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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3

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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
Fiorella Tomassini

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In the Doctrine of Right Kant holds that the classical Ulpian command honeste vive is a juridical duty that has the particular feature (in contrast to the other juridical duties) of being internal. In this paper I explore the reasons why Kant denies that the duty to be an honorable human being comprises an ethical obligation (as, for example, Pufendorf and Achenwall thought) and conceives it as a juridical duty to oneself. I will argue that, despite the conceptual problems that the systematical incorporation of this type of duty into the doctrine of morals might entail, these reasons are coherent. The fulfillment of the duty honeste vive involves a coercion to the self but at the same time does not necessarily imply the adoption of a moral end.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
Winnie Sung

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This essay analyses the Confucian conception of xin, an attribute that broadly resembles what we would ordinarily call trustworthiness. More specifically, it provides an analysis of the psychology of someone who is xin and highlights a feature of the Confucian conception of trustworthiness: the trustworthy person has to ensure that there is a match between her self-presentation and the way she is. My goal is not to argue against any of the existing accounts of trustworthiness but to draw on Confucian insights so as to shed light on features of trustworthiness that are overlooked in current discussions. I hope to show that the Confucian conception of trustworthiness puts more emphasis on the way a trustworthy person actively tries to make sure another’s dependency on her is not unwarranted than on how the trustworthy person responds to the one who gives trust.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
Josef Novák

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Since the beginning of the twentieth century, abstract art has formed a central stream of modern art. To attain purely aesthetic goals, many avant-garde artists turned painting in particular into a pursuit of breaking off the relations with natural forms. Instead of copying them, they have merely relied on their inner visions. When externalizing these visions directly on the canvas or sheets of paper, the practitioners of abstract art have inadvertently used the phenomenological method and its epoché. In this essay I argue that the philosophies of Kupka and Husserl are largely compatible. This is not because the two use the same terminology, but because they virtually mean and do the same thing in their respective fields. Even where there are significant differences between them, these are not as great as it might at first seem. In the essay’s conclusion I sum up some of the most significant implications their compatible theories have for the philosophy of art and for various theories of art today.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
K. Lauriston Smith

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There is a significant lack of clarity among critical realists in the language they use to discuss perception. In this paper I illustrate this lack of clarity and then argue that a critical realist view of perception is best understood as conceiving of perception as an active process in direct contact with the world. I connect this view with the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s views of perception and embodiment and argue that seeing this point has implications for our understanding of perception by offering a path through the direct/indirect debate. It suggests challenges both to the definition of knowledge as justified true belief and to the reduction of knowledge to effectiveness. It bears on the question of truth insofar as it challenges the view that truth can be reduced to propositions.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
Travis Dumsday

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Structural realism has re-emerged as part of the debate between scientific realism and antirealism. Since then it has branched into several different versions, notably epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism. The latter theory (which itself has now divided into competing formulations) is still an important perspective in the realism/antirealism dialectic; however, its significance has expanded well beyond that debate. Today ontic structural realism is also an important player in the metaphysics of science literature, engaging with a variety of ontological questions. One of these pertains to the basic categories of ontology, with the proponents of ontic structural realism typically advocating a radical rethinking of how to view substance and relation while calling into question the (allegedly) traditional privileging of the former over and against the latter. In this paper I assess ontic structural realism from the perspective of two major systems: Thomism and Scotism. I argue that the basic commitments of Thomism allow for some surprising convergences with ontic structural realism, while Scotism does not.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
George J. Aulisio

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I show that Neo-Confucianism is practiced in two ways: (1) deontologically and (2) as a virtue ethical theory. When fully appreciated, Neo-Confucianism is a virtue ethical theory, but to set out on the path of the sage and behave like a junzi, Neo-Confucianism must first be practiced deontologically. I show this by examining the importance of Neo-Confucian metaphysics to ethical practice and by drawing out the major practical differences between “lesser learning” and “higher learning.” In my view, Neo-Confucianism can be practiced deontologically because some adherents may never move to practicing Neo-Confucianism as a virtue theory.

book reviews

8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
Peter N. Bwanali, S.J.

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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
Gary M. Gurtler, S.J.

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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
Aaron Pidel, S.J.

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11. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.

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12. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 60 > Issue: 3

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