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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Artur Szutta, Moral Intuitions, Disagreement, and the Consensus Condition
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In this paper I focus on Roger Crisp’s objection to moral intuitionism. The objection is that in the face of disagreement, especially between ethical experts (understood here as epistemic peers), the mere fact of one’s having a moral intuition, even after reflection, is insufficient to hold a given moral belief. The core assumption of the objection is the consensus condition (or Sidgwick’s principle) according to which in the face of reasonable disagreement with one’s epistemic peers one should suspend one’s contested view. My goal is a critical analysis of this objection (with special attention paid to the idea of consensus condition). I offer five counter-arguments to show that Crisp’s argumentation is not conclusive. They are as follows: an argument from self-reference, from the doubt about the possibility of voluntarily suspending one’s judgment, from the priority of the first-person evidential basis, from epistemic luck, and from practical consequences of observing the consensus condition.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Fernando Martin De Blassi, Considerations on the Concept of Audacity (tólma) in Plotinus
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Within the Plotinian corpus the topic of audacity provides a key for explaining the hypostatic constitution of what proceeds from the One and advances towards the formation of the sensitive world. This essay will try to settle some questions about the role of audacity within the corpus of Plotinus. Doing so will allow us to argue for the following position. Even if the generation of a being separate and distinct from the One includes the notion of otherness and therefore of multiplicity, this action—a product of the Intellect’s daring—does not imply dispersion but only the constitution of a living being able to develop by its own strength the richness already contained in its germinal potency.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Scott Roniger, Speech and Being in Aristotle’s Metaphysics
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In this paper I argue that Aristotle presents speech (logos) as the dynamic manifestation of the being of things and hence truth. By highlighting the role of speech, I attempt to amplify what it means to discuss being-as-the-true, one of the four senses of being that Aristotle investigates in the Metaphysics. The paper unfolds in three sections. First, I survey some influential reflections on the theme of speech and being in Aristotle. In sections two and three, I consider portions of the Metaphysics that show the intimate connection between speech and being. The first comes from the opening book of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle discusses the manner in which technê is a kind of wisdom. The second passage comes from Metaphysics Book Γ, where Aristotle defends the so-called “principle of non-contradiction.”
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Michelle Brady, Acting for the Public Good: Locke on Freedom and Judgment
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In the Second Treatise of Government, Locke clearly intends to construct a political order that limits the harm a tyrannical ruler can do, but his account of prerogative also effectively limits the good a ruler can do. If political and paternal power are distinct, then the standard for legitimate rule is not the public good but the good as the public understands it. The significance of this distinction becomes clear when we recognize Locke’s pessimism about our ability to adequately judge the public good. Locke’s reliance on the public’s judgment as the final authority, despite his expectation that we will judge badly, can be explained in practical or pedagogical terms. He further suggests that the limits to a ruler’s power follow from inherent limits on what human beings can know about the good.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Keith Lemna, Enstatic Phenomenology and the Meaning of Suffering
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This paper explores the question of the meaning of suffering by comparing the work of Michel Henry with that of Max Scheler. Henry’s “enstatic phenomenology” is proposed as an approach to existential disclosure that deepens our understanding of the paradoxical character of human affect in light of a phenomenology of Christ by delving into the mystery of suffering and following a path of exploration opened up by Max Scheler in his seminal essay “The Meaning of Suffering.” I suggest that our understanding of suffering needs a phenomenology of sacrifice to make possible the integration of enstatic and ecstatic ways of phenomenologically disclosing affect.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Tamar Levanon, Reid on Leibniz’s Monad and the Conceptual Priority of the Whole
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In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Thomas Reid draws an analogy between his notion of the self and Leibniz’s notion of a monad. Reid formulates this analogy in order to highlight what he considers to be the essential feature of the self: its unified and indivisible structure. This paper considers Reid’s analogy in the specific context of the diachronic aspect of substantial unity. Its focus is specifically on the role that the idea of continuity plays in establishing the unity and indivisibility of the entities in question (viz., the self and the monad). As part of the ongoing debate over Leibniz’s mature metaphysics of substance, this paper highlights the positive implication of Reid’s analysis of the self (usually viewed as a critical reaction to Locke and Hume) and its place within the early modern debate over the nature of substantial unity.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
John D. Gilroy, What Pragmatism Was. By F. Thomas Burke
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Brendan Sweetman, Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an Unmanned Military. Edited by Bradley Jay Strawser
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
James P. Iovino, Retrieving Apologetics. By Glenn B. Siniscalchi
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