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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 1
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 1
Stephen Chamberlain, The Virtue of Fictional Wisdom: An Aristotelian-Thomistic Account
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This paper defends the cognitive value of literary fiction by offering an account of fictional truth and wisdom that is based upon Aristotelian-Thomistic principles. It first shows how Aristotle’s notion of understanding (sunesis) as an intellectual virtue provides the foundation for the possibility of fictional truth and wisdom. Second, it considers how Aquinas’s notion of the cogitative faculty or ratio particularis elucidates the faculty that is employed in the act of perception (aísthēsis) that is essential to the virtue of understanding. Third, the author shows how Martha Nussbaum’s contemporary account of deliberative imagination clarifies these classical notions of understanding and the cogitative faculty. Finally, the author argues that these central concepts, when connected to literary fiction, provide philosophical justification for the claim of fictional truth and in turn knowledge or wisdom.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 1
Tom Spencer, The Root of All Evil: On the Monistic Implications of Kant’s Religion
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In Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone Kant claims that human beings are radically evil and that this evil is to be regarded as both freely chosen and universal. Scholars have long struggled to makes sense of this paradoxical notion. In this paper I propose that the regulative concept of the supersensible as presented in the third Critique can be legitimately extended to cover the mysterious “subjective ground” of radical evil. More specifically, I argue that the symmetry between radical evil (the appearance of law-like universality within the realm of freedom) and purposive nature (the appearance of self-determination within the realm of natural law) warrants the notion of a common supersensible principle underlying both phenomena that is neither nature nor freedom but that motivates their mutual incursions. I call this doctrine of reflective judgment “supersensible monism.”
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 1
Anthony T. Flood, Aquinas on Self-Love and Love of God: The Foundations for Subjectivity and its Perfection
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This paper addresses the connections between love of self and love of God in terms of their impact on personal subjectivity according to the thought of Thomas Aquinas. I argue that Aquinas’s understanding of self-love illuminates the experience of oneself as a person. Part of this argument relies on Aquinas’s notion that love of self is more basic than love of others. Aquinas further affirms that one ought to love God more than oneself. I explore the implications of this claim for my interpretation concerning personal self-experience. I maintain that our participation in God causes a pull toward goodness and God within one’s experience of self. Also, friendship with God through charity offers the highest fulfillment of self-experience.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 1
Masaya Honda, Individualizing Virtues: Comparing Kitarō Nishida’s Normative Naturalism with Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism
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This paper compares two philosophical views from vastly different intellectual traditions: the views typical of neo-Aristotelian naturalism and the views that Kitarō Nishida describes in his An Inquiry into the Good. I concentrate on the following points. (1) Nishida and neo-Aristotelian naturalists share the view that the mind tends to construct experience as it characterizes phenomena. It evaluates those that fulfill this tendency positively and those that fail to fulfill it negatively. Moral judgment is one manifestation of this tendency. (2) This allows both approaches to claim that the natural goodness/defect that characterizes human beings results from the capacity of rational choice, and that normalcy in developing and exercising this capacity provides criteria for evaluating the moral status of individuals. (3) Nevertheless, they diverge on whether or not the application of these criteria is agent-neutral or agent-relative. Based on these considerations, I argue that Nishida’s view is free from a major difficulty that the neo-Aristotelian naturalist encounters.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 1
Stephen Napier, Thought Experiments, the Reliability of Intuitions, and Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research
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It is common in bioethical discussion to present thought experiments or cases in order to construct an argument. Some thought experiments are quite illuminating, and ethical theorizing will often appeal at some point to one’s intuitions. But there are cases in which thought experiments are useless or do not contribute to the argument. This article considers cases presented in the context of stem cell research that are destructive of human embryos. I argue that certain popular cases that are meant to motivate the view that such research is permissible either are dialectically useless or do not contribute to the argument. By dialectically useless, I mean that the cases analyzed here yield intuitions in people who are already committed to the permissibility of such research. I end with some reflections that challenge the reliability of our intuitions on applied ethics issues by suggesting that thought experiments in this field are dubious from the start. My argument should not be read to support moral skepticism but to urge that our inquiries on applied issues requires certain intellectual virtues.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 1
Michelle Panchuk, Created and Uncreated Things: A Neo-Augustinian Solution to the Bootstrapping Problem
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Theistic activism and theistic conceptual realism attempt to relieve the tension between transcendent realism about universals and a strong aseity-sovereignty doctrine. Paradoxically, both theories seem to imply that God is metaphysically prior and metaphysically posterior to his own nature. In this paper I critique one attempt to respond to this worry and offer a neo-Augustinian solution in its place. I demonstrate that Augustine’s argument for forms as ideas in the mind of God strongly suggests that only created beings need universals to ground their character. For them, divine concepts can do all of the work that universals are typically invoked to do in the contemporary literature. An uncreated being’s character needs no such grounding and can be accounted for in terms of his own concepts. If this is correct, theists may be realists about universals while maintaining the traditional read of God’s aseity and sovereignty.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 1
Lydia L. Moland, Kant’s Politics in Context. By Reidar Maliks
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 1
Jeffrey Kinlaw, The Expansion of Autonomy: Hegel’s Pluralistic Philosophy of Action. By Christopher Yeomans
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 56 > Issue: 1
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics. By Jonathan J. Sanford
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