horak Debate” that began in the eighteenth century. In this paper I seek to introduce the Horak Debate to contemporary philosophers by (a) historically situating the debate within the tradition of Korean Neo-Confucianism, (b) providing an outline of the Horak Debate and identifying its central points of contention, and (c) demonstrating the debate’s philosophical significance by revealing how some of its key issues are rooted in disagreements that continue to concern contemporary philosophers.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
John F. Crosby Is Love a Value-Response? Dietrich von Hildebrand in Dialogue with John Zizioulas
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Metropolitan John Zizioulas has recently written a probing assessment of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s The Nature of Love. Zizioulas has thereby opened a dialogue between his own theological personalism and von Hildebrand’s phenomenological personalism. In this paper, I am at continuing this dialogue. I formulate three objections that I see Zizioulas raising to von Hildebrand’s claim that love exists as a value-response. In considering them, I try to eliminate misunderstandings, to identify areas of agreement and disagreement, and to show where each of these thinkers has something to gain from the encounter with the other. Most of all, I aim at working towards an understanding of love that incorporates the insights of both von Hildebrand and Zizioulas.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Amihud Gilead Self-Referentiality and Two Arguments Refuting Physicalism
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I suggest two valid and sound arguments refuting physicalism, whether it is reductive or supervenience physicalism. The first argument is a self-referential one that is not involved with any self-referential inconsistency. The second argument demonstrates that physicalism is inescapably involved with self-referential inconsistency. Both arguments show that arguments and propositions (to be distinguished from sentences) are not physical existents. They are rather mental existents that are not reducible to any physical existent and do not supervene on anything physical. From these two arguments it clearly follows that any physicalist argument or proposition, as a mental existent, is self-refuting.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Federica De Felice On Causation and Infinitive Modes in Spinoza’s Philosophical System
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The theory of infinite modes is not only one of the most controversial points in the philosophy of Spinoza, but also a kind of crossroads concept on whose clarification or interpretation the definition of his philosophy’s overall meaning depends. This article aims to examine Spinoza’s theory of infinite modes, mediate and immediate, in relation to other elements of Spinoza’s theory. Through an analysis of Spinoza’s writings, it proposes an inner reconstruction of the theory in order to ensure the consistency of the difficulties pointed out by several critics and to provide a solution. Spinoza’s identification of immediate infinite in motion, rest, and infinite intellect involves the questions of “what” they really are and what their role is within his system. About mediate infinite modes, Spinoza talks very little and only in terms of facies totius universi. This “silence” is closely linked to the “false” problem of the deduction/mediation of the finite from the infinite, a problem for which Spinoza himself was partly responsible by his statements on motion and the need to analyze the topic in more depth.
contemporary currents
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Raoni Padui Heidegger on the Nonsense of Objects: A Historical Backdrop to a Textual Ambiguity
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Heidegger’s position regarding the independent existence of entities has been a matter of considerable controversy. On the one hand he appears to defend something resembling transcendental or Kantian idealism without the notion of a thing in itself. On the other he upholds the independent existence of entities in their ontic dimension. The resultant interpretive controversy primarily pertains to how one can make the Dasein-dependence of being cohere with the Dasein-independence of entities. In this paper I argue that this philosophical difficulty arises from a textual ambiguity in the notion of Vorhandensein, which is used to designate two different senses of objectivity: one of the innerworldly existence of objectified entities and another regarding their bare existence independent of their worldliness. After tracing the historical context for this ambiguity, I argue that Heidegger believes that entities unlike Dasein are inherently bare of meaning or nonsensical in themselves.
book reviews
9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. From Eden to Eternity: Creations of Paradise in the Later Middle Ages. By Alastair Minnis
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Stephen R. Palmquist Kant and the Meaning of Religion. By Terry F. Godlove
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11. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Siobhan Nash-Marshall The Problem of Evil. By Daniel Speak
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12. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Sarah Borden Sharkey Lived Experience from the Inside Out: Social and Political Philosophy in Edith Stein. By Antonio Calcagno
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13. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Books Received
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14. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Index for Volume 55
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15. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
About Our Contributors
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16. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
W. Matthews Grant The Privation Account of Moral Evil: A Defense
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The privation account of moral evil holds that the badness of morally bad acts consists not in the positive act itself or in any positive feature of the act but rather in the act’s lack of conformity to the moral standard. Traditionally recognized for its theological usefulness, the account has been the target of at least five recent objections. In this paper I offer a positive philosophical argument for the account and then show that the objections fail.
17. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
B. A. Worthington What Has Self-Reference to Do With Self-Consciousness?
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In the Tractatus Russell’s caveat against linguistic reflexivity becomes a caveat against reflective thought. The paper explores the relation between these. There is a connection, perhaps exemplified by 1789, between reflection on one’s assumptions and change (with, perhaps, consequent aporia). The same connection may be exemplified by violation of Russell’s system of levels (levels of generality and detail). Even though Russell never explored this area, they will be violated by interactions of the macroscopic and microscopic. These interactions, like the philosophical questioning of assumptions, are a source of change and instability, of the failure of assumptions or presuppositions, and with it of aporia. Russell’s system of levels precludes these. An aim of avoiding presupposition failure links type theory to “On Denoting.” It is likely that the resistance to reflexivity has its origin in Russell’s rejection of the philosophy of Hegel where reflective thought is the motor of historical development.
18. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
James M. Ambury Plato’s Conception of Soul as Intelligent Self-Determination
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This paper articulates two seemingly distinct but interrelated conceptions of soul in the Platonic corpus: soul as self-mover (the ontological soul) and soul as self-ruler (the ethical soul). It argues that Plato conceives of soul as a principle of intelligent self-determination. The dialogues in principal focus are the two in which the ontological soul and ethical soul are most manifest: the Phaedrus and the Laws. The article concludes with a brief reflection, by way of the Timaeus, on the relationship between soul thus understood and Plato’s sense of the importance of the care of the soul for the good life.
19. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Travis Dumsday How Divine Hiddenness Sheds Light on the Problem of Evil
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The problems of evil and of divine hiddenness are the two most prominent arguments for atheism in the contemporary literature on the philosophy of religion. But relatively little has been written on the possible relations between these two problems, and especially on whether a solution to one could shed light on a solution to the other. I explore this question here by arguing that a resolution to the hiddenness problem could help address the problem of evil, specifically by supplying a new counter-argument to a common objection raised against the free-will defense.
20. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
V. Martin Nemoianu Pascal on Divine Hiddenness
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This essay aims to reconstruct and defend Pascal’s account of divine hiddenness. In the first section I explain Pascal’s view that divine hiddenness is primarily a function of human volitional aversion and only secondarily a result of God’s intentional action. In the following section I evaluate the primary sense of hiddenness by considering Pascal’s response to the objection that divine goodness requires and divine power makes possible God’s provision of evidence sufficient to overcome human volitional indisposition. While Pascal does think it possible for God to provide such evidence, he argues that this would unjustly harm human freedom and endanger human intellectual understanding. I conclude by addressing a weaker form of the objection through consideration of the second sense of divine hiddenness and Pascal’s surprising view that God’s intentional “hiding” is in fact a progressively deeper entry into the particulars of human history.