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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Ilaria Acquaviva Francisco Suárez on Metaphysics of Modality: An Actualist and Essentialist View on Real Possible Beings
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In this paper I explore modal metaphysics in regard to Francisco Suárez’s idea of real being (ens inquantum ens reale), in order to track down an early model of the relationship between synchronical alternative states of affairs and the temporal frequency paradigm. In doing so this article will offer an interpretation of Suárez’s doctrine of eternal truths as found in Disputationes Metaphysicae d. 31, c. 12, § 38–§ 47. I argue that Suárez’s modal theory of real possibilities and logical (im)possibilities should be regarded as an actualist and essentialist form of modalism.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Jessy Jordan Natural Normativity and the Authority-of-Nature Challenge
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Proponents of natural normativity maintain that the moral evaluation of human beings shares a certain common conceptual pattern with the evaluation of other living things. The adequacy of this analogy has been challenged, with opponents arguing that because humans are rational, there is a gap between what is natural and what is normative for humans. Rational creatures, the argument goes, are importantly different from non-rational living things in that reason includes the ability to step back from what is natural and ask whether it is good that our nature is constituted as it is. Micah Lott has attempted a response to this challenge. After evaluating his proposal, I offer a reply that attempts to resolve an important dilemma, namely, that the naturalist either lacks a satisfying response to the authority-of-nature challenge or is forced to abandon naturalism.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Dariusz Sagan The Nature of Design Inference and the Epistemic Status of Intelligent Design
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This article considers the main methodological objections against the theory of intelligent design. In general, they claim that it lacks a scientific character and they emphasize that design cannot be detected using scientific tools. The critics focus on showing that intelligent design violates various methodological criteria. In response to these objections, this article examines the methodological claim made by its proponents that the characteristic effects of the designer’s activity do provide a sufficient basis for inferring design. This paper also argues that the procedure of inferring that a certain feature has been designed by a supernatural being does not differ in principle from design-detection procedures in other spheres of research.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
James Dominic Rooney, O.P. Grounding Relations Are Not Unified: Aquinas and Heil versus Schaffer
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Jonathan Schaffer, among others, has argued that metaphysics should deal primarily with relations of “grounding.” I will follow John Heil in arguing that this view of metaphysics is problematic, for it draws on ambiguous notions of grounding and fundamentality that are unilluminating as metaphysical explanations. I take Heil’s objections to presuppose that “grounding” relations do not form a natural class, where a natural class is one where some member of that class has (analytic or contingent a posteriori) priority among others and explains order among other members in the class. To strengthen Heil’s criticism that “grounding” is a non-natural class of relations, I will draw on an unlikely ally. Thomas Aquinas’s “analogy of being” doctrine, if accurate, offers reasons that no categorical relations (like grounding relations) form a natural class.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
William M. Webb Petitionary Prayer for the Dead and the Boethian Concept of a Timeless God
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The practice of prayer for the dead has been criticized by some Christians on the grounds that it is useless (on the assumption that a postmortem change in spiritual state is impossible) and even sinful inasmuch as it wills a state of affairs contrary to that which God has already ordained. In this article, I challenge these arguments using a Boethian or Augustinian conception of God’s relationship to time. If prayers from all times are perceived by God in a tenseless present, I argue that prayer for the dead becomes no more problematic than petitionary prayer about the future.
contemporary currents
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Jeremy D. Wilkins Lonergan’s Isomorphism of Knowing and Being: A Reply to Gaven Kerr
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Gaven Kerr argues that Lonergan is a metaphysical realist but follows an inherently idealist method. Furthermore, Kerr claims, Lonergan’s isomorphism of cognitional and ontological elements does not hold, because ontological act is not parallel to cognitional judgment. In so arguing, however, Kerr conflates ontological act with efficient causality, misunderstands the nature of the parallel asserted by Lonergan’s isomorphism, and involves himself in a priori speculation about the implications of Lonergan’s method. An efficient cause is an extrinsic principle, whereas “act” names an intrinsic constituent of contingent being. The parallel between ontological and cognitional composition, moreover, and the isomorphism of ontological and cognitional elements, are subtler than Kerr appreciates. The suspicion, finally, that Lonergan’s method is somehow inherently idealist is idle and not borne out by the facts.
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Gaven Kerr A Response to Wilkins
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In my paper, ‘Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Isomorphism between Intellect and Reality’ I argued that Lonergan’s notion of the isomorphism between judgement and being cannot be correct if the being involved is Thomist esse. In his paper Wilkins criticises me for this and he disagrees with a number of my conclusions. In this response I engage with Wilkins’s criticism and defend my original position.
book reviews
9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Silvia Carli Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics. By Eve Rabinoff
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 59 > Issue: 1
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession. By T. A. Cavanaugh
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