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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Gene Fendt Socrates as the Mimesis of Piety in Republic
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The absence of any discussion of the virtue of piety in Plato’s Republic has been much remarked, but there are textual clues by which to recognize its importance for Plato’s construction and for the book’s intended effect. This dialogue is Socrates’s repetition, on the day after the first festival of Bendis, of a liturgical action that he undertook—at his own expense, at the “vote” of his “city”—on the previous day. Socrates’s activity in repeating it the next day is an “ethological” mimesis of properly pious liturgy. In the course of that liturgy we find that piety is specifically discussed, but in a (mimetic) mirror, and darkly (in its absence). The mirror of piety is the laws about stories of the gods. The absence is in the (missing) discussion of the best city, that is, one above aristocracy.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Weijia Wang Three Necessities in Kant’s Theory of Taste: Necessary Universality, Necessary Judgment, and Necessary Free Harmony
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This paper argues that the structural obscurity in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment reflects his tacit employment of three correlated but distinct notions: necessity considered as the universal validity of the judgment of taste; necessity considered as a feature of the judgment itself; and necessity considered as a feature of the mental free harmony that obtains in judging certain forms with taste. These distinctions have not been sufficiently recognized by commentators so far. Clarification of these three notions can shed new light on the structure of the first part of Kant’s third Critique as well as on debates over the plausibility of his claims regarding taste.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Vlastimil Vohánka Material Value-Ethics: Evaluating the Thought of Josef Seifert and John F. Crosby
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Josef Seifert and John F. Crosby are the two main proponents of applied material value-ethics. Both reject all forms of suicide and abortion. Seifert also explicitly rejects euthanasia, torture, destructive stem-cell research, genetic enhancement, in vitro fertilization, and contraception. Crosby explicitly rejects spousal in vitro fertilization and spousal contraception. In this essay I examine whether their case should be regarded as convincing. Against Seifert, and possibly also against Crosby, I show why it definitely should not.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Tim Black Action and Luck in the Kierkegaardian Ethical Project
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To see the ethical as a space that is immune to luck, it seems that we must see it as a space that is utterly inner, locked away inside the cabinet of consciousness. If, on the other hand, we wish to see the space of the ethical as extending into the world, it seems that we must see it as being vulnerable to luck. Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms steer us through this dilemma by extending the space of the ethical into the world while also inoculating it against luck. For Kierkegaard, an action is a single thing with two aspects, one under which it is seen in terms of movements of the will, and another under which it is seen in terms of movements in the world. Given the structure of the Kierkegaardian ethical project, these movements are immune to luck since they can always achieve their ethical aims: they can always count as doing what one’s ideal self would do.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Andrew Israelsen Imperatives of Right: The Essential Ambiguity in Kant’s Rechtslehre
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The relationship between Kant’s “Doctrine of Right” and his broader moral philosophy is a fraught one, with some readers insisting that the two domains are mutually supporting parts of a cohesive practical philosophy and others arguing for their conceptual and legislative independence. In this paper I investigate the reasons for this disparity and argue that both main interpretive camps are mistaken, for Kant’s Rechtslehre can neither be reconciled to his moral philosophy nor stand on its own. I argue that this failure results from Kant’s confused attempt to define the sphere of right as one that functions independently of (yet analogously to) the moral domain through the construction of non-moral yet categorical imperatives. The result is a fundamental tension in Kant’s text that can only be solved through either collapsing juridical duties into broad moral duties or denying any categorical status to duties of right.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Christopher James Wolfe, Jonathan Polce, S.J. A Response to John Rawls’s Critique of Loyola on the Human Good
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In this paper we shall consider whether John Rawls’s treatment of Ignatius of Loyola is a fair one. Rawls claims in A Theory of Justice that Catholic theology (and Ignatius’s theology in particular) aims at a “dominant end” of serving God that overrides other moral considerations. Rawls argues that dominant end views lead to a disfigured self and a disregard for justice. We do not question Rawls on the normative issue of whether dominant end conceptions are untenable, but rather on his factual claim that Ignatian spirituality and Catholic theology in general presupposes a dominant end view as he defines it. The Loyola whom Rawls attacks in Theory of Justice is a straw-man. Ignatian spirituality and Catholic theology in general embraces something closer to an inclusive end view, since it argues that several different ways of virtuous living can lead to happiness.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Sophie Berman The A Priori in the Thought of Descartes: Cognition, Method and Science. By Jan Palkoska
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Justin M. Anderson Aquinas on Virtue: A Causal Reading. By Nicholas Austin, S.J.
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 58 > Issue: 3
Aaron Segal David Shatz: Torah, Philosophy, and Culture. Edited by Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Aaron W. Hughes
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